A cartoon to illustrate a Taef principle

In 1989, the Lebanese parliamentarians convened in Taef, with financial encouragements from Rafik Hariri. In this Saudi Arabian city, they spawned an agreement, the Document of National Accord supposed to provide the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. Have a glimpse at the document, and check a good commentary for backdrop information. But let’s get to the crux of the matter.

In 1989, the country was in the hands of five militias (PSP, Amal, Lebanese Forces, Hezbollah, SLA), two foreign armies (Israeli, Syrian) and a divided Lebanese army. These militias are only mentioned once in the document that speaks of “disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced”. This mention focuses on militias as a weapon bearing group. Sure, this is its defining quality, but militias are much more than that. Militias are power centers, networks, they have a human, an economical, a territorial, a symbolic and in this case an ethnic dimension. These dimensions are not mentioned in the Taef Agreement which hides one basic principle: The militias, after decommissioning will be recognised as political parties, and will safeguard their positions within government (a process that began in the 1980s with the Rachid Karami lead National Unity government).

Three of those militias are now pillars of the quadripartite oligarchy, two other decommissioned militias are junior partners of the oligarchy, and so is the former head of the Lebanese Army.

A very revealing affair (3): Gad Elmaleh & Lebanese Jewish Politics

Let’s cut to the chase (and cut the crap). The Gad Elmaleh affair reveals three things?

• The political function of rhetorical battles. Rhetorical battles are an excellent tool for mobilisation. They grant politicians room for overbidding (with no political cost). It allows people to express and affirm key values (not necessarily held, but at least celebrated). In a polarised setting, it affirms, confirms and “justifies” the separation between the two groups.

Lastly, it has a very satisfying emotional dynamic. In the beginning, it “wakes people up”, in this case, keeps them alert to the danger of Hezbollah (for March XIV) or to the danger of March XIV (for Hezbollah). Through overbidding, the tension builds up: “they are imposing cultural censorship on us” vs “they are pushing for cultural normalisation with Israel“). The more the tension builds up, the more it infiltrates the masses; people start repeating the politicians slogans, strengthening the framework that was set up for them… Frustrations are expressed… freely. Emotions become violent. Taboos fall. Accusations swell… Each and every one participating in this rhetorical battle feels he is winning it. Each person feels he has the better arguments. At this point, no one is listening to the other, and each is intoxicated by his own rhetoric, values, arguments… People and groups let off steam. And they feel relieved.

It’s a rhetorical battle, so nothing on the ground will change, nothing except the deepening of the divide between the two “battling” groups.

• A Lebanese jewish quagmire. Since the establishment of Israel, Lebanese officials seem to have  felt uncomfortable with Lebanon’s Jewish community. Unlike Morocco whose king (Hassan II) took a public stand affirming and reaffirming  the place Moroccan Jews held in Moroccan society, Lebanese officials have preferred to remain silent on that issue. Sure, the Lebanese security forces offered the community protection in times of war and tensions. The Kataeb party was quite vocal in its defence of Lebanese Jews, and Kamal Joumblatt seems to have offered some Beiruti-Jews shelter in newly formed fiefdom in 1967. But on the governmental level, Jews were pushed out of the public administration and the army, and the 1943 “national pact” offered them no public place. The country was being redefined as Christian-Muslim.

Hypocrisy denounced in a hypocritical cartoon

In the 1960s, anti-Israeli rhetoric started soaring. Lebanese politicians engaged in this new rhetorical battle and some really excelled in it (ex: Kamal Joumblatt). Things haven’t changed today. Lebanese politicians are proud to boast that “Lebanon will be the last arab country to sign peace with Israel“. And they keep on reminding the Lebanese that “Israel is our natural enemy“, that “Israel is Lebanon’s antithesis“, and that “Israel is bound on destroying Lebanon because we’re their competitors“. This empty rhetoric isn’t Hezbollah’s (absolute) privilege. It is expressed by Lebanese politicians of all sides. March XIV® politicians regularly engage in “anti-israeli” or “anti-zionist” overbidding (c.f. my former posts  1 2 on the inoperative distinction between “Jews” and “Zionists”). Two days ago, Fares Soueid (a Lebanese politician who hasn’t been able to reclaim his mother’s seat in Parliament since Syria’s withdrawal) declared as secretary general of March XIV that the Gad Elmaleh affair serves the interest of Israel! This kind of overbidding certainly benefits Hezbollah and corners March XIV politicians because it prevents any alternative discourse on Israel, and comes across as insincere to many Lebanese.

• An orphan peace camp. It’s becoming quite clear that there is a growing number of Lebanese that is in favour of peace with Israel. They know that their communal leadership is in favour of peace with Israel (Hariri Senior, Jumblatt, Gemayel, Geagea and Aoun have all expressed this in one way or another at a given time), but they can plainly see that this leadership is engaged in anti-Israeli rhetoric and paying lip service to the importance of resistance to Israel and the Palestinian cause.

