Government formation… what lesson learnt?

Analytical difficulties

An informed analysis is tributary to the access to the relevant information. The problem one encounters in studying the cabinet formation process is not the lack of public discussion on the matter, but the lack of reliable information. This is true for several reasons:

• The discussion was mostly polemical. Oddly enough it was limited to three questions : distribution of portfolios, choice of ministers, and foreign meddling.
• The negotiating parties had decided to keep the discussions secret.
• Middle or lower ranking members of the concerned political formations discussed extensively matters that were supposed to be kept private (i.e. distribution of portfolios and choice of ministers).
• Editorialists not only built their analysis on unreliable sources, polemical outbursts and unsubstantiated allegations (of intent and of foreign allegiance) but also raised expectations.

Preliminary agreements

Three of the most difficult elements in grand coalition government formation were solved from the onset of the process, and these elements are:

• the choice of Prime minister: Saad Hariri
• the number of parties participating in the government: Amal, Hezbollah, FPM, Marada, Tashnag (for the smaller parliamentary coalition), Lebanon First, Lebanese Forces, Kataeb and “independents”  (for the larger parliamentary coalition).
• the general distribution of cabinet seats: with an agreement on four forumlas:
  • the two constitutional formulas of communal distribution (parity between Christian and Muslims, proportionality between the larger communal groups within each half) that translated in these terms: 6 Maronite, 6 Sunni, 6 Shiite, 3 Druze, 4 Greek-Orthodox, 3 Greek-Catholic, 2 Armenians ;
  • The general partisan formula: 12-3-5-10, that is: 12 to be distributed between Lebanon First, Lebanese Forces, Kataeb and their allies, 3 for the PSP, 5 for the President of the Republic, 10 to be distributed between Amal, Hezbollah, FPM, Marada, Tashnag.
  • Muslim communal super-Zu’ama choose the ministers belonging to their community: Saad Hariri 4 ministers (with one given to an independent ally), Nabih Berri chooses 3 ministers, Walid Jumblatt chooses 3 ministers, Hassan Nasrallah 2 ministers. There are two exceptions to the rule that were agreed on: the President picks a Shiite and a Sunni minister that is not vetoed by the communal super-Zu’ama.

Several hypothesis for the delay

With so many points already agreed upon from the onset, why did the process take so much time. Here are the possible reasons that were put forward by the analysts:

• “Foreign intervention” (meddling of the US, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran)
• “Michel Aoun’s impossible conditions” and his style.
• “The March XIV Christians’ pressure on Saad Hariri”.
• Inexperience and bad counseling of Saad Hariri’
• Absence of arbitrator or mediator between the two large cross-communal coalitions.

More tomorrow

Government composition… a closer look.

What can we learn from the result? Let’s have a quick look at the picture of the new government to see what’s new, and what trend has been confirmed. Once this is done, we’ll have a glance on some basic rules that were followed in this 4 month long process of government formation.

What’s new:

• Less than 1/3 of the ministers hail from the parliament.
• Only three parties chose to be represented by their MPs: the PSP (3 ministers), the Hezbollah (2 ministers) and Ramgavar (1 minister extremely close to the Future Movement). The Future Movement (3 ministers), the Free Patriotic Movement (3 ministers), Amal (2 ministers), the Lebanese Forces (2 ministers), Kataeb (1 minister), Marada (1 minister) and Tashnag (1 minister) chose non parliamentarians to represent them.
• Hariri is the only Za’im in the government. But two other Za’im are represented by their most trusted aids (Michel Aoun by Gibran Bassil, Amin Gemayel by Selim Sayegh)
• The presidential share in government (that has no bases in either the constitution or democratic parliamentarian principles) is increased to 5 and includes two muslim ministers.

