Policy statement. Who gives a damn?

Resistance picture, part of the "only in Lebanon" series.

Future Movement’s Shiite effigy, MP Oqab Saqr considers that the sentence regarding the “spread of state authority throughout Lebanese territory” and placing “war and peace decisions solely into the hands of the Lebanese state” does not harm the resistance (Voix du Liban). So he sees no reason why it shouldn’t be included in the Policy Statement of Saad Hariri’s government.

I personally see no reason why any sentence should or shouldn’t be included in the Policy Statement. It is after all a totally futile rhetorical exercice with no legal or political effects whatsoever. The only use it could possibly serve is feed sterile polemics whenever any disagreement appears between any two parties/blocs represented in the government (with no less than 10 political parties on board, I’m sure there will be numerous occasions for that). Has anyone bothered to take a look at the previous declaration and see which part of it was actually implemented? Such an exercice would certainly be extremely difficult to follow through because it is rather difficult to see what these abstract statements imply in practice.

What does the sentence “spread of state authority throughout Lebanese territory” imply practically? Does that mean that police officers would be able to do their job in Palestinian camps? Certainly not. Politicians and officials have already “given guarantees” to Mahmoud Abbas’ representative that they won’t. Does that mean that the Minister of Interior will actually be able to monitor the work of the security forces anywhere outside his office? And I’m not only hinting at Hezbollah’s “security pockets”, but also some directories and local forces in Northern Lebanon and Beirut (that obey to Hariri), Southern Lebanon (that obey to Nabih Berri) or Southern Mount Lebanon (that obey to Walid Jumblatt). Wouldn’t it be more effective to say that the Minister of the Interior is mandated to assert the authority of his ministry throughout the territory and make sure that no group can hold arms unless authorised by Parliament?

Security first? The contours of a Lebanese policy for peace talks with Israel

The Lebanese have grown accustomed to governments unable or unwilling to deal with their southern neighbour. Some regret that these governments haven’t been able to defend the country militarily and diplomatically (from the IDF’s ferocious attacks), while others deplore that none has come up with a policy for peace talks with Israel.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a contributor to NOW Lebanon, has come up with an interesting analysis on the subject. He believes Lebanon should define a policy on Israel and embark in peace talks because “Lebanon will never defeat Israel militarily, [so] its ‘conflict’ with the Jewish state can only be resolved by diplomacy”. He concludes his article with the following statement:

Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, both governments have failed to produce a policy on Israel. The Mitchell team is determined to change all this, but they need the help of Lebanon’s leaders, who must not be shy about talking peace with Israel, just like their Syrian and Palestinian brethren. The rest will become details.

At face value, his conclusion is indisputable, but if you look into it, you discover there is an important dimension to Israeli-Lebanese relations that Hussain Abdul-Hussain completely leaves out: the “security” dimension.

This is quite common among Beirutis. But if you ask Israelis or Lebanese living in Southern Lebanon, it’s their primary concern. And this issue is certainly the murkiest. Here’s why:

• Since the 1960s, the Lebanese government has failed to secure its border with Israel. So before embarking in Peace talks, the Lebanese government should see how it will be able to achieve that and start working on it.
• Since the 1960s, Israel has been “retaliating” after each attack coming from Lebanon. This has brought a lot of destruction, death and distrust in Southern Lebanon. Shouldn’t Lebanon build a defensive strategy so as to dissuade, limit or restrain the “IDF”?
• An armed grouped, Hezbollah, backed by the majority of the local population wants to keep the fight going. Their most popular argument within their constituency is similar to the one of the Israeli army: only military strength will ensure our security and disuade our enemy from attacking us. It’s a defensive argument (that is not weaker than that of the Israeli army). What could the Lebanese government answer to this argument be?
• There are other armed groups that are held back by Hezbollah (mostly Palestinian, and Sunni islamists) who are willing to pursue the fight, and the Lebanese State doesn’t seem to have a hold on them.

Before asking the government to come up with a diplomatic strategy toward Israel, I think it is foremost important to ask them to come up with a coherent military and defensive strategy, one that takes into account and deals with Hezbollah and the Palestinians of Lebanon.