This growth of Peaceniks is noticeable from the growing interest Lebanese are having in Israeli issues, the growing consumption of Israeli cultural products (music, films, literature), the Lebanese readership of Haaretz, the growing interest in Judaism and Lebanon’s Jewish community… I personally believe that most of the people who are getting involved in this controversy and supporting Gad Elmaleh’s show in Beiteddine are such peaceniks.

So there is an obvious gap between the leadership (that hides its past and probably present ties with Israeli officials and engages in anti-Israeli rhetoric) and some groups of the population. This gap feeds frustrations. But instead of being rightly  expressed toward their hypercritical leadership, they are canalised and diverted toward Hezbollah (that defends values they don’t agree with), accusing it of being the reason behind Lebanon’s antagonism with Israel, and Israeli’s violent policy toward Lebanon. It takes a couple of minutes on the internet to verify the public support Gad Elmaleh offers to Israel. Insisting on his performance in Lebanon in a way reflects an unexpressed desire of normalisation with judaism, and what has become central to it, i.e. Israel.

A very revealing affair (2): Gad Elmaleh & the Lebanese Media

Now let’s look at the facts:

1. Beiteddine Festival, operated by Nora Joumblatt (Walid Joumblatt’s syrian born wife) programs French stand-up comic and actor Gad el-Maleh in this year’s edition of the Festival.
2. Manar TV station, that’s nothing less than a mouthpiece for Hezbollah, airs two “reports” claiming that Gad el-Maleh has fought in the IDF (Israeli army), denounce his participation in a Lebanese summer festival and pronounce him unwelcome in Lebanon.
3. Tourism Minister Elie Marouni (Kataeb), Information Minister Tarek Mitri (Future Movement ally), Culture Minister Tamam Salam (pro-Future Movement ally), and Beiteddine Festival President Nora Joumblatt (oligarch’s wife) speak out against al-Manar’s reports and denounce them as unfounded.
4. Gad el-Maleh cancels his three shows for security reasons
5. Pro-March XIV media, March XIV politicians and the above ministers launch a campaign against Hezbollah’s “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking” and (my personal favourite) “bringing the image of Lebanon into disrepute”,  and for maintaining the show (or having it “videoconferenced” from Paris).

Then let’s get to the analysis:

A rhetorical battle. Up to now, the whole “Gad elmaleh affair has been a “rhetorical battle” between el-Manar on one hand and some March XIV politicians and media mouthpieces (Hezbollah’s allies, most notably the FPM, have remained completely silent on it). As you have noted from fact #5, the accusations brought against el-Manar can hold no legal ground (except for the fourth one). This “detail” is quite important. Why have the accusers chosen to attack Hezbollah on charges that hold no legal ground?

No charges have been pressed. Well, the matter is quite simple. Under lebanese law, there actually are several grounds for legal charges against el-Manar and Hezbollah. So why sticking to polemical accusations, when there are three accusations that actually hold.

• El-Manar is accused of either disinformation or basing its reporting on dubious sources. Why doesn’t the Minister of Information press charges (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Tarek Mitri?
• El-Manar is accused of attacking Gad el-Maleh on the bases he’s Jewish. Now Lebanon doesn’t have a specific law against anti-semitism, but it does have a law against inciting confessional hate, and Judaism is one of Lebanon’s protected faiths. Now El-Manar has been doing it for years. Why hasn’t anyone pressed charges against that? Why hasn’t the Interior Minister pressed charges against tmhat (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Ziad Baroud?
• El-Manar is accused of tarnishing Lebanon’s image. I personally find the concept absurd and totally illiberal and antidemocratic (it’s no coincidence that it is mostly used by authoritarian regimes). But it holds under Lebanese law. Why hasn’t the Minister of Justice acted upon it?

Silly yet revealing accusations. el-Manar and Hezbollah have been accused of “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking”. Let’s take one accusation at a time and see in what way it is revealing.

• Censorship. My dictionary defines censorship as “the practice of officially examining books, movie, etc. and suppressing unacceptable parts”. The most important element in this definition is obviously “Officially“. Censorship is practiced by an authority that holds power. Hezbollah shares with Walid Joumblatt’s “Democratic Gathering”, the position of fourth largest bloc in Parliament (less than 10% of MPs). It has one minister in the current government (out of 30). Now that doesn’t really put it in a position of power institutionally. And the “anti-Gad Elmaleh campaign” was launched by one of Lebanon’s medias, not by an official media. Sure, Hezbohallah is armed and could endanger Gad Elmaleh’s life were he to come to Lebanon. But it’s not the only armed side in Lebanon, and a security arrangement could be found with it, like it has been found on so many other matters. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Intellectual terrorism. Here’s wikipedia’s definition (my translation): “the practice which aims at intimidating or silencing people by submitting them to arguments and intellectual pressures through publications, media interventions (etc) so as to prevent them from formulating perturbing ideas (regardless of their validity, falsity or disputability)”. What is interesting with the concept of “intellectual terrorism” is that it doesn’t have to be “official”, it can be operational as long as the people exercising it hold the upper hand in the specific field they are operating in. Now Hezbollah surely doesn’t have the upper hand in the communication field or the cultural production field. Truth to tell, its cultural influence is rather limited (and so is its participation in cultural production). So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Cultural hostage taking. The charge is quite meaningless. It assumes that Hezbollah has a dominant position in the cultural sector and can define Lebanese cultural expressions or at least censor them, which bring us back to the first two “charges”. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?

