Week’s highlight: the weapons issue

Weapons sparked three debates this week. It all started when the Israeli military fished a weapon cargo heading to Beirut. Then the Maronite patriarch made a speech on how weapons and democracy were mutually exclusive and finally the head of the FPM Michel Aoun criticised the Patriarch’s speech and added that if he had the means he would arm himself to fight for Palestine! We’ll look into these polemics one at the time.

The record weapon catch. The most fascinating thing about the story isn’t what was said, but what wasn’t said. We got a lot of info about how much the booty weighted, we didn’t get any info about what exactly these weapons were and who had made them. We got a lot of info about the crew and the three last destination of the ship, but no info on its past and its real ownership. Classified information or courteousness between weapon dealers and producers?

The Patriarch’s sermon. The Patriarch picked up a habit of recurrently making a sermon against Hezbollah and its weapons. His followers, that is political followers (not necessarily of his flock) and backers applaud his “national stands” and celebrate his “national role”. But they never mention the effect it has on communal politics and the gate it opens for other political interventions of clergymen in the public sphere (his backers had even asked him to pick a President for the country two years ago…). His stance does not prevent him from backing parties who will join a government in which Hezbollah will be part of and whose declaration will not condemn the weapons this party holds. Three of the christian political groups he has been actively supporting for nearly a decade (what is left of Qornet Chehwan that was never a political party and is the biggest looser of the past elections with only one MP in parliament, the Lebanese Forces that hasn’t been reestablished as a party since its dissolution in the 1990s probably for financial reasons and the Kataeb that has been hijacked by the Gemayel family after having been hijacked by the Syrian intelligence) will probably express their reservations on the government’s declaration but that will not prevent them from participating in it.

This kind of condemnation is the best example of the “public stand culture” ثقافة المواقف that is meant to satisfy (with words) one’s constituency or sponsor, but that never translates into political action.

Aoun’s tantrum. When angry, the hindered Za’im has no qualms about contradicting himself and making the most outrageous and irresponsible declarations. His first argument to the Patriarch followed these lines: “these weapons were never used against you, so why are you complaining”. Then he expressed his willingness to take up arms too, but regretted he didn’t have the financial ressources for that. I pity Michel Aoun’s supporters who will have to find a way to justify this outburst.

David Issa on MTV, political analysis gone astray

This guy is obviously angry… and in need of recognition. During his hour long discussion on MTV (a resurrected Lebanese TV channel), his voice showed an emotional range that varied from displeasure to exasperation to indignity to outrage. At a random moment I decided to count how many times he repeated “I” in one minute: 7 times, and twice for no apparent reason (there was no call in grammar, syntax or meaning for it). I didn’t catch the show from the start (when the presenter gives a flattering biographical outlook on his guest), but I believe he ran as candidate in 2000 for Beirut’s Greek-Catholic seat (and lost to Michel Pharaon).

The host obviously tried as hard as he could to formulate his questions as if his guest was a fortuneteller or a weather forecaster; doesn’t political analysis belong to this family of activities after all? when you read our press or watch our news programs, you come up with the obvious answer: YES.

So you can’t really blame David Issa for answering these questions as a weatherman or a fortuneteller would. When given the occasion, he pointed out a couple of things that were very true, but then made a mess of the analysis that was a times incoherent at others biased and most of the time unfounded (traits that are alas shared by the political system).

Here are the most interesting points he made:

• The Christians are divided, but what are the issues that they disagree on? They have an important role in bridging the divide between Shiites and Sunnis.

Now this in itself is a topic that could be discussed lengthily. David Issa didn’t notice the internal contradiction between his two statements. He regrets the division of the Christians, but believes that the mobilisation of the Shiites and Sunnis behind two blocs is negative (and leaves aside the Druze and Alawite communities). If the Christians were mobilised (which is structurally impossible) behind one leader and bloc, how would that facilitate the demobilisation of the muslim groups?

• Zahlé, as the capital of Greek-Catholics, should be represented in government by a minister holding a “respectable” portfolio.