Violence spills over: Shooting at Tel Aviv gay center

Candles in memory of dead spell out "love"

How fast is Israel heading for trouble? How much can one extrapolate from one crime news heading, a simple human interest story? Could it be an indicator or is it just an isolated case?

One thing is certain, Israeli editorialists and politicians are not taking it so lightly (c.f. Yediot Ahronot article). For them, it’s not just about Nir Katz (24) and Liz Trubeshi (17) who were killed on saturday. It’s about a shooting attack on a gay and lesbian youth center in Tel Aviv. It’s about a hate crime. It’s about an automatic weapon (such as an M-16 rifle) that was used by an Israeli to kill other Israelis because of differences in lifestyle and values.

It’s about a bubble exploding, but unlike Eytan Fox’s הבועה, the needle that burst it is not directly tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict… but might very well be indirectly link to it. For how long can Israeli society nurture  its militaristic culture and breed distrust between some of its sectors, before that starts spreading?

Judging from the reaction of editorialists and politicians, the fear is there, but also the discomfort. How should this attack be called? A terror attack? Can it be called a terror attack although its perpetrator seems to be jewish? This is the kind of hesitation one sees in interviews and opinion papers. It’s not a simple case of semantics, its about classification, operating a distinction between “jewish violence and “palestinian violence”: when violence is so instrumental in separating and defining two groups, what happens when it erupts within one of the groups? what does it say about the opposition between the two groups…

Concealing Palestinians: A telling advert on the Separation Barrier

Haaretz published a story on Israeli Arab MK Ahmed Tibi  joining calls to scrap this television commercial which he finds offensive. He explained to Reuters that “the advertisement presents the barrier as though it were just a garden fence in Tel Aviv”, while it actually ”separates families and prevents children from reaching schools and clinics”.

Don’t you find his stand rather irrelevant? It will certainly not bring about any kind of change. The advert will keep on running (which is inconsequential) and the wall will stay standing. And Ahmed Tibi will keep on making ineffective political moves meant to reassure his constituency on his political stands.

A cartoon to illustrate a Taef principle

In 1989, the Lebanese parliamentarians convened in Taef, with financial encouragements from Rafik Hariri. In this Saudi Arabian city, they spawned an agreement, the Document of National Accord supposed to provide the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. Have a glimpse at the document, and check a good commentary for backdrop information. But let’s get to the crux of the matter.

In 1989, the country was in the hands of five militias (PSP, Amal, Lebanese Forces, Hezbollah, SLA), two foreign armies (Israeli, Syrian) and a divided Lebanese army. These militias are only mentioned once in the document that speaks of “disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced”. This mention focuses on militias as a weapon bearing group. Sure, this is its defining quality, but militias are much more than that. Militias are power centers, networks, they have a human, an economical, a territorial, a symbolic and in this case an ethnic dimension. These dimensions are not mentioned in the Taef Agreement which hides one basic principle: The militias, after decommissioning will be recognised as political parties, and will safeguard their positions within government (a process that began in the 1980s with the Rachid Karami lead National Unity government).

Three of those militias are now pillars of the quadripartite oligarchy, two other decommissioned militias are junior partners of the oligarchy, and so is the former head of the Lebanese Army.

A very revealing affair (3): Gad Elmaleh & Lebanese Jewish Politics

Let’s cut to the chase (and cut the crap). The Gad Elmaleh affair reveals three things?

• The political function of rhetorical battles. Rhetorical battles are an excellent tool for mobilisation. They grant politicians room for overbidding (with no political cost). It allows people to express and affirm key values (not necessarily held, but at least celebrated). In a polarised setting, it affirms, confirms and “justifies” the separation between the two groups.

Lastly, it has a very satisfying emotional dynamic. In the beginning, it “wakes people up”, in this case, keeps them alert to the danger of Hezbollah (for March XIV) or to the danger of March XIV (for Hezbollah). Through overbidding, the tension builds up: “they are imposing cultural censorship on us” vs “they are pushing for cultural normalisation with Israel“). The more the tension builds up, the more it infiltrates the masses; people start repeating the politicians slogans, strengthening the framework that was set up for them… Frustrations are expressed… freely. Emotions become violent. Taboos fall. Accusations swell… Each and every one participating in this rhetorical battle feels he is winning it. Each person feels he has the better arguments. At this point, no one is listening to the other, and each is intoxicated by his own rhetoric, values, arguments… People and groups let off steam. And they feel relieved.