So why is the Gad Elmaleh affair just another rhetorical battle, and in what way does it reveal that people feel cornered by Hezbollah? You can look at the way some bloggers (Jester, Now Lebanon, Khaled Barraj) or journalists (Daily Star’s Michael Young, Orient-Le Jour’s Michel Hajji Georgiou) have been dealing with this issue. My answer comes tomorrow.

A very revealing affair (1): Gad el Maleh & the Jewish/Israeli Quagmire

A little test before stating the facts behind what can be termed the “Gad el-Maleh affair”.

How do you read this bumper striker?

Here are the most common answers:

I love Israel

I love Jews

I love Judaism

Now try to think how a Jew would read this sticker. And try remembering that in conclusion of two of the most important jewish holidays and services (Yom Kippur and the Passover) the words “ Next Year in Jerusalem” are recited. And that since the 1960s, Israel and Jerusalem have once again become the cultural and religious centers of Judaism (in terms of pilgrimage, religious publishing, and religious authority). For most Jews living in the West (or anywhere else in the world), it’s not really easy to make the difference between the three answers. And most people who identify as Jewish won’t find the differentiation very meaningful.
Now imagine what Gad Elmaleh’s answer would be

To complicate things even more, look into some statistics. Try to see how many Jews in the US or France (the two western countries with the largest jewish communities) consider Israel as important and relevant (or even vital) for them as Jews… Try asking most representatives of jewish communities throughout the world if they are zionist or not… and listen to their answers.

All this to say that the comfortable distinction between “Jews” and Zionist that some Lebanese hide behind isn’t really operational anymore (it’s not that easy to make), and it’s mostly irrelevant for most of the world’s jewish population. Israel (defined in zionist terms) has become central to world jewry. And except a very small number of jewish groups and individuals who identify as non-zionist (mostly Iranian Jews, a minority  left leaning Jews or some hasidic leaders), and who are usually attacked by other Jews and accused of being “self-hating” or wrongly condemned as anti-Semitic (sometimes by court, c.f. Eyal Sivan’s case).

Lobby for the appointment of these MINISTERS (and now the guys)

• Ministry of Secularism, Religious & Communal affairs

This ministry is certainly the trickiest of all. Its basic mission is to set the record straight about Lebanon’s secularism and its commitment to the recognition of religious communities and their rights.

Wouldn’t Ziad Baroud be great in it? Sure, our current Minister of the Interior has made quite a blunder on this particular issue with his decision to allow people to cross of their communal membership on the civil registries (a sloppy decision with a very muddled legal justification). But he is a fast learner, and he can be quite flexible…

• Minister of Civil liberties & Rights: Now this ministry would have the important task of fighting censorship (replacing the censorship bureau with a rating bureau), putting some order into the Personal registries and modernising them (giving each citizen a personal number instead of a family number linked to one locality, reinstating the obligatory mention of communal membership, reinstating the mention of place of residency), and proposing legislation for the protection of civil liberties and privacy. This ministry should equally insure that all residents in Lebanon benefit from the legislation protecting and guaranteeing civil rights and liberties. And this legistlation should also encompass a broadening of our legislation on political refugees from the Arab States, if Lebanon wants to truly become the beacon of democracy and free thoughts.

Who better than Nizar Saghieh could do the job? This lawyer is one of the founders of Hurriyyat Khassa (Private Liberties), a Lebanese human rights organization founded on October 1, 2002 (not sure it’s still active). He has published widely on such topics as reform of the judicial system and the memory of war (in Arabic).

• Minister of Defence and Human Security: A Lebanese General. Not really familiar with the Kaki world. Does anyone have a person in mind?

• Minister of Palestinian Affairs.

This ministry is certainly the most “explosive” new ministry I have suggested, both metaphorically and literally. Palestinian affairs” are a very sensitive issue in Lebanon. After all, this group was singled out in the 1990s as being responsible for the civil war. Moreover, if you want to terrorize a Lebanese Christian, just mention the possible naturalisation of Palestinians… This fear runs so deep that the preambule of our constitution sees it fit to explicitly state “NO to naturalisation”. And this is used as an excuse for rampant discrimination against a population that is mostly born in Lebanon (and has never been anywhere else).
Finally, the Lebanese Army and Police still respect the Cairo Accords (though they have been abrogated), and refuses to enter the Palestinian neighbourhoods or settlements (called “camps” to emphasise their ephemerality) and the Palestinian training camps (now these are usually quite far from palestinian settlements).