David Issa, speaking on behalf of his community (although he claimed several times that he was against the communal feelings and the power-division scheme with a communal dimension) introduced a new principle for the composition of the government. He linked together two constitutional principles: the quota system along communal lines and  the fair representation of region. If such a rule is introduced, one could imagine its complicating effect on the formation of governments. Should Armenian ministers be from Burj Hammoud, should there be a minister Shiite minister from Baalbeck, one from Nabatieh and one from the Southern suburb of Beirut… Regional representation are obviously taken into account in all governments, so are family issues. But does this mean they should be transformed into rules that know of no exception?

Interpreting death & giving freedom a bad name

I just came back from the screening of Marmoulak (the Lizard) at the Samir Kassir Foundation. I didn’t have the time to sit through the whole film and as the subtitles were hard to decipher (white on white), I let my mind drift around the room and the event.

Why on earth did the Samir Kassir Foundation choose to screen this film? Is it because it was censored? Is it because it is Iranian? Is it because it is critical of the Iranian regime? I think all three reasons are equally true. The Samir Kassir Foundation is quite clear about its political orientation. It is unabashedly March XIV and follows this camp’s political and geopolitical stands and views. So you’re sure to hear more criticism of the Syrian, Hamas and Iranian regime than the Saudi, Fatah or Egyptian regime.

I was sitting in the main room. On my left there was a wall with some 12 pictures of assassinated journalists on it, each “martyr” featured twice: Kamal Mroueh, Michel Seurat, Samir Kassir, Gibran Tueni, Salim al-Lawzé and probably Riad Taha. By putting the word martyr between quotes, I don’t mean to downplay the tragedy of these journalists’ death. My point is to stress that this appellation has political implications and that it indicates a specific interpretation of their deaths.
I’ve never quite understood how the death of some people could be paraded in a country like Lebanon where life has very little value to start with and violent death is not an uncommon occurrence. In 1958, a civil war brought about the death of over 2000 Lebanese citizens, most of them civilians. Between 1975 and 1990, over 200 000 Lebanese perished in the civil war, most of them civilians. In 2006, over a 1000 Lebanese were killed by war acts, most of them civilians. In 2008, over a hundred people were killed in less than 10 days, many of them were civilians.
So what makes the death of a few people significant enough to distinguish them from the lot, to remember their name, to commemorate their death and to give it a personal meaning that elevates them to the rank of role models, heroes? For the innocent civilians that were killed by armies and militias, they are only remembered collectively as victims of the brutality of war. For the journalists that were targeted, their death is interpreted as saying as much about them as it says about their perpetrator.

All Soul’s Day blues

As I drove back home today in the pouring rain, I noticed three women entering a cemetery holding flowers (and umbrellas). They were probably visiting a relative’s grave. The neighbourhood they were in is a strange one. It’s made up of six or seven walled in cemeteries, each belonging to a different community. Most cemeteries lie on a planned highway’s path. Two of them are more or less abandoned.
This menacing highway was planned in the 1960s, and expropriation orders were issued. Two stretches have been built on both sides of the neighbourhood, but they do not pass through it. The Protestant community evacuated its cemetery couple of years ago (at the same time it evacuated another cemetery by the seaside in downtown Beirut that was expropriated by a private company). The Syriaque Catholic cemetery is still in use.
As for the Jewish cemetery, it looks rather warn down. Like the neighbouring cemeteries it suffered a lot of damage during the war because it lied on the demarcation line between East and West Beirut. But very little money was put into restoring it, while the neighbouring catholic and armenian cemeteries have been fully restored by the families of the deceased. Withstanding its desolate state, the Jewish cemetery is the main reason why all the other cemeteries are preserved. The government is afraid that any action against it would be interpreted as one directed against the Jewish community.
Do the three women I saw this morning entering a cemetery know that they owe the preservation of the grave they are visiting to the Jewish cemetery? If they did, I’m sure they’d try to visit it and put a stone next to a grave.