It’s a rhetorical battle, so nothing on the ground will change, nothing except the deepening of the divide between the two “battling” groups.

• A Lebanese jewish quagmire. Since the establishment of Israel, Lebanese officials seem to have  felt uncomfortable with Lebanon’s Jewish community. Unlike Morocco whose king (Hassan II) took a public stand affirming and reaffirming  the place Moroccan Jews held in Moroccan society, Lebanese officials have preferred to remain silent on that issue. Sure, the Lebanese security forces offered the community protection in times of war and tensions. The Kataeb party was quite vocal in its defence of Lebanese Jews, and Kamal Joumblatt seems to have offered some Beiruti-Jews shelter in newly formed fiefdom in 1967. But on the governmental level, Jews were pushed out of the public administration and the army, and the 1943 “national pact” offered them no public place. The country was being redefined as Christian-Muslim.

Hypocrisy denounced in a hypocritical cartoon

In the 1960s, anti-Israeli rhetoric started soaring. Lebanese politicians engaged in this new rhetorical battle and some really excelled in it (ex: Kamal Joumblatt). Things haven’t changed today. Lebanese politicians are proud to boast that “Lebanon will be the last arab country to sign peace with Israel“. And they keep on reminding the Lebanese that “Israel is our natural enemy“, that “Israel is Lebanon’s antithesis“, and that “Israel is bound on destroying Lebanon because we’re their competitors“. This empty rhetoric isn’t Hezbollah’s (absolute) privilege. It is expressed by Lebanese politicians of all sides. March XIV® politicians regularly engage in “anti-israeli” or “anti-zionist” overbidding (c.f. my former posts  1 2 on the inoperative distinction between “Jews” and “Zionists”). Two days ago, Fares Soueid (a Lebanese politician who hasn’t been able to reclaim his mother’s seat in Parliament since Syria’s withdrawal) declared as secretary general of March XIV that the Gad Elmaleh affair serves the interest of Israel! This kind of overbidding certainly benefits Hezbollah and corners March XIV politicians because it prevents any alternative discourse on Israel, and comes across as insincere to many Lebanese.

• An orphan peace camp. It’s becoming quite clear that there is a growing number of Lebanese that is in favour of peace with Israel. They know that their communal leadership is in favour of peace with Israel (Hariri Senior, Jumblatt, Gemayel, Geagea and Aoun have all expressed this in one way or another at a given time), but they can plainly see that this leadership is engaged in anti-Israeli rhetoric and paying lip service to the importance of resistance to Israel and the Palestinian cause.

This growth of Peaceniks is noticeable from the growing interest Lebanese are having in Israeli issues, the growing consumption of Israeli cultural products (music, films, literature), the Lebanese readership of Haaretz, the growing interest in Judaism and Lebanon’s Jewish community… I personally believe that most of the people who are getting involved in this controversy and supporting Gad Elmaleh’s show in Beiteddine are such peaceniks.

So there is an obvious gap between the leadership (that hides its past and probably present ties with Israeli officials and engages in anti-Israeli rhetoric) and some groups of the population. This gap feeds frustrations. But instead of being rightly  expressed toward their hypercritical leadership, they are canalised and diverted toward Hezbollah (that defends values they don’t agree with), accusing it of being the reason behind Lebanon’s antagonism with Israel, and Israeli’s violent policy toward Lebanon. It takes a couple of minutes on the internet to verify the public support Gad Elmaleh offers to Israel. Insisting on his performance in Lebanon in a way reflects an unexpressed desire of normalisation with judaism, and what has become central to it, i.e. Israel.