Chibli Mallat is a lawyer and a professor of law. Director, Centre for the Study of the European Union. He currently teaches in the US. He considers himself left-leaning and supportive of Palestinian rights. He was candidate to the Presidential elections in 2004. Nobody really took him seriously.

• Minister of Municipalities and Decentralisation

Karam Karam. No, not the old one, the young one!  He’s the one sitting next to Ziad Baroud in this picture. He is a researcher in political science that had worked a couple of years ago on the Municipal Elections. He used to be close to the IFPO (French Institute for the Near East) and now works for the LCPS (Lebanese center for Policy Studies). He is also an active member of LADE (The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections).

Lobby for the appointment of these MINISTERS (ladies first)

Ladies first:

Minister of Cultural innovation, Heritage, Media and Communication

Christine Tohmé. She is a cultural organiser, born in Beirut in 1964. She founded Ashkal Alwan in 1994, a Lebanese Association for the Plastic Arts. It is a non-profit organisation that initiates and supports the production of contemporary artistic practice and provides a grounding for critical reflection and theory with the aim of promoting free thought and critical discourse in Lebanon.

Minister of Green economy and environmental affairs

Nayla Tueini. Lebanon’s youngest MP. Also known as the smurf because of the poster she used during her electoral campaign. Heir to three political families. Her grandfather (Michel Murr) and her grandmother’s brother (Marwan Hamade) are both MPs. She inherited her parliamentary seat from her father, Gibran Tueni who was savagely assassinated in 2005. She also replaced him in the family’s Newspaper. An-Nahar (Lebanon’s most prestigious Newspaper… which says a lot about the quality of our Press).

Minister of Social solidarity and governance.

Layla Solh Hemadé. She is the vice-president of Al-Walid bin Talal Foundation, and was  Lebanon’s first woman minister. Born in Beirut in 1946, she is the daughter of the former Prime Minister Riyadh Solh.

Alwaleed Bin Talal Foundation is a charitable and philanthropic organization established by Sauid Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal (nephew of Leila Solh)

Ministry of Administrative Affairs

Ghinwa Jalloul. Computer engineer, Professor of Computer Science at the American University of Beirut. She was born in 1962. She was a Future Movement MP from 2000 to 2009 (Beirut 3, Sunni Seat).

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Fadia Kiwan. Professor of political science, Director of the Institute of political science (St Joseph University). Former Secretary of the National Bloc (under Raymond Edde). She is also a prominent researcher and activist in the field of human rights and advocacy activities in building democracy. She is a Member of the Executive Council of the National Commission for Lebanese women.

Lebanese Diplomacy is in much needed change. Fadia Kiwan is probably one of the few women in Lebanon who could pull off such a job.

Minister of Education.

Salwa Saniora Baasiri. She is Secretary General of the Lebanese National Commission, and sister of outgoing Prime Minister Fuad Siniora.

Minister of Remembrance & Reconciliation.

Bahia Hariri. Obviously. Born in 1952, she became a teacher (1970- 1979), then she headed the Hariri Foundation, founded by her brother Rafik Hariri. She was first elected to the parliament in 1992 (Saida, Sunni Seat), and has held this seat ever since. She is Minister of Education in the outgoing Cabinet (2008-2009).

I would have obviously preferred  Wadad Halawani (head of the Committee of the Kidnapped and Missing in Lebanon), or Rabab Sadr Charafeddine, Mussa Sadr’s sister and Director, Imam Al Sadr Foundation (Beirut & Tyre). But I think Bahia Hariri has a better chance of creating such a ministry.

Minister of Justice.

Denise Khoury (judge) or Alia Zein (lawyer).

My criteria for a couple of ministerial appointments

In a couple of weeks, Lebanon will likely have a new government. Pundits are discussing and arguing about numbers: should the minority coalition have a “blocking” third, how many Ministers should the President appoint…
I think it’s time to broaden the discussion to things that matter: principles!

Here are a couple of principles that I have followed in my appointment of  Ministers:
- Choose a number of women possible (aim at one third of ministers): Women are underrepresented in our political system, and this is mainly because of a psychological barrier: women are not seen as possible candidates, women are not envolved in political life. Imagine that 2/3 of the President’s appointees are women… and that the President asks each bloc to name at least two women! Then we’ll have 6 or 7 women for ministers. With such a figure, be sure that there will be an increased number of women candidates in the next elections, and the proposition for a quota for women in Parliament will have more chances to be voted.
- Choose non-politicians: These individuals should be are competent in their domain and have proven themselves in NGOs or through their academic or professional work.
- Advantage youth (or at least people who are less than 50 years old).

Let’s break up the Interior Ministry!