How they helped defeat Farouk Hosny (the story)

The 9 original candidates. Housny is second from left

Before delving into the analysis, let’s set the record straight. I won’t be looking into the dirty politics behind these elections. I do have some crusty insider information on some dirty play, but it’s closer to gossip than meaningful information, and strictly off topic. What we’ll be looking into is the public debate that surrounded these elections. I believe it had an incidence on the final outcome: Irina Bokova’s election to the post of Director General of UNESCO. But there is no way to prove this fact.

Interestingly enough, the reasons behind Farouk Hosny’s defeat are not of much interest. They will leave no trace in the public conscience. On the other hand, the fierce debate surrounding this election will undoubtedly mark those who feel envolved in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Let’s start with a quick look at the five rounds that brought Farouk Hosni to his defeat. If you’re interested in more details, check out this blog.

Results of the 5 rounds


Candidate	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5
Farouk Hosny	22	23	25	29	27
Irina Bokova	8	8	13	29	31
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	7	9	11	0	0
Ivonne Baki	7	8	9	0	0
Ina Marciulionyte	3	4	0	0	0
Alexander Yakovenko	7	3	0	0	0
Noureini Tidjani-Serpos	2	2	0	0	0
Sospeter Muhongo	1	1	0	0	0
Mohammed Bedjaoui	0	0	0	0	0
Blank	1	0	0	0	0
Total	58	58	58	58	58

As the figures clearly show, Farouk Hosni was the leading contestant up to the fifth round. His candidacy was supported by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization for the Islamic Conference. It was backed by France and unopposed (though grudgingly) by Israel. So what happened? If you’re interested in geopolitics, check out what Stephen Suleyman Schwartz had to say about it. I’d rather look into one campaign that picked up speed and was given more media attention than any other story in these elections: that of Bernard-Henri Lévy (alias BHL, alias BHV) relayed on the net through Save Unesco!, a blog started by “French students in political science” that was deleted earlier today (but here is the cached copy). Much can be said about Bernard-Henri Levy and the anonymous group of French students, but I will focus on the issues that they raised, and they are identical. Instead of supporting one specific candidate, they attacked the Egyptian candidate on three main issues

• Antisemitism. This accusation springs from a misquoted statement on burning Israeli books found in Egyptian libraries (a statement Farouk Hosny later apologised for in his “message to the world“). BHL reinterpreted this statement as a vow “to burn with his own hands any book in Hebrew that could have possibly infiltrated the stacks of the Alexandria Library”.
• An alleged involvement in the Achille Lauro Hijacking affair.  
• Responsibility as Minister of Culture (for over two decades) in the crackdown of liberties and freedom of expression in Egypt.

So, is Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace price laureate, right when he says “UNESCO has escaped a scandal, a moral disaster. Mr. Hosni did not deserve the job he does not deserve this honor  tomorrow”. Can we agree with BHL when he says “We have won. Liberty has won. Tolerance has won. And thanks to all of you, respect has won. I’d like to thank you, net surfers, for engaging in this battle for democracy and peace. Thanks to all who refused the unacceptable and who allowed for this beautiful victory”. That’s what we’ll be looking into tomorrow.

عيد مبارك & שנה טובה

When Americans speak of the “wall of separation”, they mean the principle of separation between “Church” and State (i.e. Religion & Government). The expression takes a whole different meaning in our region, doesn’t it?
Well, I thought the title of this post (transliterated: Eid Mubarak and Shana Tova, translated: Blessed Feast and Happy New Year) reflects the hopes of many perfectly, that an ampersand replaces the wall.

