Deconstructing March XIV® _______________________ *********************** 3 Steps for change: Bringing women into politics... massively! _______________________ ***********************
Battling God-fearing combattants -2 _______________________ *********************** Mixed courts: an unexplored approach to M.E. peace
More than 57% of voters and 22 out of 26 cantons voted in favour of a referendum proposal banning the building of minarets in Switzerland. The result came as a surprise. All surveys preceding the vote showed a majority of Swiss opposed to the ban. So how can one explain this gross disparity between the predicted and the actually result?
There are three explanations for this disparity:
The surveyors did a bad job. They relied on bad sampling… This could very possibly be the case. But how come all surveys gave similar results up to today? Could they all be wrong? And how come they were so wrong. We’re not talking about a 1 to 5 % error range, but more than 10%. That’s huge.
People who had declared that they would vote against the ban didn’t turn up to the polling station at the same rate than those who voted in favour of the ban. If this is true, one still wonders why they were not motivated? Were they too comforted in their belief that the ban wouldn’t be approved? Did the parties that had declared their opposition to the ban (all except one it seems) fail to mobilise their constituencies? etc.
People who wanted to vote for the ban declared that they would vote against it. But why would they do such a thing? Could it be because they understood that their vote would be considered as islamophobic, and that such feelings are morally condemned because of their xenophobic character?
What next?
Instead of trying to understand why the Swiss voters decided to support the ban, I would like to quickly look into its significance. Most of the analysis I’ve encountered were geopolitical. Some analysts were worried about the possible international outcomes of the ban: disinvestments, riots, targeting of Swiss embassies. It is quite obvious that the Danish Cartoon affair is still present in many minds. Some of the analysis I’ve come across were more interested in the social consequences it could have in Switzerland. How would this ban effect the relations between muslim and non-muslim individuals and groups in Helvetia?
Could this cow find the poster offensive?
My thoughts on this question have been drifting another way. The Swiss law doesn’t ban the building of Mosques. It bans the building of Minarets. In other words, it is targeting one essential element in Muslim religious architecture. Let’s not get all freudian about it, but it’s obviously a form of castration. They are banning the most defining feature of this religious building, what makes it recognizable as a Mosque. Interestingly enough, modern technology has removed much of a Minaret’s functional importance. Loudspeakers are more efficient and less costly a solution to call to prayer. And there is no legal provision banning these loudspeakers (except for the general nuisance provision that could be used by mayors). So basically, the Swiss banned a defining architectural element, what makes the building recognizable in the urban setting. So it has more to do with identity and visibility in the public space than anything else.
Did we say Freudian?
Such a ban is new to Europe (I wonder how the Council of Europe and its court will react to it). But similar provisions existed in the Middle East. The Ottomans for centuries had banned bell towers. They were only allowed during the second part the 19th century. In cities, there were even provisions stating that no Synagogue or Church must be prominent; And no distinctif part should be seen from the street (menorah, tables of the law, cross)… The general idea behind the islamic provision and the swiss provision are the same. National religious minorities should remain invisible.
Weapons sparked three debates this week. It all started when the Israeli military fished a weapon cargo heading to Beirut. Then the Maronite patriarch made a speech on how weapons and democracy were mutually exclusive and finally the head of the FPM Michel Aoun criticised the Patriarch’s speech and added that if he had the means he would arm himself to fight for Palestine! We’ll look into these polemics one at the time.
The record weapon catch. The most fascinating thing about the story isn’t what was said, but what wasn’t said. We got a lot of info about how much the booty weighted, we didn’t get any info about what exactly these weapons were and who had made them. We got a lot of info about the crew and the three last destination of the ship, but no info on its past and its real ownership. Classified information or courteousness between weapon dealers and producers?
The Patriarch’s sermon. The Patriarch picked up a habit of recurrently making a sermon against Hezbollah and its weapons. His followers, that is political followers (not necessarily of his flock) and backers applaud his “national stands” and celebrate his “national role”. But they never mention the effect it has on communal politics and the gate it opens for other political interventions of clergymen in the public sphere (his backers had even asked him to pick a President for the country two years ago…). His stance does not prevent him from backing parties who will join a government in which Hezbollah will be part of and whose declaration will not condemn the weapons this party holds. Three of the christian political groups he has been actively supporting for nearly a decade (what is left of Qornet Chehwan that was never a political party and is the biggest looser of the past elections with only one MP in parliament, the Lebanese Forces that hasn’t been reestablished as a party since its dissolution in the 1990s probably for financial reasons and the Kataeb that has been hijacked by the Gemayel family after having been hijacked by the Syrian intelligence) will probably express their reservations on the government’s declaration but that will not prevent them from participating in it.