Dismantling the Ministry of Interior?! Now that’s easier said than done. But it is quite obvious that such a ministry is more suited for Napoleonic times than ours. A country like the United States doesn’t have such a ministry. Why should we? Interior ministries are usually repressive, bureaucratic and static (immune to change). And ours certainly doesn’t have a very good record.
Now let’s have a quick look at the Ministry’s ambit. It is responsible for administrative affairs (e: Civil registries), policing, immigration matters, palestinian affairs and municipalities. Moreover, it represents the government at local levels (districts and governorates). This ministry is one of the major obstacle in front of a “national goal” set by the Taef accords, that of decentralisation! It is the authority in charge of censorship (its body includes religious people, a fact that has no grounds in constitutional law). It has invented several mechanisms that are quite objectionable (according “under-study” I.D. Cards… a status that can be inherited! It has deviated our laws on associations), and has failed in managing Palestinian affairs. Finally, the police is corrupt, ignores the laws that govern the society and is inefficient in maintaining civil peace.
I propose to subdivide it into six Ministries, two of which will be merged with existing ministries (namely the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Minister of State for administrative reform.

• Ministry of Administrative affairs

This ministry will take over all the “administrative” functions of the Interior Ministry: Ombudsman, Administrative reform, Civil registries…

• Ministry of Civil liberties and rights

So as to balance the power of the Ministry of Defence and the obsession the government has with “security”, it is important to have a ministry in charge of promoting, protecting and expanding civil liberties.

• Ministry of Secularism, Religious and Communal affairs

Lebanese are generally unaware that their country is amongst the most secular in the region, and that there is a complete separation between State Law and religious law. Unfortunately, the principle of separation between State and Church is not complete in Lebanon. Muslim communities still benefit from the State’s financial support (for their hierarchies and their courts), while Christian and Jewish communities don’t. But this can be changed following another principle, that of equal treatment of established religions.
Moreover, people ignore that Religious freedom and membership to an established community have two different legal grounds. It is possible to adhere to any religion one wants, even if it is not recognised by the state, as long as one doesn’t threaten public order. Lastly, the same legal text establishing the different religious communities also recognizes the “Civil law community” (Communauté de droit commun). One of the aims of this new ministry would be to finally establish this community (with almost 80 years overdue).

• Ministry of Palestinian Affairs

Palestinians affairs have been badly managed by the State from the onset. The focus has been on the fact that Palestinians are “Refugees” and that their primary (or sole) political right is to return to their country. All the rest has been neglected. Palestinians were not treated as individuals who have intrinsic rights as individuals, to be protected, to have a space to grow and thrive. This new ministry’s function is precisely to change this way of dealing with Palestinians. Not only will it be in charge of decommissioning within the camps, but also of organising elections for the representation of Palestinians in Lebanon, and for the modification of discriminatory legislation towards them (ex: they should be allowed to create NGOs under the same conditions as Lebanese or any resident in the country).

• Ministry of Municipalities and Decentralisation

Decentralisation has been a national goal for almost twenty years, and yet nothing has been done up to now to start implementing it. By handing over to the Interior Ministry the function of supervising Municipalities (the only “decentralised” authority in Lebanon), the successive government have actually increased the centralisation of the State. By separating the two Ministries, the national goal will be highlighted, and there will be an authority that’s function is to devise a plan (mechanism and agenda) for this decentralisation, and then to follow it up.

• Ministry of Defence and Human Security

This Ministry is actually an expanded version of the Ministry of Defence. It will take over all the Policing responsibilities so as to concentrate all security and law enforcements efforts. This will help the country protect itself against external or internal threats. It will have the authority to modify and merge new forces for the sake of efficiency. It will have an agenda to decommission all non-governmental armed forces, fight corruption within the police force, modernize the army and protect Lebanon from foreign interventions and most importantly, protect the citizens in case of attack (by building shelters, organising evacuations…). The notion of “human security” (i.e. the citizen’s security) is at the center of the ministry’s thinking, and not the abstract notion such as “national security”. Its aim is to preserve human life.

Transfiguring old ministries: Culture/Environment/Displaced

Let’s start by looking at the relatively “new”  ministries that were created in the 1990s and that look ancient already. What I’m suggesting here is not a simple “lifting”, a kind of plastic surgery. It’s genetic manipulation and engineering that I have in mind. It’s time for these ministries to mutate! Basically , we’re looking at the Ministry of Culture (established in 1993), the Ministry of the environment (an Office of a Minister of State since 1981 established as a ministry in 1993), the Ministry of the Displaced (an Office of a Minister of State since 1992, established as a Ministry in 1993).

• Ministry of Heritage, Cultural innovation, Media and Communication. The Ministry of Culture is probably the most underfunded ministry in the land. But that’s not its only problem. Most of the ministers who headed it seem to have looked down on it and failed to take it very seriously. Their vision of what this Ministery should or could do was rather limited. That is particularly true for the better ministers such as Ghassan Salamé (who was preoccupied with the Francophonie Summit), Tarek Mitri (who preferred to play Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Tamam Salam (who is completely taken by the project “Beirut, world book capital” that was totally neglected by his predecessor). So I suggest we expand this ministry and merge it with another ministry that seems better sooted for a totalitarian state: the Ministry of Information.