Notice the clouds lurking in the back… well, you’ll understand what they’re up to in a coming post

עיניים פקוחות Opening one’s eyes to different lifestyles

Frequent sojourns in Paris do have their advantages. One of them is being able to see a great variety of films at the movies, many of which have no chance of being screened in Beirut (at least not in public screenings). I had the pleasure to watch a couple of hours ago “Tu n’aimeras point”, an Israeli film by Haim Tabakman (that came out in Paris before Tel Aviv).
Don’t let this hollywood style trailer mislead you. The film is not about a gay couple. It’s no Israeli version of Bareback Mountain. It’s not about conflict of lifestyles (Jerusalem vs Tel Aviv; secular global vs religious local). It’s about a righteous person (צדיק, صادق) who discovers love with another man yet refuses to make choices until confronted by his community. He indulges in a homosexual relation without letting go of his beliefs and his respect of the Law. Quite the contrary, his passion opens up his eyes to a less stoic interpretation of religious texts. But he doesn’t notice the social consequences of his acts until the social reaction hits him in the face.
What is particularly interesting about the film is that it introduces you to a hassidic worldview showing you its many facets and its struggle for survival in a world that upholds opposing values. Withstanding the risks entailed by its subject matter, it refrains from being judgemental, pedagogical or raunchy. The excellent performance, clean editing and focused cinematography also serve a script that leaves no room for justification or explanation (neither from the director’s perspective nor from the characters’).

No Presidential share in government! Some reasons why Michel Suleiman shouldn’t get any!

Ever since the process for the formation of a new government started, pundits have been discussing the Presidents share; how large its going to be, and who is likely to be part of it. At first, analysts wondered if the President’s share could be neutral, given the extreme polarisation of Lebanese politics, or if it will bring together people from both sides of the spectrum. Then the magic formula appeared: 15 (for March XIV® and allies), 10 (for the Opposition®) – 5 (for the President). The political class had agreed to increase the President’s share from 3 to 5! This was presented as a measure to reinforce the presidency that was much weakened by the constitutional amendments agreed upon in Taef. Unsurprisingly, analysts were easily convinced by this unanimous decision & argument. No one seemed to question its appropriateness, its pertinence or its constitutionality. But don’t worry, things are going to change! I’m going to share with you a couple of good reasons why their shouldn’t be any “presidential share” in any cabinet!

Here are 5 good reasons why the President shouldn’t have a share in government.

Having a share neutralises his constitutional function as arbitrator. Being able to swing from one to another in a cabinet vote is not arbitration, it’s taking sides.

1. Being part of the government weakens his authority. It’s not about numbers and positions, it’s about being on another level! He should assert his moral authority and stay above the political fray.
2. Having ministers means that he accepts to be like all the other political players, but with one notable difference, he will be the only one who cannot count on a group of MPs.
3. By having a share, he complicates and circumvents two rules of coalition formation : the proportionality rule and the consociational rule.
4. By accepting to have a share, he affirms the mouhassassa and mahsoubié principle.

What the President should do.

At this point of time, he should set the rules behind the composition of the government by arbitrating between the opposing contentions, and innovating. There is no agreement on the three dimensions of coalition buildings. The political class still hasn’t defined definitive rules for distributing share and portfolios, picking ministers and setting a common program. Now these issues are quite complex, and they are never formulated in legal terms so as not to complicate even more the process. But when disagreements run so deep, an arbitrator is needed. Why go to Damascus, to Riyad or to Doha to find an arbitrator? why not simply go to Baabda.

Here are a couple of principles that the President should arbitrate on:

• Can a candidate who lost the parliamentary elections become minister? People are thinking about Gebran Bassil, but there are others, and I’m thinking of Ahmad Asaad, for instance. I personally believe Asaad should become Minister even though he lost during the elections… This would ensure a political diversity within the Shiite representation. And then, is it fair to exclude from the government people who lost during the elections without equally excluding politicians who didn’t dare run because they were almost sure to loose?
• Should the different Zuama stick to naming people from within their ranks or can they name people from outside their ranks? such as “independents” or “allies”.
• Does anyone have a veto power on the nomination of ministers within each share?