A very revealing affair (2): Gad Elmaleh & the Lebanese Media

Now let’s look at the facts:

1. Beiteddine Festival, operated by Nora Joumblatt (Walid Joumblatt’s syrian born wife) programs French stand-up comic and actor Gad el-Maleh in this year’s edition of the Festival.
2. Manar TV station, that’s nothing less than a mouthpiece for Hezbollah, airs two “reports” claiming that Gad el-Maleh has fought in the IDF (Israeli army), denounce his participation in a Lebanese summer festival and pronounce him unwelcome in Lebanon.
3. Tourism Minister Elie Marouni (Kataeb), Information Minister Tarek Mitri (Future Movement ally), Culture Minister Tamam Salam (pro-Future Movement ally), and Beiteddine Festival President Nora Joumblatt (oligarch’s wife) speak out against al-Manar’s reports and denounce them as unfounded.
4. Gad el-Maleh cancels his three shows for security reasons
5. Pro-March XIV media, March XIV politicians and the above ministers launch a campaign against Hezbollah’s “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking” and (my personal favourite) “bringing the image of Lebanon into disrepute”,  and for maintaining the show (or having it “videoconferenced” from Paris).

Then let’s get to the analysis:

A rhetorical battle. Up to now, the whole “Gad elmaleh affair has been a “rhetorical battle” between el-Manar on one hand and some March XIV politicians and media mouthpieces (Hezbollah’s allies, most notably the FPM, have remained completely silent on it). As you have noted from fact #5, the accusations brought against el-Manar can hold no legal ground (except for the fourth one). This “detail” is quite important. Why have the accusers chosen to attack Hezbollah on charges that hold no legal ground?

No charges have been pressed. Well, the matter is quite simple. Under lebanese law, there actually are several grounds for legal charges against el-Manar and Hezbollah. So why sticking to polemical accusations, when there are three accusations that actually hold.

• El-Manar is accused of either disinformation or basing its reporting on dubious sources. Why doesn’t the Minister of Information press charges (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Tarek Mitri?
• El-Manar is accused of attacking Gad el-Maleh on the bases he’s Jewish. Now Lebanon doesn’t have a specific law against anti-semitism, but it does have a law against inciting confessional hate, and Judaism is one of Lebanon’s protected faiths. Now El-Manar has been doing it for years. Why hasn’t anyone pressed charges against that? Why hasn’t the Interior Minister pressed charges against tmhat (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Ziad Baroud?
• El-Manar is accused of tarnishing Lebanon’s image. I personally find the concept absurd and totally illiberal and antidemocratic (it’s no coincidence that it is mostly used by authoritarian regimes). But it holds under Lebanese law. Why hasn’t the Minister of Justice acted upon it?

Silly yet revealing accusations. el-Manar and Hezbollah have been accused of “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking”. Let’s take one accusation at a time and see in what way it is revealing.

• Censorship. My dictionary defines censorship as “the practice of officially examining books, movie, etc. and suppressing unacceptable parts”. The most important element in this definition is obviously “Officially“. Censorship is practiced by an authority that holds power. Hezbollah shares with Walid Joumblatt’s “Democratic Gathering”, the position of fourth largest bloc in Parliament (less than 10% of MPs). It has one minister in the current government (out of 30). Now that doesn’t really put it in a position of power institutionally. And the “anti-Gad Elmaleh campaign” was launched by one of Lebanon’s medias, not by an official media. Sure, Hezbohallah is armed and could endanger Gad Elmaleh’s life were he to come to Lebanon. But it’s not the only armed side in Lebanon, and a security arrangement could be found with it, like it has been found on so many other matters. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Intellectual terrorism. Here’s wikipedia’s definition (my translation): “the practice which aims at intimidating or silencing people by submitting them to arguments and intellectual pressures through publications, media interventions (etc) so as to prevent them from formulating perturbing ideas (regardless of their validity, falsity or disputability)”. What is interesting with the concept of “intellectual terrorism” is that it doesn’t have to be “official”, it can be operational as long as the people exercising it hold the upper hand in the specific field they are operating in. Now Hezbollah surely doesn’t have the upper hand in the communication field or the cultural production field. Truth to tell, its cultural influence is rather limited (and so is its participation in cultural production). So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Cultural hostage taking. The charge is quite meaningless. It assumes that Hezbollah has a dominant position in the cultural sector and can define Lebanese cultural expressions or at least censor them, which bring us back to the first two “charges”. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?