Trends confirmed

• Global shares are determined from the onset of the process: after the 16-11-3 formula of 2008, the 15-10-5 formula of 2009.
• The President of the Republic has a share in government even if he doesn’t have a party in parliament (and even though no constitutional text provides for such a share).
• The President of the Republic doesn’t have any facilitating function in the formation of the government (no mediation, no arbitration).
• The patronage networks and communal Zaim are represented by ministers belonging to their community, even if they have a cross-communal representation in parliament. The Democratic Gathering is solely represented by the PSP its Druze core). Berri and Jumblatt are deprived yet another time from Christian ministers.
• The Christian parties and communal patronage networks have a larger share in government (and in “important” portfolios).
• Female ministers. As expected, we have one extra female minister (if the Marada had stuck to their original choice we would have had three female ministers!).
• Lack of rotation in portfolios. No sovereignty portfolios changes hand. Defence and Interior Ministries stay in the presidential share (and with the same ministers), Foreign affairs stays with Amal and Finance stay with Future Movement. Justice stays with the Lebanese Forces (same minister). As for the service portfolios, Energy and Telecom stay with Aoun’s bloc. Education stayed with Mustaqbal but changed hands. Agriculture and Industry stayed with the “opposition”, Public work and Agriculture stayed with the same ministers (PSP and Amal respectively).

Rules of this particular game

• Choice of ministers: Each party chose its own ministers once it was attributed a share and a portfolio. The President and Prime Minister had no say in the choice. This rule knew of no exception (the principle that “candidates who lost in the parliamentary elections couldn’t join the government”, was not taken into account).
• Choice of portfolios: This is done through negotiation between the Prime Minister and each individual party backed by its coalition partners.
• Choice of participating parties: This is done by each mega-coalition. The self-titled “opposition” chose to be represented by 3 large blocs (5 political parties), excluding two other parties that are part of the coalition. The self-titled “majority” chose to be represented by 4 parliamentary blocs and 3 “independent” MPs (Boutros Harb, Mohamad Safadi, Michel Pharaon).
• Type of negotiation: mostly secret with a lot of polemics nurtured by low ranking politicians (mostly christian politicians belonging to the LF, the FPM and Mustaqbal blocs).

Should any rule be derived from the process and result? we’ll see that tomorrow with a look at the “Government formation… what lessons learnt”

Week’s highlight: the weapons issue

Weapons sparked three debates this week. It all started when the Israeli military fished a weapon cargo heading to Beirut. Then the Maronite patriarch made a speech on how weapons and democracy were mutually exclusive and finally the head of the FPM Michel Aoun criticised the Patriarch’s speech and added that if he had the means he would arm himself to fight for Palestine! We’ll look into these polemics one at the time.

The record weapon catch. The most fascinating thing about the story isn’t what was said, but what wasn’t said. We got a lot of info about how much the booty weighted, we didn’t get any info about what exactly these weapons were and who had made them. We got a lot of info about the crew and the three last destination of the ship, but no info on its past and its real ownership. Classified information or courteousness between weapon dealers and producers?

The Patriarch’s sermon. The Patriarch picked up a habit of recurrently making a sermon against Hezbollah and its weapons. His followers, that is political followers (not necessarily of his flock) and backers applaud his “national stands” and celebrate his “national role”. But they never mention the effect it has on communal politics and the gate it opens for other political interventions of clergymen in the public sphere (his backers had even asked him to pick a President for the country two years ago…). His stance does not prevent him from backing parties who will join a government in which Hezbollah will be part of and whose declaration will not condemn the weapons this party holds. Three of the christian political groups he has been actively supporting for nearly a decade (what is left of Qornet Chehwan that was never a political party and is the biggest looser of the past elections with only one MP in parliament, the Lebanese Forces that hasn’t been reestablished as a party since its dissolution in the 1990s probably for financial reasons and the Kataeb that has been hijacked by the Gemayel family after having been hijacked by the Syrian intelligence) will probably express their reservations on the government’s declaration but that will not prevent them from participating in it.

This kind of condemnation is the best example of the “public stand culture” ثقافة المواقف that is meant to satisfy (with words) one’s constituency or sponsor, but that never translates into political action.

Aoun’s tantrum. When angry, the hindered Za’im has no qualms about contradicting himself and making the most outrageous and irresponsible declarations. His first argument to the Patriarch followed these lines: “these weapons were never used against you, so why are you complaining”. Then he expressed his willingness to take up arms too, but regretted he didn’t have the financial ressources for that. I pity Michel Aoun’s supporters who will have to find a way to justify this outburst.