Sex, Values & Globalisation or Mazen Abdel Jawad’s free fall

Last week, LBC & its young anchorman Malek Maktabi were reminded that “red lines” still exist in the Arab world and that crossing them can have an economical and a political cost. This simple fact was brought to their mind when the Saudi authorities closed down their offices in Jeddah following the airing of the weekly programme “A7mar bil khat al 3arid”, “Bold Red Line”.

Here’s the extract that started the whole commotion.

As you might have noticed, the reporting isn’t really interesting. The anchorman’s sensationalism comes across as cheap and uninteresting. We are shown a young man in his “crib” bragging about his sexual exploits, expressing how important sex is to him and how he stimulates his partner’s desire. Some people have described his crowing as lewd, while others have stressed how immature and teen-like his approach to sexuality is.

Anti-confessionalism’s side effects

Indoctrination: As we have seen, Anticonfessionalism is a State defused ideology. Not only is it a defining element of our constitution and our institutions, but it’s the most prominent feature of our political discourse. Even those who want to maintain the political system as it is are either uncomfortable with it or are embarrassed to defend it publicly.
All public discussions are dominated by negative views of confessionalism. These views have been diffused through the media for over half a century. They have found their way in history books and civic education books.
The consequence is obvious: an overwhelming majority of Lebanese holds negative views on confessionalism and consider it incompatible with all values they consider positive (the latter values are not necessarily shared). As we will see, these views are not based on facts, on demonstrations, but on a global prejudgment. A critical approach is surely warranted when it involves an analysis of merits and faults. But  it ceases to be interesting when it’s a simple expression of adverse or disapproving comments and judgments.

Anti-Confessionalism: a state ideology

This is not a joke. Anti-confessionalism is a state ideology. It might sound shocking to many ears, but I believe it is actually indisputable. Will this sketchy demonstration you are about to read convince you? I hope so. This blog is certainly not the place for a meticulous study of this surprising and counterintuitive feature. But it will allow me to point out quite broadly a couple of arguments that are usually overlooked by most analysts. And then you’ll do the math.

First, I’d like to remind the reader that the Lebanese political system was not founded on a single pre-existing ideology or political theory that one could call “confessionalism”. This is usually the case with state ideologies. Let’s take the example of the United State (where federalism and democracy were theorised before they were implemented), France (where the basic elements of republicanism were theorised before the overthrow of the Monarchy), the Soviet Union (with communism) and closer to us, Syria (where Baasism was theorised before the establishment of the Baasist regime) and Israel (where Zionism was theorised half a century before the establishment of the State). In all these cases, we find thinkers, intellectuals or theorists who pondered over a regime before its establishment. This is not the case of Lebanon. No thinker, intellectual or theorist reflected on the country’s communal reality and how it could be translated politically before the establishment of the political system or regime (the Constitution of 1926).

Violence spills over: Shooting at Tel Aviv gay center

Candles in memory of dead spell out "love"

How fast is Israel heading for trouble? How much can one extrapolate from one crime news heading, a simple human interest story? Could it be an indicator or is it just an isolated case?

One thing is certain, Israeli editorialists and politicians are not taking it so lightly (c.f. Yediot Ahronot article). For them, it’s not just about Nir Katz (24) and Liz Trubeshi (17) who were killed on saturday. It’s about a shooting attack on a gay and lesbian youth center in Tel Aviv. It’s about a hate crime. It’s about an automatic weapon (such as an M-16 rifle) that was used by an Israeli to kill other Israelis because of differences in lifestyle and values.

It’s about a bubble exploding, but unlike Eytan Fox’s הבועה, the needle that burst it is not directly tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict… but might very well be indirectly link to it. For how long can Israeli society nurture  its militaristic culture and breed distrust between some of its sectors, before that starts spreading?