This kind of condemnation is the best example of the “public stand culture” ثقافة المواقف that is meant to satisfy (with words) one’s constituency or sponsor, but that never translates into political action.
Aoun’s tantrum. When angry, the hindered Za’im has no qualms about contradicting himself and making the most outrageous and irresponsible declarations. His first argument to the Patriarch followed these lines: “these weapons were never used against you, so why are you complaining”. Then he expressed his willingness to take up arms too, but regretted he didn’t have the financial ressources for that. I pity Michel Aoun’s supporters who will have to find a way to justify this outburst.
As I drove back home today in the pouring rain, I noticed three women entering a cemetery holding flowers (and umbrellas). They were probably visiting a relative’s grave. The neighbourhood they were in is a strange one. It’s made up of six or seven walled in cemeteries, each belonging to a different community. Most cemeteries lie on a planned highway’s path. Two of them are more or less abandoned.
This menacing highway was planned in the 1960s, and expropriation orders were issued. Two stretches have been built on both sides of the neighbourhood, but they do not pass through it. The Protestant community evacuated its cemetery couple of years ago (at the same time it evacuated another cemetery by the seaside in downtown Beirut that was expropriated by a private company). The Syriaque Catholic cemetery is still in use.
As for the Jewish cemetery, it looks rather warn down. Like the neighbouring cemeteries it suffered a lot of damage during the war because it lied on the demarcation line between East and West Beirut. But very little money was put into restoring it, while the neighbouring catholic and armenian cemeteries have been fully restored by the families of the deceased. Withstanding its desolate state, the Jewish cemetery is the main reason why all the other cemeteries are preserved. The government is afraid that any action against it would be interpreted as one directed against the Jewish community.
Do the three women I saw this morning entering a cemetery know that they owe the preservation of the grave they are visiting to the Jewish cemetery? If they did, I’m sure they’d try to visit it and put a stone next to a grave.
When Americans speak of the “wall of separation”, they mean the principle of separation between “Church” and State (i.e. Religion & Government). The expression takes a whole different meaning in our region, doesn’t it?
Well, I thought the title of this post (transliterated: Eid Mubarak and Shana Tova, translated: Blessed Feast and Happy New Year) reflects the hopes of many perfectly, that an ampersand replaces the wall.
Notice the clouds lurking in the back… well, you’ll understand what they’re up to in a coming post
Frequent sojourns in Paris do have their advantages. One of them is being able to see a great variety of films at the movies, many of which have no chance of being screened in Beirut (at least not in public screenings). I had the pleasure to watch a couple of hours ago “Tu n’aimeras point”, an Israeli film by Haim Tabakman (that came out in Paris before Tel Aviv).
Don’t let this hollywood style trailer mislead you. The film is not about a gay couple. It’s no Israeli version of Bareback Mountain. It’s not about conflict of lifestyles (Jerusalem vs Tel Aviv; secular global vs religious local). It’s about a righteous person (צדיק, صادق) who discovers love with another man yet refuses to make choices until confronted by his community. He indulges in a homosexual relation without letting go of his beliefs and his respect of the Law. Quite the contrary, his passion opens up his eyes to a less stoic interpretation of religious texts. But he doesn’t notice the social consequences of his acts until the social reaction hits him in the face.
What is particularly interesting about the film is that it introduces you to a hassidic worldview showing you its many facets and its struggle for survival in a world that upholds opposing values. Withstanding the risks entailed by its subject matter, it refrains from being judgemental, pedagogical or raunchy. The excellent performance, clean editing and focused cinematography also serve a script that leaves no room for justification or explanation (neither from the director’s perspective nor from the characters’).
Indoctrination: As we have seen, Anticonfessionalism is a State defused ideology. Not only is it a defining element of our constitution and our institutions, but it’s the most prominent feature of our political discourse. Even those who want to maintain the political system as it is are either uncomfortable with it or are embarrassed to defend it publicly.