So why is the Gad Elmaleh affair just another rhetorical battle, and in what way does it reveal that people feel cornered by Hezbollah? You can look at the way some bloggers (Jester, Now Lebanon, Khaled Barraj) or journalists (Daily Star’s Michael Young, Orient-Le Jour’s Michel Hajji Georgiou) have been dealing with this issue. My answer comes tomorrow.

Out of court… on-air “settlements”

I received two emails with the same content: an extract of a TV show in which MP Ibrahim Kanaan (Free Patriotic Movement, Metn) answers accusation of corruption and vote buying by screaming at the show’s anchorwoman, Ghada Eid.

When I first watched the show, I was appalled by Ibrahim Kanaan’s reaction. The first few words he uses are quite revealing about the way he perceived this episode of al-Fasad. He called it “a political assassination”. And after saying that, he started yelling, scolding the anchorwoman, denigrating her work, insinuating things, accusing her of corruption and threatening her with a lawsuit for libel (something NTV is rather used to). She on the other hand insinuates that Ibrahim Kanaan’s party is corrupt and doesn’t hold its promises, she starts yelling as well, saying that her voice will always be higher than the others” and threatens him with a lawsuit for insults.

Now here is the interesting part of the story, Ibrahim Kanaan isn’t accused of actually bribing people, but of promising to bribe people and not honouring his promise. How can you prove that? And how can you prove that wrong?

This being said, Ibrahim Kanaan’s on-air reaction is shocking, and I wanted to know more about this incident, so I tried to search the internet for more info. What I found were two OTV news extracts. Now OTV is operated by the Free Patriotic Movement. One can hardly expect it to be neutral on that matter. So here is how the anchor answered the accusation: he showed two men apologising for their brother, Nabil Fala’s conduct (that of falsely accusing Ibrahim Kanaan of failing to honour his promise of bribery). The anchorman also showed an interview of Kanaan in which the latter didn’t apologise for his language and tone on Ghada Eid’s show, and instead talked about the accusers criminal records… These criminal records were later shown on air! A TV show answers another TV show’s circus with another circus (that of denigration and publication of criminal records… doesn’t that infringe Nabil Fala’s rights?).

So it’s not only about Lebanese politics being at their worst, but Lebanese journalism too.

Addendum

OTV followed this news broadcast with another one on June 17th. Here, the television questions and answers another witness’ allegations by showing that part of another TV’s investigation was actually fabricated.

Autopsie ou Anatomie d’une haine?

Ceci est une lettre que j’ai envoyé à Michel Hajji Georgiou, en réponse à un article qu’il avait partagé avec des amis sur le net avant de le publier dans l’Orient-Le Jour. Son article était lui même une sorte de réaction aux propos (injurieux) d’une lectrice.

J’ai lu avec beaucoup d’intérêt ton article intitulé “Autopsie d’une haine”. A tout dire, je m’attendais à son contenu,
un énième réquisitoire contre le chef du CPL et sa mouvance. Mais c’est le titre qui m’a un peu surpris. Pourquoi
autopsie? Cette haine serait-elle morte? Et d’ailleurs, de quelle haine s’agit-il? Celle qu’expriment Michel Aoun et
ses partisans ou celle qui est exprimé à leur encontre?
On pourrait discuter et se disputer autour de leur origine, de leur validité, de leur dynamique, de leur expression;
on pourrait même les comparer, les opposer, les interpréter, les expliquer et les condamner… Mais il faut se
rendre à l’évidence: on ne peut pas nier leur double existence. Aucune heure de la journée ne passe sans qu’on ne
les rencontre au détour d’une rue ou d’une conversation. Elles sont bien vivantes, vigoureuses et épanouies; elles
s’expriment ouvertement, fièrement et se déclinent sur tous les tons: amical, descriptif, analytique, scientifique,
prévenant, pédant, cavalier, empathique, euphémiste, dramatique, lyrique, menaçant, méprisant, apocalyptique,
naïf, cynique, injurieux, vulgaire, ironique… On pourrait d’ailleurs s’amuser à écrire une tirade des haines, façon la
tirade des nez de Rostand.
Mais franchement, la lecture que tu nous as servi ne me donne pas envie de m’amuser. Elle m’inquiète et me
chagrine.
Je ne vais évidemment pas m’attarder sur l’opinion de Mme Haddad. Il est évident que son propos est méprisant et
injurieux. Ce qui me pousse à me poser quelques questions: Vaut-il la peine d’être publié? Pourquoi? Est-il
véritablement symptomatique ou représentatif? De quoi?!
Dans ton article, tu y réponds de manière claire et catégorique, et à mon avis, hative. Ces questions méritent
d’être posées à nouveau, à froid, à tête reposée, une fois l’injure (dé)passée. S2al mjareb, mish hakim. Je ne peux
pas te compter le nombre de fois où l’on m’a servi ce genre d’insultes, que ce soit en famille, en société, ou même
à l’université; avec le même ton, les mêmes arguments, la même fin… mais cette fois brandi par des gens qui se
revendiquent du Quatorze Mars. On m’a même agressé physiquement, à deux reprises. Pourquoi? Parce que je
rejetais les arguments de la coalition dite du Quatorze Mars, parce qu’à l’occasion je donnais raison à ses rivaux,
parce que je ne suis pas prêt de voter pour elle…