David Issa on MTV, political analysis gone astray

This guy is obviously angry… and in need of recognition. During his hour long discussion on MTV (a resurrected Lebanese TV channel), his voice showed an emotional range that varied from displeasure to exasperation to indignity to outrage. At a random moment I decided to count how many times he repeated “I” in one minute: 7 times, and twice for no apparent reason (there was no call in grammar, syntax or meaning for it). I didn’t catch the show from the start (when the presenter gives a flattering biographical outlook on his guest), but I believe he ran as candidate in 2000 for Beirut’s Greek-Catholic seat (and lost to Michel Pharaon).

The host obviously tried as hard as he could to formulate his questions as if his guest was a fortuneteller or a weather forecaster; doesn’t political analysis belong to this family of activities after all? when you read our press or watch our news programs, you come up with the obvious answer: YES.

So you can’t really blame David Issa for answering these questions as a weatherman or a fortuneteller would. When given the occasion, he pointed out a couple of things that were very true, but then made a mess of the analysis that was a times incoherent at others biased and most of the time unfounded (traits that are alas shared by the political system).

Here are the most interesting points he made:

• The Christians are divided, but what are the issues that they disagree on? They have an important role in bridging the divide between Shiites and Sunnis.

Now this in itself is a topic that could be discussed lengthily. David Issa didn’t notice the internal contradiction between his two statements. He regrets the division of the Christians, but believes that the mobilisation of the Shiites and Sunnis behind two blocs is negative (and leaves aside the Druze and Alawite communities). If the Christians were mobilised (which is structurally impossible) behind one leader and bloc, how would that facilitate the demobilisation of the muslim groups?

• Zahlé, as the capital of Greek-Catholics, should be represented in government by a minister holding a “respectable” portfolio.

David Issa, speaking on behalf of his community (although he claimed several times that he was against the communal feelings and the power-division scheme with a communal dimension) introduced a new principle for the composition of the government. He linked together two constitutional principles: the quota system along communal lines and  the fair representation of region. If such a rule is introduced, one could imagine its complicating effect on the formation of governments. Should Armenian ministers be from Burj Hammoud, should there be a minister Shiite minister from Baalbeck, one from Nabatieh and one from the Southern suburb of Beirut… Regional representation are obviously taken into account in all governments, so are family issues. But does this mean they should be transformed into rules that know of no exception?

Recipe for a fruitful discussion

Bring a thread, not a woven carpet!

I was reading a couple of blogs today, vast discussions debating over the best solution to the Palestinian question (the more realistic, the more equitable, the more profitable…). Bloggers were parrotting  politicians, proposing package deals and behaving like merchants, trying to sell the best product, the miracle pill.

It reminded me of those humorous pills you find in gadget stores (“Take two pills a day and become blond”, “Four pills to learn German”) or at your chemists (“this pill will make u happier”, “this pill will make u slimmer”).

These discussions have little sens. They do not even qualify as discussions. It’s like merchants yelling their goods. And taking it very much at heart, behaving as if they created the product to start with.
In Lebanon, we have similar discussions. The debate over institutional reform follows the same pattern. People will howl at you the virtues of federalism, others will hammer at you the necessity for deconfessionalisation. Each is convinced that the opponent’s solution is seditious, destructive and morally flowed.

Such discussions are sterile. A one state solution for Palestine/Israel could threaten Jewish existence as much as it could threaten Palestinian existence. It could be a solution just as it could just reframe the problem. All depends on the institutions that will be chosen and the way social and political actors will interact with them. Similarly, a two state solution could reinforce the antagonism between the two people just as it could comfort their fears.
The same could be said about the institutional debate in Lebanon. Federalism could bring the country closer together just as it could be the first step towards a permanent divorce between regions and communities. It all depends on what kind of federalism is adopted and how the social and political actors will interact with the new institutions. These two elements are hardly ever considered. The same could be said about confessionalisation and deconfessionalisation. Up to now, the results haven’t been very positive either way. When President Chehab introduced confessionalism to the public administration in the 1960s, it worked as an instrument of “affirmative action” but increased the hold of patronage networks and gave it a stronger communal flavour. Similarly, when the Taef agreement got rid of the Chehabist parity rule, it didn’t diminish the hold of the patronage networks but encouraged Christian-Lebanese to “withdraw” from the State apparatus (just as they had did since the 1950s from the Municipality of Beirut)…

Wouldn’t it be preferable to stop looking for the miracle panacea and spend all our energy on defending this “global solution” and just tackle the points that we find important, one by one? For example advancing individual and collective rights or dismounting the patronage networks in Lebanon, or working on mobility, security and the respect of individual and collective rights in Israel/Palestine…

Lueur d’espoir à l’Orient-Le Jour?