All public discussions are dominated by negative views of confessionalism. These views have been diffused through the media for over half a century. They have found their way in history books and civic education books.
The consequence is obvious: an overwhelming majority of Lebanese holds negative views on confessionalism and consider it incompatible with all values they consider positive (the latter values are not necessarily shared). As we will see, these views are not based on facts, on demonstrations, but on a global prejudgment. A critical approach is surely warranted when it involves an analysis of merits and faults. But it ceases to be interesting when it’s a simple expression of adverse or disapproving comments and judgments. Read the rest of this entry »
How fast is Israel heading for trouble? How much can one extrapolate from one crime news heading, a simple human interest story? Could it be an indicator or is it just an isolated case?
One thing is certain, Israeli editorialists and politicians are not taking it so lightly (c.f. Yediot Ahronot article). For them, it’s not just about Nir Katz (24) and Liz Trubeshi (17) who were killed on saturday. It’s about a shooting attack on a gay and lesbian youth center in Tel Aviv. It’s about a hate crime. It’s about an automatic weapon (such as an M-16 rifle) that was used by an Israeli to kill other Israelis because of differences in lifestyle and values.
It’s about a bubble exploding, but unlike Eytan Fox’s הבועה, the needle that burst it is not directly tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict… but might very well be indirectly link to it. For how long can Israeli society nurture its militaristic culture and breed distrust between some of its sectors, before that starts spreading?
Judging from the reaction of editorialists and politicians, the fear is there, but also the discomfort. How should this attack be called? A terror attack? Can it be called a terror attack although its perpetrator seems to be jewish? This is the kind of hesitation one sees in interviews and opinion papers. It’s not a simple case of semantics, its about classification, operating a distinction between “jewish violence and “palestinian violence”: when violence is so instrumental in separating and defining two groups, what happens when it erupts within one of the groups? what does it say about the opposition between the two groups…
Anti-confessionalism probably lacks historical perspective because it is utterly uninterested in context. It is obsessed with values and rules: it seeks to impose what it claims to be positive, modern (western), secular values (and rules), while claiming to combat what it defines as archaic, religious, oppressive values (and rules). By doing so, it defines itself (anti-confessionalism) and what it combats (confessionalism).
Before going into this dual definition (and its implication), let’s have a glimpse at these very values and value-laden political programmes anti-confessionalism vows to defend and implement.
A glimpse at the muddle
As Maria sang to the children, “let’s start at the very beginning, a very good place to start”. The whole debate over confessionalism started in the 1940s. Sure, one could trace articles and writing about its many elements to the 1930, and even to the 1920s. But they were still scattered then, and dealt with points that were quite rightly seen as unrelated: secularisation, modernisation, westernisation, nation-building and state building. From the 1940s onwards, all these views converged under the label of “anticonfessionalism” as their proponents defined a common enemy, confessionalism.
This conversion obscures the fact that we are dealing with distinct processes, political programmes and values. This is why we will look into each of them one at a time.
Secularisation: A process in which the various aspects of society (economic, political, legal, and moral) become increasingly specialised and distinct from religion (and religious authority). It is usually accompanied by a societal decline in levels of religiosity. Its proponents usually link the decline of religiosity to the increase of freedoms. In Lebanon, secularisation usually means three things:
Abolishing the personal status laws and courts (up to now, each recognised and established community has its own laws and courts), and replacing them by one civil legislation in matters of family law.
Supporting “secular” education, i.e. state schools and universities (vs schools and universities within religious networks).
AntiConfessionalism! The word seems easy to grasp. The prefix and suffix speak for themselves. Intuitively, one could assume that anticonfessionalism is antonymous & opposed to a specific system, principle, ideology: confessionalism. Up to now things might seem pretty clear. But when you look a bit closer, you discover something completely different. It’s actually quite hard to oppose anti-confessionalism to confessionalism. It’s like opposing black and white. Sure it’s a common assumption that black is the opposite of white, but it doesn’t tell you much about one or the other, and so the opposition turns out to be meaningless.
I have already dealt with the issue of anticonfessionalism two years ago (albeit hysterically) through a “hate mail” sent to Amam05 posted here. The arguments haven’t changed, but maybe I should restate them more serenely.