Through this merger and expansion, we’ll have a ministry that is better suited to guide Lebanon into the information age where culture not only matters, but is an important (and ever expanding) economical sector.  two other ministries: The Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Information. This new Ministry will concentrate its effort on innovation, and making Lebanon a platform for artistic creativity in the Middle East. We already have a very productive audiovisual sector, and Lebanese youth are quite good in software and internet production… With a little push… and an energetic Minister, we could play wonders.

• Ministry of Green economy and environmental affairs. The green economy is starting to grow in Lebanon, with organic farms, organic markets, eco-tourism, natural reserves…

Unfortunately, the government’s approach to the environment hasn’t changed much. It is still focused on “natural reserves”, forestation and awareness. It’s high time somebody took it a step further.  Having a ministry in charge of an expanding economical sector is not only relevant, but necessary. It should be given the means to propose important changes in the Legislation (on imports of pollutants) and it should have a special office in charge of converting polluting industries in Lebanon.

• Ministry of Remembrance & Reconciliation. Our Ministry of the displaced has a dreadful record. It was basically used as a tool to reintegrate Lebanese nationals into two clientelistic networks (notably, Walid Jumblatt’s and Nabih Berri’s). It’s time things changed.

Instead of simply abolishing this ministry (as former minister Nehmé Tohmé suggested, its mission should be expanded to deal with non-financial issues, and more specifically, social and psychological issues. Lebanon is deeply marked (and scarred) by intercommunal strife. Lives have been shattered, families broken up and destroyed, villages and neighbourhoods wiped off the map, livelihoods ruined… And very little has been done to deal with it, except giving money to two categories of people: those who are living in properties belonging to “displaced” (i.e. expelled) people, and displaced people whose property has suffered damages). A ministry that has to deal with this memory is probably what the country needs to heel its wounds. Such a ministry will help us go beyond the current cult of martyrs.

Tania Saleh on Lebanese Politicians: “Ya Wled”

Do you want CHANGE? lets start with new Ministries!!

In two days, I’ll be proposing the names of people I’d like to see as Ministers in the coming government. But first, we need some new ministries to ge the country going!
I believe that some of our ministeries are anachronistic and should be abolished (Ministry of information, Office of the Minister of State for administrative reform, Ministry of Interior), some need to be expanded (Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Environment…).

So here’s a short list of Ministries that SHOULD be created, why? Because it’s time our country entered the 21st century. It’s also time we got over the silly, rigid and sterile debate over confessionalism that has been raging on for a century. So here’s a couple of suggestions. You’ll have more details about what these ministries in the coming posts. Please don’t hesitate to suggest other ministries.

• Ministry of Heritage, Cultural innovation, Media and Communication (وزارة التراث،الابتكار الثقافيت وسائل الاعلام والتواصل،)
• Ministry of Green economy and environmental affairs (وزارة الاقتصاد الاخضر والشؤون البئية)
• Ministry of Social solidarity and governance (وزارة التضامن والحوكمة الاجتماعية)
• Ministry of Remembrance & Reconciliation (وزارة التزكر والمصالحة)
• Ministry of Secularism, Religious and Communal affairs (وزارة السؤون العلمانية، الدينية والطوائفية)
• Ministry of Administrative affairs (وزارة الشؤون الادارية)
• Ministry of Civil liberties & Rights (وزارة الحقوق الفردية والحريات)
• Ministry of Defence and Human Security (وزارة الدفاع والامن البشري)
• Ministry of Palestinian Affairs (وزارة الشؤون الفلسطينية)
• Ministry of Municipalities and Decentralisation (وزارة البلديات واللامركزية)

Self-criticism? Why the FPM lost some popular support…

Two days ago, my post ended with a question: Why did Michel Aoun’s FPM loose 20% of its electorate in 4 years? Truth to tell, I was quite surprised by the FPM’s score. I was convinced that it had lost a larger number of supporters or potential voters.

Sure some of its losses could be attributed to its opponents’ electoral conduct. The FPM had to wrestle the National Bloc, the Kataeb, the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal Party and a flock of notables supported by the religious hierarchies (most notably the Maronite, the Greek-Orthodox and the Syriac hierarchies). People and parties who had little in common, who hated each other’s guts, who were political rivals, were united in a common front against the FPM. Their common and individual campaigns focused on a direct attacks on the FPM and personal attacks on Michel Aoun. Their smear campaign was echoed by the Media and the Press that was largely hostile to the FPM and Aoun (LBC, MTV, Future, Nahar, L’Orient-Le Jour, Dyar, Daily Star, NOW…). I find it quite miraculous that Aoun’s FPM survived (& vanquished) the Christian Bulldozer (a Syrian electoral device first experimented by Hezbollah and Amal, and now adopted by March XIV) in Mount Lebanon.

But instead of playing victim, the FPM should reflect on its own conduct and communication strategy. It should examine how these helped all traditional Christian parties and forces coalesce against it. The FPM should also look into why so many journalists and opinion makers are opposed to it. Sure they work for a March XIV controlled media, but that doesn’t explain their personal and individual hostility to the FPM and its leader.

