Wi’am Wahab, ambassador?

The person is vociferous, crude and politically powerless. Anywhere else, he would have been meaningless, invited once or twice a year to a talkshow for a cheap laugh based on slander. But not in Lebanon. Wi’am Wahab has continuously been in the headlines for the past two weeks. Why?
This guy (pictured on the left) has no power base to count on. His party is insignificant (it’s very little more than a name actually). He doesn’t hail from a political dynasty (local or national). A couple of months ago, he knew that had no chance of becoming an MP so he didn’t even bother take part in the parliamentary elections. Wi’am Wahab doesn’t hold a big fortune. He doesn’t operate a clientelist network (he doesn’t have “his men” in the public administration). He cannot assert himself through force (he has no militia to count own, just a couple of boisterous bodyguards). He isn’t backed by his community’s religious authorities. Saying that he isn’t prominent in any social field is an understatement.
So how come he is given any media attention? Why do his “visits” to political actors (politicians & clergy) seem significant? What makes them significant?
The answer is fairly simple, he is seen as an essential figure in the “reconciliation with Syria”, more precisely with the Syrian regime, or even more precisely with the Syrian President, Bachar el Assad. Interestingly enough, Wi’am Wahab isn’t even close to the Syrian President (unlike Suleiman Frangieh, for instance). He is not part of the regime’s inner circle. So it’s not on a personal level. His visits are not acts of “political socialisation”. He is perceived as an agent of the Syrian regime. He is seen as playing the same role as an ambassador. So I ask myself the following questions:
- Has he been invested as “ambassador”?
- Why are the Lebanese political actors giving his role?
- What does that mean?
I’ll skip the first two questions (expecting the reader to answer them) and go directly to the third one. The fact that the Lebanese political actors and media are recognising Wi’am Wahab’s political function shows not only that they have grown accustomed to informal politics, accepting it and seeing nothing wrong with it, but that they seem to prefer it to formal politics. Why? because it makes them regional actors, small ones for sure, but hell who cares when it inflates your ego! On the other hand, formal politics will surely make them feel left out (remember what happened when Bachar al-Assad and Emile Lahoud established exclusive relations, something that they are entitled to as Presidents of two countries). Moreover, if they established direct contacts with the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon, this would be seen as encouraging Syrian interventionism in Lebanon (which is bad for Syria and bad for the former or persistent March XIV® politicians). So keeping it informal arranges everyone.
If you notice it, only one person is left out of the picture: the Lebanese President, Michel Suleiman. But he’s not complaining (but then, he never does).

A Maverick’s trip to the hinterland -2

Samir Geagea said he was “worried about MP Michel Aoun’s political situation in the wake of his visit to Syria”. By visiting his former foe, did Michel Aoun play his last political card? Is it a political suicide? Will his supporters accept it, would they vote for him during the next elections? 

These are the questions that many Lebanese and foreign analysts have been asking themselves since the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement announced his visit to Syria.

It’s too early to the judge, and the coming parliamentary elections will certainly give us a clearer indication on the consequences of the visit. One thing is for sure, it’s a very surprising move and one with a strong symbolic effect for Lebanese and Syrians alike. For many years, Aoun was the symbol of anti-syrian sentiment in both countries. And now he comes to Syria, as a friend… and a Christian.

Aoun’s visit to Syria is certainly a very daring political move. It certainly shows how independent-minded the leader of the FPM is, and how he refuses to conform even to the particular party and group that he has constituted, and moves in a way that seems to disavow two of the FPM’s trademarks: its anti-syrian sentiment and its commitment to secularism.  

Having voted for that party during the last two elections, I was a bit flustered when I heard about the trip. I didn’t feel “betrayed” because of it. I too consider that relations with Syria should be normalised, and I have been visiting that country regularly since its government withdrew its troops from my country (and refrained from doing it before that date). I had witnessed the negative impact the discourse of the “March 14th” coalition had on the relations between the two people. And I thought that something should be done about it. But when Aoun announced he was visiting Syria, I felt that he was playing into regional politics, that he was sacrificing internal politics to geopolitics (like all the rest of the Lebanese political actors); something that is quite apparent in his discourse, but that he seemed to be putting into action. 

A Maverick’s trip to the hinterland -1

 Aoun’s visit to Syria has sparked a bush fire in the Lebanese media. It seems like every single editorialist and politician in the country felt the urge to comment on it. 

Much of the analysis coming from the aounophobic press was twofold, one one hand geopolitical and on the other electoral. Aoun’s visit was seen as an electoral trick to insure Syrian support during the coming parliamentary elections. It was also presented as a proof of Aoun’s political positioning within the “Syrian-Iranian Axis”. 