We might have many bad intellectual habits in Lebanon, but anti-confessionalism is unmistakably the worst. If you’re looking for insight, learning, critical engagement… keep away from anti-confessional literature. On the other hand, if you’re looking for repetitive prose, dogmatism, distilled ideology, decontextualised constructions, baseless assumptions, groundless accusations… Then you should definitely check out the many books, articles and declarations written on confessionalism.
At first, I thought it would be possible to discuss this issue in one post, but judging from the reactions I’m getting, I think it better to discuss one paradox at a time.
Monday: Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin.
Vous avez remarqué les points de suspension qui terminent le titre de l’article, ou plutôt le laisse ouvert pour indiquer que beaucoup de choses restent à dire. En fait, il aurait été plus juste de le ponctuer avec un deux-points car cet editorial est un véritable réquisitoire où l’auteur exprime méthodiquement tout son dégout sur les Musulmans, un dégout ordinaire puisqu’il est partagé par beaucoup et peut passer inaperçu: une virulente islamophobie de salon dirons nous en détournant l’une de ses expressions. Pour bien saisir les idées fondamentales autour desquels l’article s’articule, il est conseillé de se poser ces trois questions suivantes en le lisant:
Journalists, housewives and other coffee drinkers have been discussing the changes they have noticed in Saad Hariri’s attitude. These changes are quite noticeable. Not only has Hariri become a better public speaker, but he modified his political positioning. For the past few months, he no longer positions himself as the government’s godfather, and the Prime Minister’s protector. He has taken center stage. Let’s have a closer look at what he represents.
The unexpected heir
Saad Hariri enjoys a very enviable political position, gathering support and having leverage on three different levels: .
On a local and communal level, Saad Hariri inherited his father’s position within the Sunni community. His authority over the Sunni religious institutions is no secret to anyone. The Sunni religious leadership has been openly and collectively campaigning for him during the last two parliamentary elections. Furthermore, Saad Hariri is the king maker amongst Sunnis. He finished what his father had started (and the Syrians had prevented him from completing), becoming the sole political “reference” (مرجع) of the Sunni community, head of an electoral bulldozer (محدلة) and the arbitrator who chooses amongst the local notables those who will represent the nation in parliament. Out of the 26 sunni MPs, 14 are officially part of his bloc (54%), 6 MPs are members of allied blocs (out of which at least 3 are “lent”), 4 are independent (2 of which owe their place to Hariri), 2 are part of rival blocs (owe their seats to the Shiite Bulldozer).
On a national level, the Sunni leader was hurled into a dominant position on his father’s coattail. Since 2005, he heads the country’s largest political group, parliamentary bloc, media group, financial group, real estate group (and security company, so it seems). If you want to get a clearer picture of what he represents, think Berlusconi and multiply him by 10 (at least).
On an international level, Saad Hariri enjoys the backing of Saudi Arabia, France and the United States, so in practical terms, that means that he has the wealthiest and strongest international allies amongst all Lebanese politicians.
A little test before stating the facts behind what can be termed the “Gad el-Maleh affair”.
How do you read this bumper striker?
Here are the most common answers:
I love Israel
I love Jews
I love Judaism
Now try to think how a Jew would read this sticker. And try remembering that in conclusion of two of the most important jewish holidays and services (Yom Kippur and the Passover) the words “ Next Year in Jerusalem” are recited. And that since the 1960s, Israel and Jerusalem have once again become the cultural and religious centers of Judaism (in terms of pilgrimage, religious publishing, and religious authority). For most Jews living in the West (or anywhere else in the world), it’s not really easy to make the difference between the three answers. And most people who identify as Jewish won’t find the differentiation very meaningful. Now imagine what Gad Elmaleh’s answer would be
To complicate things even more, look into some statistics. Try to see how many Jews in the US or France (the two western countries with the largest jewish communities) consider Israel as important and relevant (or even vital) for them as Jews… Try asking most representatives of jewish communities throughout the world if they are zionist or not… and listen to their answers.
All this to say that the comfortable distinction between “Jews” and Zionist that some Lebanese hide behind isn’t really operational anymore (it’s not that easy to make), and it’s mostly irrelevant for most of the world’s jewish population. Israel (defined in zionist terms) has become central to world jewry. And except a very small number of jewish groups and individuals who identify as non-zionist (mostly Iranian Jews, a minority left leaning Jews or some hasidic leaders), and who are usually attacked by other Jews and accused of being “self-hating” or wrongly condemned as anti-Semitic (sometimes by court, c.f. Eyal Sivan’s case).