The FPM’s weaknesses:

• Aoun’s populism. His hostility to journalists (for being inquisitive) and the Media (for distorting his message) in general. If the FPM doesn’t want journalists to be hostile to it, it should learn to speak to them and establish a communication strategy towards journalists and opinion makers (just as the March XIV platform did).
• The FPM’s “Change and Reform” message. The Christian electorate has traditionally been conservative. Promising change without taking into consideration the demographic shifts in the country can be perceived as adventurous by many. The “third republic” slogan was to say the least sloppy (it’s actually the 4th Republic… if one wants to count each time the 1926 constitution was modified).
• The FPM’s defensive communication. The FPM established the frames of the electoral debate within the Christian constituencies (it didn’t work on any cross-communal message… call it Christian navel gazing). March XIV simply reacted to the FPM’s positioning and slogans (which was expected). At this point, the FPM started justifying itself… and took a defensive approach.
• The lack of a clear outlook or identity. March XIV has elaborated a clear identity (albeit an unfounded one) in which people identify with. It tapped into people’s fantasies, imagination and emotions. The FPM hasn’t been able to achieve this.
• Multiple incoherences: The FPM’s behaviour is similar to that of its opponents. If it wants to distinguish itself from them, it should start by changing its behaviour and work on being more convincing about the change it represents.

Approaching Iran: Lebanese wishful thinking

I find this picture quite revealing of the mindset of many of my nationals who are interpreting the electoral turmoil in Iran: Hezbollah is seen as a branch of the Iranian regime. This perception has two consequences:
- If the tree is venomous (violent and repressive), so is its branch.
- If the tree is weakened, the branch will wither.

These two postulates aren’t very convincing. Its actually a very simplistic view that ignores the complexity of the situation.

Historically, one could say that Hezbollah is somewhat an offshoot of the Islamic Republic of Iran (even though it really stems from Musa Sadr’s Amal movement…). But that doesn’t mean that it is a branch of the Iranian Regime. Moreover, one could also argue that Hezbollah is bound by its spiritual obedience to Iran’s spiritual leader and its financial & military dependence on Iran’s government. But this doesn’t negate its autonomy. It certainly limits it, but doesn’t annul it. Hezbollah enjoys a massive popular backing within Lebanon’s Shiite community. Its leadership is Lebanese, its rank and file are Lebanese, its territorial site is Lebanese… Sure, a change in Iran’s regime will have an impact on Hezbollah. But that doesn’t mean that turmoil or change in Iran will weaken the party or make it disappear. Hezbollah can always adapt, choose another spiritual leadership (most Lebanese shiites supporters of Hezbollah don’t even recognise the spiritual authority of Khamanei), find other sources of financing (remember the drug trade in the Beqaa?)… and even if there was a regime change in Iran, would that mean that this budding regional power will abandon its regional ambitions? Why would it, and if it doesn’t, can it do it without Hezbollah?

As it is usually the case, the Lebanese pundits take on Iran says more about them then it does about Iran.

Self-criticism? not a Lebanese word (part 1)

I stumbled on a short interview on el-Nashra with Charles Jazra. The article presents him as a leading figure in the FPM. His name reminded me of an unsuccessful “independent” candidate in the Metn (running for the Greek-Catholic seat) who was presented as close to the FPM and to the SNSP (Syrian national social party). I wonder if it’s the same person. Here are the interviewed Charles Jazra’s arguments:

اعتبر القيادي في “التيار الوطني الحر” شارل جزرا أن ما أسقط المعارضة في الانتخابات لم يكن خطأ في ماكيناتها الانتخابية أو حتى في اعلامها انما كانت الحملة الاعلامية المضادة التي شنّها الفريق الآخر والتي اعتمدت “التخوين، الدفاع عن رئيس الجمهورية وكأننا نريد اسقاطه، عناوين المثالثة والانقلاب على الطائف

He believes that the Opposition’s electoral conduct and its communication strategy are not to blame for its defeat. This was brought by its opponent’s campaign that focused on accusing the opposition of treason, defending the Presidency as if the opposition wanted to bring it down, and the slogan of the reduction of christian share to one third, and the overthrow of Taef.
This idea is shared by many FPM supporters and it shows an unwillingness to assess their political and electoral conduct. Instead of reflecting on their methods, strategy and capacity to respond to the opponent’s campaign, we find an insistance on the denunciation of the other. Not only such an approach is pointless, but it shows a lack of consideration for the electorate’s capacity of seeing through false-accusations, and also of hearing both parties and choosing the side that he finds more convincing.

Sure, the Kataeb (property of the Gemayel family), the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal Party (property of the Chamoun family), the National Bloc (property of the Edde family), and Christian “independents” (semi-autonomous notables), focused on a smear campaign against the FPM, and this smear campaign was mostly ungrounded. But this says quite a lot about these parties and very little about the FPM.
But it begs the following question: Did the electorate believe in the smear campaign launched by the FPM opponents? Sure the FPM remains the largest christian party and retains the confidence of approximately half of the Lebanese Christian voters, but how can one explain the evaporation of  20% of its electorate in 4 years?