On the other side of the policial spectrum, journalists and politicians were praising the visit or saying that it was perfectly natural. Aoun’s internet media Tayyar.org emphasised the religious aspect of the visit, and so did his Orange TV.

I personally believe that in practical terms, the visit doesn’t have much sens. By that, I mean that it will not have any immediate result. Syria has very limited influence on the Lebanese elections. It can no longer choose who is allowed to run, and it is no longer a broker in the formation of alliances or the constitution of slates. It can assert its influence through the votes of its nationals that were accorded a Lebanese citizenship in the 1990s, it can try to pressure its allies into making or unmaking alliances, but this is relatively insignificant compared to its influence during its “mandate” over Lebanon. In fact, its influence depends on the will and compliance of its local allies; on their acceptance of its interference, like it was the case in the late 1950s and 1960s with Nasser’s Egypt. 

So what’s the fuss about?

How can Lebanon contain Syria?

Sometimes geography can be quite unforgiving and quite a hassle. Since Syria’s independence, its successive governments have shown that they could “contain” Lebanon by closing their borders. A couple of years later (by the late 1950s) the Syrian governments discovered that they could play an active role in Lebanon by arming some of its groups: first Rachid Karame and Kamal Jumblatt’s thugs; then some groups within the PLO, starting in the late 1960s; then Mussa Sadr’s militia in the 1970s, and finally Sunni and Shiite islamists in the mid 1980s… and most of the time without having to spend a dime.
What have the successive Lebanese governments done to prevent those actions up to now? Nothing other than protesting, most of the time discretly and now very loudly, accusing the Syrian President (which is more than likely) of being behind the past political assassinations, bombings and attacks.
“We fight with our words”, said a Lebanese politician a couple of months ago… “our voice is our only weapon”, said another. Sadly enough, for once, these politicians are speaking their minds. The very corrupt and murderous political class we have is now conviced that words are weapons, and that they can actually do everything with words.
It is true that words in politics can have important consequences, but they certainly do not replace deeds and political actions.
Will the deployment of UN troups prevent Syria from intervening in Lebanon? Certainly not. Not more than the UNIFIL has prevented the launching of rockets from Lebanon to Israel. So what can? Maybe the quintuple D.
Diplomacy: The Lebanese government has joined an international axis so as to “counter” Syria. This has left little room for diplomacy. What has the Lebanese government done to try to seperate the Iranians from the Syrians? What has it done to try to convince the Turks to stick with the Lebanese, or the Jordanians, or the Iraqis?
Democracy (concensual democracy): Lebanese democracy is based on intercommunal understanding, and equality between all groups, it’s by showing that element that it can discredit other regimes that do not follow these principles. How come there is no Alawite in government?
Deliberation (public deliberation): Lebanon should strengthen public liberties and free speech, and encourage the Lebanese media to adress the Syrian population and public. Up to now, the Lebanes politicians have been attacking the Syrian government in general terms and the Syrian population has been reading this as xénophobia towards them (with some help from the Syrian government). What steps has the government taken to prevent or even to reverse that?
Discretion: If the Lebanese sees the Syrian government as a threat, does it necessarily have to voice it. Wouldn’t it be better to try to use counter-intelligence or to develop a strategy to try to pressure the Syrian government without offending the Syrian people.

Moderates vs Radicals

Seen from the outside, there seems to be a clash between the “moderates” and the “radicals” throughout the Middle East. And the major fronts seem to be Palestine and Lebanon. In Palestine, Fateh is presented as a moderate force, while Hamas is denounced as a radical force. In Lebanon things are always more complicated. The moderates are an aggregate of historically opposed and confessionally varied political forces. And the radicals are Hezbollah on one side, and the Qaeda/pro-syrian sunni islamist forces on the other.
Since the 2005/2006 parliamentary elections in Lebanon and Palestine, the US and Europe have been very openly supportive of the “Moderates”, and very vocally opposed to the “Radicals”. On the other hand, Syria and Iran have been very vocally supportive of the “Radicals” and sometimes violently hostile to the “Moderates”.
The whole international and regional mood has been to pit one against the other. In Palestine it has successfully led to an open war between the two factions. In Lebanon, violence has errupted between the “Moderates” and some “Radicals”, while a “cold” war has been opposing for almost a year the “Moderates” and the “Radicals”.
This disctinction and labelling of forces was created by the Americans. The “moderates” are their allies, and the “radicals” are those who are still combatting Israel. This labelling is justifiable if one is looking at the international dimensions of the conflict, but they are totally unsatisfactory if one is interested in the local and social dimension.
What is moderate about Mubarak’s regime? What is the trait shared by Siniora’s and Abbas’ regimes?