Retournons à cette haine dont tu as été victime. J’aurai aimé que tu nous décrives son anatomie. Ta lecture
m’aurait vraiment intéressé. Mais au lieu d’une analyse, nous avons eu droit à un réquisitoire. A aucun moment tu
ne te demandais pourquoi une citoyenne comme toi et moi s’est exprimé ainsi, ce qui l’a amené à s’exprimer
ainsi. Qu’est-ce qui se cache derrière sa haine: quelle frustration, quelle colère, quelle exaspération? Qu’est-ce
qui est à leur origine?

March XIV's new emblem... does it look familiar?

Je ne cherche à justifier ni son propos ni son ton. Loin de là. J’essaie juste de montrer qu’au-delà de la
condamnation, il existe des questions qui méritent d’être posées.
Mais ta réponse semble tout prête: cette jeune femme est soit fasciste soit victime de la pensée fasciste
puisqu’elle exprime une haine fasciste et soutiens un mouvement populiste et donc fasciste. L’équation est
simple, si simple qu’elle se passe d’une définition même du fascisme. Il suffit de répéter le mot et de le décliner 9
fois! Tu sais aussi bien que moi que traiter l’adversaire de fasciste est la meilleur manière de le faire taire. L’OLP
s’en est longtemps servi, relayé par le PSP, le Baas et quelques groupuscules dits de gauche. En ce temps, c’était
les Kataeb et les Forces Libanaises qui en faisaient les frais…

A défaut de nous présenter l’anatomie de la haine “aouniste”, tu nous as présenté l’anatomie de ta haine du
“aounisme” que l’on peut déterminer avec les critères que tu as toi même choisi. Tu te sers de la réaction colérique
et haineuse d’une lectrice comme pièce à conviction. ֵTu ramènes le soutien au CPL à une “dialectique” entre une
masse et son chef. Tu réduis les partisans de Aoun à une masse sans personnalité, sans identité, haineuse,
enflammée, formatée, sans logique, une secte incapable de discuter et qui cherche à annihiler la pensée,
l’intellect, toute forme de rationalité, souvent lâche (ce sont tes mots que j’utilise). Et tu assimiles Michel Aoun (que
tu nommes même pas) à un Führer, un Duce, un puit abyssal de vices et de dépravation… (toujours tes mots).
Ne peut-on pas te faire le même reproche que tu fais à tes détracteurs? Franchement, j’ai eu du mal à trouver une
logique dans ton réquisitoire tant les “moyens” sont obscurcis par des accusations, des allusions, des
rapprochements (historiques et littéraires) et des glissements.

Comment ne pas te rejoindre lorsque tu dis percevoir une “dérive à tous les niveaux de la société”. Mais
personnellement, j’ai l’impression qu’on a atteint le fond. Il n’existe plus de lieux ou d’espaces publics où la
discussion politique est possible. La haine s’est déjà répandue dans tous les recoins de notre société. Et une
extrême polarisation flanquée d’une hyper-mobilisation a amené tout le monde (à commencer par la presse) à se
présenter comme “engagé” alors qu’en réalité on est tout simplement partisan. Je t’écris cela à la veille d’un
scrutin que je boycotte tant mon dégout est grand et le choix politique me paraît impossible.