Dans l’édition d’aujourd’hui, Mahmoud Harb partage avec ses lecteurs son point de vue sur le processus de formation du gouvernement dans un article intitulé “À propos d’une pantalonnade“. L’éditorialiste est manifestement de plus en plus las de son camp politique (même s’il continue à le préférer au camp adverse). Et il semble inconfortable dans la perspective adoptée par son journal (et qui reste socio-culturellement bourgeoise, francophone et chrétienne). Voici le petit commentaire que je lui ai envoyé.

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Analyse intéressante, parmi les meilleures que j’ai lu dernièrement dans votre journal.
Mais à mon avis, elle est obscurcie par deux erreurs analytiques qui sont malheureusement assez communes.
Vous dites “les deux mastodontes confessionnels que sont les communautés chiite et sunnite”. Cette métaphore organiciste est complètement inadaptée parce que le propre des communautés libanaises est leur non-corporalité (absence d’organe représentatif et organisationnel), d’où les conflits récurrents autour de leur représentation. Les mastodontes à caractère confessionnel sont Mustaqbal et le duopole Amal-Hezbollah. La nuance est importante puisqu’elle montre des enjeux partisans et des manipulations & des mobilisations communautaires extrêmes.

Concernant les ministères, votre propos emprunte quelques éléments à l’approche réductrice et polémique régnante. Un ministre n’est pas nécessairement la personne la plus forte dans son ministère, et doit de toute manière négocier avec les réseaux clientélistes en place. Ce n’est pas le ministre de l’Intérieur qui a procédé à la nomination de plus de 2000 personnes ces dernières années dans la police. Certaines directions sont controlées par des forces politiques de manière indépendante du ministre de tutelle (ex: à Jumblatt la caisse des déplacés, à Hariri la Banque Nationale et Ogéro, à Murr la mécanique, à Amal la sécu et le rectorat de l’UL…). Ceci complique les calculs politiques et clientélistes que vous présentez de manière trop schématiques.

Student elections echo the country’s woes

Results: Politically exploited, freely interpreted

I followed quite closely this year’s student elections back at my Alma Mater. The picture wasn’t a pretty one. If you took the time to read the Daily Star, l’Orient-Le Jour, An-Nahar, As-Safir, lebanese-forces.org and Tayyar.org, it might just kill your hopes for a better future. Here are the highlights:

• the university changed the electoral law without consulting students, without any debate. The proportionate system was chosen because it was “the most democratic voting system”. The university didn’t even explain how it came to this conclusion, echoing the recent general consensus that was imposed in Lebanon that the proportionate system is the only democratic voting system.
• the student groups decided to choose politically neutral names for their lists in a bid to depoliticise the battle. This bid didn’t go any farther than this terminological camouflage (that everyone found satisfactory). Most candidates didn’t hide their political affiliations and much of the discussions within the student body were about political affiliations.

   

  

  Unabashed political bias by L'Orient-Le Jour

• The battle was extremely polarised. “Independents” didn’t have a common platform and many question their real independence. The dominant lists replicated the national divide between “opposition” (that is extremely heterogeneous and mostly in government) and “majority” (that is a loose and divided coalition of rival or autonomous parties and patronage networks), here called “B+” and “réforme” (or “University2010″).
• The campaign were quite costly and relied on explicit or implicit commercial and political sponsoring. The University did nothing to regulate the financing of the campaign. Even if there were no cases of vote buying, patronage networks were quite active. You had posters, T-shirt distributions, professional logos for the campaign… To try to mobilise the students, one camp proposed manakish and crepes, while the other proposed popcorn. On the following day, each brought loudspeakers and played electronic music.
• Are you interested in programs? Well, each list had prepared one. But the students didn’t seem much interested in it. Most of those who I talked to had no clue about what each list was campaigning for (those who did were actually part of the core team supporting a list). The programs were a formal exercice with very little meaning.
• Each camp had its own interpretation of the results. Samir Geagea, the leader of Lebanese Forces celebrated the victory of “March XIV” with a “bye bye ya 7alween” while Aoun claimed that his party won the popular vote and most of the big faculties.