Resolution 1757 or International law perceived as “fact on the ground”

One of the most surprising outcomes of resolution 1757 was that it was immediately perceived and present by the Lebanese political class as a fact on the ground. The government’s supporters hailed it as a victory, while most of the opposition forces described it as an imposed fact with negative consequences.

The Future Movement’s leader and Sunni Zaïm, Saad Hariri, started a series of symbolic acts, a prayer at his father’s tomb (while the government ordered the opening of the seaside road where his father was assassinated), fire works and a political declaration in which he said that a page was turned and a new one could be started, inviting the opposition to join the government again.  

He made it seem as if the hardships were over, and now that the international community had decided for the Lebanese on a matter they did not agree on, the differing parties could come together and govern hand in hand again.

Pretty noose

I open the Orient-Le Jour today for the first time in 10 days. And unsurprisingly, nothing new. Same people saying the same things. Except I noticed two quotes mentioning nooses: Geagea on the opposition (they want to tie a noose around our neck), Jumblatt on Hariri’s assassins (the rope is tightening around their necks).
The effect is certainly dramatic and it does show that the “game” is a deadly one. It interwines two different issues: (1) the participation of Shiites and Christian leaders as equal partners on a common program with the Sunni and Druze leadership (2) the legal prosecution of Assad regime.
Putting it that way could seem quite biased, but how can one state the interwining otherwise?

Giving Peace a bad name -1

Two principles have come to dominate all views on peace in the Middle East these days.
- “Land for Peace”
- The establishment of a Palestinian State.
Before taking a look into the problems that these two principles raise, let’s have a look at how they emerged on the global scene.
A historical glimpse of the birth of the Middle East peace principles
People usually trace the origin of the first principle to UN Security Council Resolution 242 that stated two principles: (1) the “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and the (2) the “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”. Nowhere in this resolution voted in the aftermath of the 1967 war do you find any mention of Palestine or the word “Palestinians”. The latter are referred to as “a refugee problem that should be settled”.
The Madrid Peace conference (hosted by the government of Spain and co-sponsored by the USA and the USSR) that was convened on October 30, 1991 for three days, brought together and for the first time representatives of the Israeli, Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese government. The PLO, deemed to represent the Palestinians, was in constant communication with the Palestinian representatives in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian team. As for Lebanon, its representatives acted as if they were part of the same team as Syria and didn’t partake in bilateral talks (though Syria did).
The basic principle that was at the basis of this “Peace” conference was that of “Land for Peace”.
Following the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO, another principle started to gain ground, that of the establishment of a Palestinian State.
The Arab Summit that convened in Beirut in March 2002 finished with a much publicised declaration know as the Saudi initiative that reaffirms and combines the two principles and puts them under a common heading, that of “comprehensive peace” or “just peace” (the two formulas are found in the declaration).

Providing shelter from the storm – 1

Amr Moussa sees a (political and probably military) storm gathering in the Middle East and that something should be done to protect Lebanon from it. The Arab League’s secretary general might not be efficient, the regional organisation he heads might be utterly useless, but he sure knows how to sum up the obvious quite perfectly. In Lebanon, journalists and analysts speak of axes (ma7awir), the Iranian-Syrian axis and the Saudi-American axis (to which some add Israel or France). This analysis is usually used to ignore, to blur or to understate the political dynamics in Lebanon. A journalist friend of mine even stated once that there was no politics anymore in Lebanon, only geopolitics.

I believe this approach to be indefensible for one simple reason, there are no foreign troops in Lebanon, so the dynamics within the country are strictly domestic. They weren’t two years ago when Syrian had its troops in Lebanon and a governor general who used to interfere in most domestic decisions. But since Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, only the domestic players are direct actors on the Lebanese political scene. Exterior actors can certainly play a role by sending money, zigzaggin the Lebanese airspace with their war planes, setting a bomb here and there. But their influence is indirect; they can certainly effect the country, but only through its domestic actors (political parties, leaders or zu’ama) and the ways they react to those incentives, provocations or threats… The country’s problem lies in the fact that its political leaders see no problem in looking for exterior allies. Moreover, they tend to seek foreign interference whenever they want to change the rules of the political game.

There is of course another factor that is shifting the political game to a geopolitical game, but also through the will of the Lebanese actors: The governing coalition today is seeking a regime change in Syria, and it’s only tool is the International Tribunal on the murder of Rafic Hariri. I will discuss that further next week in a new entry.