Judging from the reaction of editorialists and politicians, the fear is there, but also the discomfort. How should this attack be called? A terror attack? Can it be called a terror attack although its perpetrator seems to be jewish? This is the kind of hesitation one sees in interviews and opinion papers. It’s not a simple case of semantics, its about classification, operating a distinction between “jewish violence and “palestinian violence”: when violence is so instrumental in separating and defining two groups, what happens when it erupts within one of the groups? what does it say about the opposition between the two groups…

Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin

Anti-confessionalism probably lacks historical perspective because it is utterly uninterested in context. It is obsessed with values and rules: it seeks to impose what it claims to be positive, modern (western), secular values (and rules), while claiming to combat what it defines as archaic, religious, oppressive values (and rules). By doing so, it defines itself (anti-confessionalism) and what it combats (confessionalism).

Before going into this dual definition (and its implication), let’s have a glimpse at these very values and value-laden political programmes anti-confessionalism vows to defend and implement.

A glimpse at the muddle

As Maria sang to the children, “let’s start at the very beginning, a very good place to start”. The whole debate over confessionalism started in the 1940s. Sure, one could trace articles and writing about its many elements to the 1930, and even to the 1920s. But they were still scattered then, and dealt with points that were quite rightly seen as unrelated: secularisation, modernisation, westernisation, nation-building and state building. From the 1940s onwards, all these views converged under the label of “anticonfessionalism” as their proponents defined a common enemy, confessionalism.

This conversion obscures the fact that we are dealing with distinct processes, political programmes and values. This is why we will look into each of them one at a time.

• Secularisation: A process in which the various aspects of society (economic, political, legal, and moral) become increasingly specialised and distinct from religion (and religious authority). It is usually accompanied by a societal decline in levels of religiosity. Its proponents usually link the decline of religiosity to the increase of freedoms. In Lebanon, secularisation usually means three things:
  • Abolishing the personal status laws and courts (up to now, each recognised and established community has its own laws and courts), and replacing them by one civil legislation in matters of family law.
  • Supporting “secular” education, i.e. state schools and universities (vs schools and universities within religious networks).
  • Combatting religious authority and interference in public affairs.

The Paradoxes of AntiConfessionalism (an introduction)

AntiConfessionalism! The word seems easy to grasp. The prefix and suffix speak for themselves. Intuitively, one could assume that anticonfessionalism is antonymous & opposed to a specific system, principle, ideology: confessionalism. Up to now things might seem pretty clear. But when you look a bit closer, you discover something completely different. It’s actually quite hard to oppose anti-confessionalism to confessionalism. It’s like opposing black and white. Sure it’s a common assumption that black is the opposite of white, but it doesn’t tell you much about one or the other, and so the opposition turns out to be meaningless.

I have already dealt with the issue of anticonfessionalism two years ago (albeit hysterically) through a “hate mail” sent to Amam05 posted here. The arguments haven’t changed, but maybe I should restate them more serenely.

We might have many bad intellectual habits in Lebanon, but anti-confessionalism is unmistakably the worst. If you’re looking for insight, learning, critical engagement… keep away from anti-confessional literature. On the other hand, if you’re looking for repetitive prose, dogmatism, distilled ideology, decontextualised constructions, baseless assumptions, groundless accusations… Then you should definitely check out the many books, articles and declarations written on confessionalism.

At first, I thought it would be possible to discuss this issue in one post, but judging from the reactions I’m getting, I think it better to discuss one paradox at a time.

1. Monday: Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin.
2. Tuesday: Anti-confessionalism: A state ideology
3. Wednesday: Anti-confessionalism’s side effects

Meet the next president? From Slimmy to Suleiman II

Is Suleiman Frangieh Jr vying for the presidency? The obvious answer is yes. Which maronite politician isn’t? But this one’s chances seem quite good. You’ve certainly heard by now that he is moving to “Beirut” (Rabieh, to be precise). And you might have read a very flattering “portrait” of him that was published in the Akhbar (cf. a previous posting) or followed his meetings with Sami and Amin Gemayel. These are certainly no indicators of his chances for the presidency.

The reasons why he is the most likely candidate for the highest office lie elsewhere. They are to be found in his political & geopolitical positioning and to the fact that he espouses the predominant social values in Lebanon. Let’s first look into his positioning before examining how he reflects the country’s prevailing values.