(to be continued)

Aounomania vs Aounophobia

The idea of comparing the two afflictions came to me when I came across an opinion paper published by NOW Lebanon: “The Madness of King Michael“. I couldn’t help myself from writing a comment thanking them for bringing so much Aounomania and Aounophobia together.

First the Aounomania:

A 50 min spot in which pictures of Gibran, JFK, Lincoln, Gandhi, Dalai Lama, Lenin, Marie Curie, Mother Theresa, Mandela, Fidel Castro, Coluche, Che Guevara, Einstein, Alexander Fleming, Mohamad Ali Clay, Napoleon, Roosevelt, de Gaule, John Paul II, Martin Luther King, Lech Walesa, Michel Aoun, scroll across the screen and a voice-over reflects: “Statesmen, Peacemakers, Visionaries… many have followed, some have ignored them, many have love them, some have denied them… Rebels, revolutionaries, geniuses! How many times were they called lunatics. They persisted in their combat until their struggle became a right, and victory a truth“.

When I saw the clip I said to myself “wow, these people are taking the cult of personality to a new high!!”.

Now the cult of personality is not new to Lebanon. Most Lebanese televisions air hero-worship spots. Al-Manar, for instance, broadcasts clips of Hezbollah combatants. Future Television has been airing spots on Rafic Hariri since his assassination. For over a month, Hariri was the only subject the television discussed. LBC followed suit and aired spots of the politicians that have been assassinated since 2005. This is equally true for the Press. Rafik Hariri’s picture adorns the Mustaqbal’s header and  Gibran Tueni’s picture adorns the Nahar header… And all those people are worshiped as heros whose actions cannot be criticised because they were savagely murdered.

Political parties follow yearly rituals to honour their heros: the anonymous combatants that died in combat and the heroic figure that founded them or lead them for a couple of years: Kamal Joumblatt for the Ishtiraki, Bechir Gemayel for the Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb, Rafik Hariri for the Mustaqbal, Pierre Gemayel for the Kataeb…

During their lifetimes, the founders enjoyed hero worship. This is particularly true for Mussa Sadr, Pierre Gemayel (Sr), Kamal Jumblat, Rafik Hariri. So did Samir Geagea, Amin Gemayel… to a lesser extent.

So what’s new with OTV’s political worship? The answer is simple: Michel Aoun is still alive! And his cult isn’t indirect. It’s not mediated by a cult to a relative (father, brother, husband). It is direct! blatant, barefaced, unashamed. It’s the Zaïm’s cult at its crudest. No critical distance, no direct reference to actions, no evaluation. Just flattery and adulation.

Then the Aounophobia:

Now let’s look at the article’s arguments. It sums up the clip quite correctly and very quickly shares with us a very convincing (and obvious) conclusion : “we are served up a sycophantic and brainless piece of drivel, dressed up as a serious message“.

The anonymous opinion writer isn’t interested in simply mocking a “clip [that] would have been terrific spoof material“. He’s real target is Michel Aoun. “The depressing truth is that Aoun has done nothing except to create conflict and division, while exploiting the aspirations of an electorate that, amazingly, still believes he offers a genuine, alternative voice in the Lebanese political arena. He believes that by shouting he is a misunderstood intellectual, that by being a hypocrite he is a visionary and that by supporting murderous non-state actions, he has the whiff of a revolutionary about him“. Notice that there is not a trace of argument in this paragraph. The opinion writer assumes that these are self-evident truths. And then we get to the last conclusion: ”But the fact that OTV, the FPM’s official television station, has seen fit to run it at prime time viewing, is surely the final nugget of proof – as if one were needed – that Aoun has lost the plot.” Now this final argument is quite interesting because it presents itself as a demonstration (albeit a superfluous one). But the logic behind the argument is actually nowhere to be found. The fact that OTV sees fit to run it at prime-time exhibits the television’s partisanship, it proves that this television is actively participating in a cult of personality! If Michel Aoun approved it, it shows that his inflated ego and megalomania (attributes shared by most Lebanese politicians) don’t shy from such crude display (other politicians would rather flirt with false modesty by publicly asking their partisans to stop such a display while privately encouraging it or even funding it).

Nothing in Aoun’s political conduct shows that he has lost his ability to understand or cope with what is happening. He still commands one of the largest parliamentary blocs, and by far the largest christian parliamentary group. And like all political actors he is bidding for the largest possible share in government. If the opinion writer things otherwise, he should try to explain to his reader how he got to that conclusion.

This being said, I believe we should thank  NOW for bringing Aounomania and Aounophobia together. It just shows how similar both afflictions are, and how blind the afflicted are to their suffering.  We shoud equally applaude all Aounomaniacs and all Aounophobics for expelling all reason (and reasonableness) from political analysis & lowering the political disussion to such a dismal pit.