Interpreting death & giving freedom a bad name

I just came back from the screening of Marmoulak (the Lizard) at the Samir Kassir Foundation. I didn’t have the time to sit through the whole film and as the subtitles were hard to decipher (white on white), I let my mind drift around the room and the event.

Why on earth did the Samir Kassir Foundation choose to screen this film? Is it because it was censored? Is it because it is Iranian? Is it because it is critical of the Iranian regime? I think all three reasons are equally true. The Samir Kassir Foundation is quite clear about its political orientation. It is unabashedly March XIV and follows this camp’s political and geopolitical stands and views. So you’re sure to hear more criticism of the Syrian, Hamas and Iranian regime than the Saudi, Fatah or Egyptian regime.

I was sitting in the main room. On my left there was a wall with some 12 pictures of assassinated journalists on it, each “martyr” featured twice: Kamal Mroueh, Michel Seurat, Samir Kassir, Gibran Tueni, Salim al-Lawzé and probably Riad Taha. By putting the word martyr between quotes, I don’t mean to downplay the tragedy of these journalists’ death. My point is to stress that this appellation has political implications and that it indicates a specific interpretation of their deaths.
I’ve never quite understood how the death of some people could be paraded in a country like Lebanon where life has very little value to start with and violent death is not an uncommon occurrence. In 1958, a civil war brought about the death of over 2000 Lebanese citizens, most of them civilians. Between 1975 and 1990, over 200 000 Lebanese perished in the civil war, most of them civilians. In 2006, over a 1000 Lebanese were killed by war acts, most of them civilians. In 2008, over a hundred people were killed in less than 10 days, many of them were civilians.
So what makes the death of a few people significant enough to distinguish them from the lot, to remember their name, to commemorate their death and to give it a personal meaning that elevates them to the rank of role models, heroes? For the innocent civilians that were killed by armies and militias, they are only remembered collectively as victims of the brutality of war. For the journalists that were targeted, their death is interpreted as saying as much about them as it says about their perpetrator.

All Soul’s Day blues

As I drove back home today in the pouring rain, I noticed three women entering a cemetery holding flowers (and umbrellas). They were probably visiting a relative’s grave. The neighbourhood they were in is a strange one. It’s made up of six or seven walled in cemeteries, each belonging to a different community. Most cemeteries lie on a planned highway’s path. Two of them are more or less abandoned.
This menacing highway was planned in the 1960s, and expropriation orders were issued. Two stretches have been built on both sides of the neighbourhood, but they do not pass through it. The Protestant community evacuated its cemetery couple of years ago (at the same time it evacuated another cemetery by the seaside in downtown Beirut that was expropriated by a private company). The Syriaque Catholic cemetery is still in use.
As for the Jewish cemetery, it looks rather warn down. Like the neighbouring cemeteries it suffered a lot of damage during the war because it lied on the demarcation line between East and West Beirut. But very little money was put into restoring it, while the neighbouring catholic and armenian cemeteries have been fully restored by the families of the deceased. Withstanding its desolate state, the Jewish cemetery is the main reason why all the other cemeteries are preserved. The government is afraid that any action against it would be interpreted as one directed against the Jewish community.
Do the three women I saw this morning entering a cemetery know that they owe the preservation of the grave they are visiting to the Jewish cemetery? If they did, I’m sure they’d try to visit it and put a stone next to a grave.

Lebanese journalism under Proposition 7

Regular readers of Lebanese newspapers have come to realise that “news” here is a misnomer. Not only there’s hardly anything new in what journalists lengthily discuss, but there’s very little factual substance in it. I don’t mean to demean our national press or rant and rave for the sake of it. Just pick any article randomly and you’ll get my point. Today’s dominant topic was Michel Aoun’s public declarations on his conditions for joining the government. Very little can be said about such a declaration, and it’s certainly not surprising (neither in its content nor in its timing) and nothing in it was new.

But this didn’t stop our journalists and editorialists (useless differentiation nowadays) from delving into head-on. The argument can be summed up formally in the following equation: prejudice +  assumptions + judgement. So much ink spilled over so little information !  I couldn’t help remembering Wittgenstein’s 7th proposition: “What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence”.

Blogging: beside the point…

It’s been almost a month I haven’t blogged. And as usual, I wonder if there’s a point to all this. Why do people blog? Why do others read blog postings? Is it a waste of time? What kind of need does it answer? I don’t know.