Remembering Nahr el Bared

This most will probably strike my countrymen as being anti-patriotic. Under Lebanese law, such posting is considered illegal because it sullies the image of Lebanon and the Lebanese armies. Two accusations that are considered to “prejudice national security interests”.

Rubbish if you tell me.

Two years to day, violence erupted in Nahr el-Bared Camp between the Lebanese army and Fateh el-Islam. The battle raged for 15 weeks, scattering the camp’s residents (around 30 000) claiming the life of hundreds, levelling the camp’s center (the “old camp”).  most of the campIt took the army  more than three months to vanquish Fateh el-Islam. The battles had a devastating effect on the camp and its population. Its center (“the old camp”).

As expected, no investigation was carried to determine the responsibility in letting Fateh el-Islam arm itself within the camp (didn’t the army intelligence know about it? why didn’t it prevent it? why didn’t it inform the government? why didn’t the Ministry of Defence react?). And no investigation was done surrounding the actions of the army during the battle. Sure Fateh el-Islam was ruthless, but does that justify or excuse the exactions carried out by some soliders (summery execution, insults, humiliation, looting…). Certainly not. I ran across a very disturbing site on the internet. It’s accusations might be groundless, but then maybe not. I would have liked to have a thorough investigation with the rights given to the victims to press charges against the army or soldiers.

In the fight against armed islamists, taking a moral stand is not only a moral necessity for those who are waging the battle, but it is a condition for its ultimate success.

Marketing belligerence: “The ultimate mission to Israel”

I stumbled upon an astonishing tourism program this morning called “The Mission“. It offers “a dynamic and intensive eight day exploration of Israel’s struggle for survival and security in the Middle East today: a military, humanitarian, historical, judicial, religious, and political reality check“.

Not only you are served propaganda, but you pay for it too! 

Take a look at the “Mission Highlights”:

• Briefings by Mossad officials and commanders of the Shin Bet.
• Briefing by officers in the IDF Intelligence and Operations branches.
• Inside tour of the IAF unit who carries out targeted killings.
• Live exhibition of penetration raids in Arab territory.
• Observe a trial of Hamas terrorists in an IDF military court.
• First hand tours of the Lebanese front-line military positions and the Gaza border check-points.
• Inside tour of the controversial Security Fence and secret intelligence bases.
• Meeting Israel’s Arab agents who infiltrate the terrorist groups and provide real-time intelligence.
• Briefing by Israel’s war heros who saved the country.
• Meetings with senior Cabinet Ministers and other key policymakers.
• Small airplane tour of the Galilee, Jeep rides in the Golan heights, water activities on Lake Kinneret, a cook-out barbecue and a Shabbat enjoying the rich religious and historic wonders of Jerusalem’s Old City.

Isn’t it just mind boggling. This tour invites you to share an experience where the most controversial of policies are presented as necessary, legitimate, lawful and heroic (targeted killing, penetration raids, separation wall)…

I wonder what a Lebanese version of such a show would look like. Any suggestions for an “Ultimate Mission to Lebanon”?

Someone please tell Siniora that charity starts at home

Siniora pledged 1m $ to Gaza last week. How considerate, how charitable, what a great signe of arab solidarity, right? nah.

What a PR stunt! What a typical arab face saving scheme!  What a pitiful action to obscure the fact that the Lebanese government did nothing when the battle was raging in Gaza. This kind of reaction is expected from the Gulf’ Petro-States. Petro-dollars are surely their best diplomatic and political asset.  But Lebanon is no petro-State, and the country doesn’t have a dollar to spare.

What it has is a relatively old diplomatic tradition, some very dynamic and imaginative diplomats (No, this comment is not intended for a regular reader), and quite a numerous Palestinian population born and raised in Lebanon. So why not start with that? Why wasn’t Lebanon more active in December and January? Why didn’t our diplomacy find a way to reconcile the two arab positions concerning Gaza? Why doesn’t the government find an imaginative solution to have a diplomatic representation in Palestine ? Why doesn’t Siniora use the million dollars he promised to Gaza to help out Lebanon’s Palestinian or to finance programmes (or a larger public institution) to advance the condition of this disenfranchised population and its relations with Lebanese nationals?