Let’s see how the political actors are using their international alliance for internal political brokering.
Disarming Hezbollah is a major change in the political game. The anti-Bachar alliance had stated in 2005 (when it joined the opposition) that the disarmament of Hezbollah is an interior affair. During the elections, when the quadripartie alliance was re-established (between the Sunni Future Movement, the Druze PSP and the Shiite Amal and Hezbollah parties), not only was there no mention of the disarmament of Hezbollah, but Walid Jumblatt (leader of the PSP) for instance joined Hassan Nasrallah (leader of Hezbollah) in a political rally where the latter said that he would cut off the hand that approached Hezbollah’s weapons! And to no surprise, once this alliance came to power, there was no mention of any kind of disarmament in the ministerial declaration of the government that it established.
So one can safely say that nothing was done domestically to encourage Hezbollah to decommission. Only legalistic arguments have sparked up and have gained in intensity after the establishment of the present government, and more specifically in the aftermath of Gebran Tueini’s assassination. Two different arguments are used: that of the State’s sovereignty (and the of its monopoly on the use of legitimate force) and that of the supremacy of international law (in reference to Security Council resolution 1559). But the problem and the brokering should be political. Instead of negociating on that bases, the contending actors have prefered to rush to their international allies to add pressure on the opposing party.

Turkey and the birth pangs of the new Middle East

Coping with religious revival in Syria

Like many places in the Middle East, religious revival in Syria is so obvious that it’s hardly noteworthy. One can see it by the increasing numbers of people going to the Mosques, by the increasing number of veiled women (and the type of veil they are wearing), and by a myriad other details (the use of certain greetings and similar formulas…).
The question that comes to mind is how long can a secular type of government cope with this revival. Then one wonders how secular the regime actually is and how one can measure its degree of secularism.
The question is just as pertinent and topical in Turkey.

Is the international tribunal timely?

For some odd reason, there hasn’t been a debate in Lebanon over the timeliness of the international court that is to be set up to find the criminals behind Rafic Hariri’s assassination. No one questions the importance in principle of such a court. Justice is obviously of paramount importance. And such a trial might put an end to political assassinations by rogue regimes in the region, would  argue the overly optimistic.

But let’s be realistic, what exactly can be expected of this Court?
- It is an ad hoc structure that will disappear after it has judged those found responsible for the assassination of Rafic Hariri. This will certainly not prevent or have a dissuading effect over similar crimes, because the judicial reaction was slow and only came about after painstaking efforts that could have been avorted by many factors: internal political pressure in the country where the crime happened, diminushing interest in the international community, a political decision by one of the veto holding powers in the Security Coucil…
- If it does find the perpetrators of the assassination and those who ordered it, the court’s decision could very well be seen as a politial one regionaly. It is a foreign court, and everything foreign is usually seen with a lot of distrust by middle-easteners, population and analysts, who are staunch believers in conspiracy theories.
- It is quite likely that the assassination was ordered in Syria, by parties “close” to the regime. If this is the case, what will the political repercussion of such a judgement be? What is the international community likely do? What will be Syria’s reaction? What will Lebanon have to suffer because of that?
Why isn’t anyone discussing these eventualities publicly?

Banners and Political messages, crossing back to Lebanon

Political Hoarding in Syria and Lebanon

The most striking difference between political hoardings in Syria and Lebanon is in the number of politicians and political messages one finds on each side of the border.

In Syria, one portrait dominates, that of the Syrian President Bashar el-Assad. And the only other portraits one sees are those of his father and Hafez and brother Bassel.

In Lebanon, the only time you see the president’s portrait today is when you enter an official buidling, where it’s required by law. Elsewhere, on public billboards, they are nowhere to be found. However, a couple of meters away from the Syro-Lebanese border, one starts noticing portraits of a great number of politicians (or wanabes). One face dominates all, that of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. It’s the most recurring.

Very quickly one is struck by the corollation between the dominant religious buildings in the neighbourhood and the religious affiliation of the politician whose portraits are found on all its walls.

Self-fulfilling categories

In 2005, the international press dubbed the Bristol Gathering an anti-Syrian alliance, although many of its participants, such as the PSP (a Druze party) and most of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering (a grouping of Christian politicians and parties brought together by the Maronite Patriarch’s emissary Bishop Beshara) insisted that they were not anti-Syrian. And many politicians belonging to that group even insisted that Syria remains in the Beqaa for some time.

Similarly, the press has been dubbing Hezbollah an opposition party for over a year, although it was still part of the coalition government.

Interestingly enough, Hezbollah is today part of the opposition, and the Lebanese government is quite openly anti-Syrian.

Can one talk of self-fulfilling prophecies? How can one explain that inaducate categories eventually ring true?