I’m going to give it another chance in these coming weeks. Here’s a glimpse of the topics that I might be discussing.

• A conference on Democracy and Religion at the Orient Institute
• A book signing at the Francophone Book Fair
• A summary of an article on Martyrocracy
• A reaction to an article published by Samir Frangieh.
• Something on Middle Eastern Peace sites and blogs.

Leaders, Spectators & Clowns: the UN’s General Assembly’s 64th session

The contrast between these four men is striking. One could easily say that in this world Assembly, they are “worlds apart”. On one hand you’ve got a world/worldly leader, on the other three buffoons with very distinct styles.

Obama knew very well who his audience was, and he spoke to them in his habitual clear and cultured style. He was here to convince the UN and world leaders that the Bush days are gone, a page was being turned and that multilateralism was to replace unilateralism. He spoke as a leader, summing his country’s policy change and telling his audience what it wanted to hear. He addressed many issues, took twice the time that was alloted to him, but everything he said was linked to a policy that he had already launched, and that he vowed to pursue (here is his speech).

Now let’s check out the three buffoons: the delusional megalomaniac buffoon, the possessed preacher buffoon and the dogmatic historian buffoon.

I’ve searched the web through and through, but found no transcription of Muammar Gaddafi’s text. The reason is simple. There was no text! The Libyan autocratic leader preferred to improvise. He brought several folders, papers and books with him, and flicked through them, giving solution to every single conflict that sprang to his mind. And instead of sticking to the 15 minutes given to him, he took a whole 90 minutes. So don’t expect coherence or clarity, it’s rants that you’re going to get.

Amadinejad’s speech on the other hand was very well constructed. It clearly defined the good guys and the bad guys. It also spoke lengthly of God… and to a lesser extent of Zionism. It hardly adressed the nuclear issue or other upsetting matters. It didn’t give much thought about the audience or the fact that Israel has been campaigning against him quite heavily accusing his country of genocidal intent. Autistic to the very end, he stuck to preaching, giving no consideration to the fact that his audience wasn’t particularly receptive to his message, and that he needed to be very convincing if he wanted to get his point through.

And then came Netanyahu! If you want a good summary of Israeli Hasbara (propaganda techniques called “explanation”), you can’t dream of a better lesson. Bibi’s speech will tell you everything about how to be self-righteous, how history is to be used against others, how rhetorical techniques could be effective and how certain references can help you sway an audience toward you.

How they helped defeat Farouk Hosny (the story)

The 9 original candidates. Housny is second from left

Before delving into the analysis, let’s set the record straight. I won’t be looking into the dirty politics behind these elections. I do have some crusty insider information on some dirty play, but it’s closer to gossip than meaningful information, and strictly off topic. What we’ll be looking into is the public debate that surrounded these elections. I believe it had an incidence on the final outcome: Irina Bokova’s election to the post of Director General of UNESCO. But there is no way to prove this fact.

Interestingly enough, the reasons behind Farouk Hosny’s defeat are not of much interest. They will leave no trace in the public conscience. On the other hand, the fierce debate surrounding this election will undoubtedly mark those who feel envolved in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Let’s start with a quick look at the five rounds that brought Farouk Hosni to his defeat. If you’re interested in more details, check out this blog.

Results of the 5 rounds


Candidate	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5
Farouk Hosny	22	23	25	29	27
Irina Bokova	8	8	13	29	31
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	7	9	11	0	0
Ivonne Baki	7	8	9	0	0
Ina Marciulionyte	3	4	0	0	0
Alexander Yakovenko	7	3	0	0	0
Noureini Tidjani-Serpos	2	2	0	0	0
Sospeter Muhongo	1	1	0	0	0
Mohammed Bedjaoui	0	0	0	0	0
Blank	1	0	0	0	0
Total	58	58	58	58	58

As the figures clearly show, Farouk Hosni was the leading contestant up to the fifth round. His candidacy was supported by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization for the Islamic Conference. It was backed by France and unopposed (though grudgingly) by Israel. So what happened? If you’re interested in geopolitics, check out what Stephen Suleyman Schwartz had to say about it. I’d rather look into one campaign that picked up speed and was given more media attention than any other story in these elections: that of Bernard-Henri Lévy (alias BHL, alias BHV) relayed on the net through Save Unesco!, a blog started by “French students in political science” that was deleted earlier today (but here is the cached copy). Much can be said about Bernard-Henri Levy and the anonymous group of French students, but I will focus on the issues that they raised, and they are identical. Instead of supporting one specific candidate, they attacked the Egyptian candidate on three main issues