Instead of those necessary actions, all Siniora did was secure a photo-op with Ms Clinton.

Gaza… Closed zone

Well, there’s a first time for everything. Up to now, I had never inserted a youtube video in this blog. I didn’t see the point of it. But how can you resist Yoni Goodman’s short film “Closed Zone”. I discovered it on Haaretz’s website. For anyone reading this blog, and interested in the Middle East, you should check out this Israeli paper as often as possible. I believe it is by far the best daily in the Middle East. Sure it has its biases, it is after all an israeli rather judeo-centric and left leaning newspaper. But you’ll probably find in its pages the best reporting and analysis on the conflict.

As for the film, it’s really worth the click, and it only runs a minute and a half. Yoni Goodman created it for the Israeli NGO Gisha devoted to the freedom of movement.  He is no other than the animator of ”Waltz with Bashir”.

I would have preferred a slightly more condensed version of the clip, without the final frames in which the bird is caged. They are rather redundant and the message is quite clear without them.

Gaza, a prequel to Lebanon War 3 ?

Every day, news leaked into my spirit on what was happening in Gaza. I had shut myself off from it, tried to ignore it. But the death toll kept reminding me that there was a new war in the Middle East, actually not a new war but a new battle (in an ongoing war)  in my neighbourhood. 

I couldn’t stand to hear the press commenting on it. It was all dabble or worse… propaganda. Almost no coverage from Gaza. Only some images (probably stolen) from a Palestinian and Islamist TV, but no western journalists, no live testimonies from westerners living there. The only people interviewed were european looking IDF personnel, mostly women. 

As I walked on the streets of Amsterdam, I noticed through a window a TV reporting on the war. Each war in the Middle East is a rehearsal to another war. It’s a training ground for another war. That’s at least how the Israeli military sees it, and that’s how their foes now understand it. In each war, new strategies are tested and “lessons” learnt from previous wars applied. 

Israel knows that the Middle East is no friendly place to live in, so it has grown accustomed to seeing itself “victim” of an everlasting and ongoing war with its neighbours. A war taking various forms (one of them being a truce or a peace treaty), with nothing to build on except ones military “defensive” capacities, nothing to do other than “prepare” for the next war.

One thing is sure. Israel isn’t the only one “learning” from the present “war lessons”. While the whole world watches the battle raging , the military operations expanding and the casualties mounting; While Palestinians in Gaza (and Hamas) try to survive… Hezbollah is equally “learning” from the “Second Gaza War” the new strategies developed by its enemy, for they will surely be applied soon in Lebanon.

And as I sit comfortably in front of my computer in a public library, Gaza II seems to be just another prequel to the next war.

Arrogance vs Resentment : street politics in Beirut

“We don’t go to that pub anymore… Because of what they did in May… They set up a roadblock, you know… They mugged and humiliated people”. 

The resentment in Beirut for Hezbollah and its allies’ takeover of Beirut in May 2008 is palpable. Hezbollah is seen as the main political foe. But people hold grudges against two other parties who they believe are the main perpetrators of the “invasion”: the Syrian Social National Party and Amal  (even though they believe Hezbollah bares the political responsibility). 

Many see the month of Ramadan as a truce. But the tension is still high, and the “authentic beirutis” do not hide their vindictiveness.

On the other side of the divide, Amal and the Syrian Social National Party behave as if they didn’t take part of the bloody fray. There seems to be a national and international consensus to restrict the responsibility on Hezbollah, and Hezbollah readily accepts it, and even boasts about it.

Interestingly enough, Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech last week which was received differently by the two sides. His allies found it conciliatory, while his foes saw it as arrogant. Actually, I believe it was actually a bit of both. The general tone was conciliatory, but his justification of the May “events” was felt by his foes as “blaming the victim”. One thing is for sure, Hezbollah and its leader have never been so arrogant. Even though this trait is shared by many politicians and parties in Lebanon, in this case, it comes from a party that knows it’s the strongest in the political arena and that’s what its arrogance is putting forward.