• Antisemitism. This accusation springs from a misquoted statement on burning Israeli books found in Egyptian libraries (a statement Farouk Hosny later apologised for in his “message to the world“). BHL reinterpreted this statement as a vow “to burn with his own hands any book in Hebrew that could have possibly infiltrated the stacks of the Alexandria Library”.
• An alleged involvement in the Achille Lauro Hijacking affair.  
• Responsibility as Minister of Culture (for over two decades) in the crackdown of liberties and freedom of expression in Egypt.

So, is Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace price laureate, right when he says “UNESCO has escaped a scandal, a moral disaster. Mr. Hosni did not deserve the job he does not deserve this honor  tomorrow”. Can we agree with BHL when he says “We have won. Liberty has won. Tolerance has won. And thanks to all of you, respect has won. I’d like to thank you, net surfers, for engaging in this battle for democracy and peace. Thanks to all who refused the unacceptable and who allowed for this beautiful victory”. That’s what we’ll be looking into tomorrow.

عيد مبارك & שנה טובה

When Americans speak of the “wall of separation”, they mean the principle of separation between “Church” and State (i.e. Religion & Government). The expression takes a whole different meaning in our region, doesn’t it?
Well, I thought the title of this post (transliterated: Eid Mubarak and Shana Tova, translated: Blessed Feast and Happy New Year) reflects the hopes of many perfectly, that an ampersand replaces the wall.

Notice the clouds lurking in the back… well, you’ll understand what they’re up to in a coming post

Looking into the central alliance behind the Opposition®

How consistent are political alliances in Lebanon and what effects do they have ? These are two important questions that Ghassan Saoud deals with indirectly in his article published by al-Akhbar: “العونيون لحزب الله: “العتب على قد المحبة (Aounists to Hezbollah: “reproaches  equal to affection”). I discovered this article yesterday thanks to Remarkz’s post on the subject.

First a quick summary then a quick interpretation followed by extrapolations.

The Summary: as the title clearly shows, the article is another example of Lebanese pamphlet-journalism (with substance). Its author is “sending a message” to Hezbollah and the FPM. He hopes that the Shiite party will hear and remedy the points or questions that he formulates. He also wishes the FPM emulates Hezbollah in several ways (balancing between charisma and institution, party organisation, communication policy and strategy…). Here are the questions Ghassan Saoud (quite rightly) believes are bugging the FPM’s christian constituency:

• Is Hezbollah willing to decommission its weapons once Shebaa is liberated and a defensive strategy is adopted & followed?
• What are Hezbollah’s priority or focus (the Shiites? Christian-Muslim partnership in Lebanon? Iran?)?
• Why doesn’t Hezbollah publicly address or communicate on issues that matter to the FPM?
• Why doesn’t Hezbollah support the FPM’s claims the way it supports its own (militarily?)?
• How does Hezbollah’s religious dimension fit in the alliance?

Quick Interpretation: The journalist is obviously frustrated by the fact that the alliance between Hezbollah and the FPM hasn’t  evolved, deepened. It has remained during these three years limited to the highest ranks of both parties and only appears publicly when the need for a common stance is felt.
Little effort is put in bridging the constituencies, deliberating together, working as partners on topics that matter to both (or even to one party). On the other hand, a lot of energy and time is spent on justifying the alliance or the ally’s actions (more at the hand of the FPM than Hezbollah).
Interestingly, many interviewed FPMers bring up the question of “justification”. They blame Hezbollah for not justifying (“explaining”) its actions sufficiently. They also mention the fact that they sometimes have problem justifying these actions to their colleagues. The insistance on justification goes hand in hand with the request for common public stances. This focus translates perfectly the way politics have come to be regarded by Lebanese (especially Christian Lebanese) as a logocracy where all that matters are words and stances.

Extrapolation: What Ghassan Saoud criticises in the Opposition® reminds me of what Michel Hajji-Georgiou reproaches March XIV® with in an even friendlier and more indirect way: Lack of consistency and content.