Dismantling the Ministry of Interior?! Now that’s easier said than done. But it is quite obvious that such a ministry is more suited for Napoleonic times than ours. A country like the United States doesn’t have such a ministry. Why should we? Interior ministries are usually repressive, bureaucratic and static (immune to change). And ours certainly doesn’t have a very good record.
Now let’s have a quick look at the Ministry’s ambit. It is responsible for administrative affairs (e: Civil registries), policing, immigration matters, palestinian affairs and municipalities. Moreover, it represents the government at local levels (districts and governorates). This ministry is one of the major obstacle in front of a “national goal” set by the Taef accords, that of decentralisation! It is the authority in charge of censorship (its body includes religious people, a fact that has no grounds in constitutional law). It has invented several mechanisms that are quite objectionable (according “under-study” I.D. Cards… a status that can be inherited! It has deviated our laws on associations), and has failed in managing Palestinian affairs. Finally, the police is corrupt, ignores the laws that govern the society and is inefficient in maintaining civil peace.
I propose to subdivide it into six Ministries, two of which will be merged with existing ministries (namely the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the Minister of State for administrative reform.
Ministry of Administrative affairs
This ministry will take over all the “administrative” functions of the Interior Ministry: Ombudsman, Administrative reform, Civil registries…
Ministry of Civil liberties and rights
So as to balance the power of the Ministry of Defence and the obsession the government has with “security”, it is important to have a ministry in charge of promoting, protecting and expanding civil liberties.
Ministry of Secularism, Religious and Communal affairs
Lebanese are generally unaware that their country is amongst the most secular in the region, and that there is a complete separation between State Law and religious law. Unfortunately, the principle of separation between State and Church is not complete in Lebanon. Muslim communities still benefit from the State’s financial support (for their hierarchies and their courts), while Christian and Jewish communities don’t. But this can be changed following another principle, that of equal treatment of established religions.
Moreover, people ignore that Religious freedom and membership to an established community have two different legal grounds. It is possible to adhere to any religion one wants, even if it is not recognised by the state, as long as one doesn’t threaten public order. Lastly, the same legal text establishing the different religious communities also recognizes the “Civil law community” (Communauté de droit commun). One of the aims of this new ministry would be to finally establish this community (with almost 80 years overdue).
Ministry of Palestinian Affairs
Palestinians affairs have been badly managed by the State from the onset. The focus has been on the fact that Palestinians are “Refugees” and that their primary (or sole) political right is to return to their country. All the rest has been neglected. Palestinians were not treated as individuals who have intrinsic rights as individuals, to be protected, to have a space to grow and thrive. This new ministry’s function is precisely to change this way of dealing with Palestinians. Not only will it be in charge of decommissioning within the camps, but also of organising elections for the representation of Palestinians in Lebanon, and for the modification of discriminatory legislation towards them (ex: they should be allowed to create NGOs under the same conditions as Lebanese or any resident in the country).
Ministry of Municipalities and Decentralisation
Decentralisation has been a national goal for almost twenty years, and yet nothing has been done up to now to start implementing it. By handing over to the Interior Ministry the function of supervising Municipalities (the only “decentralised” authority in Lebanon), the successive government have actually increased the centralisation of the State. By separating the two Ministries, the national goal will be highlighted, and there will be an authority that’s function is to devise a plan (mechanism and agenda) for this decentralisation, and then to follow it up.
Ministry of Defence and Human Security
This Ministry is actually an expanded version of the Ministry of Defence. It will take over all the Policing responsibilities so as to concentrate all security and law enforcements efforts. This will help the country protect itself against external or internal threats. It will have the authority to modify and merge new forces for the sake of efficiency. It will have an agenda to decommission all non-governmental armed forces, fight corruption within the police force, modernize the army and protect Lebanon from foreign interventions and most importantly, protect the citizens in case of attack (by building shelters, organising evacuations…). The notion of “human security” (i.e. the citizen’s security) is at the center of the ministry’s thinking, and not the abstract notion such as “national security”. Its aim is to preserve human life.
I read Obama’s Cairo speech twice yesterday and just viewed to it on Youtube, from beginning to end; and it still had the same effect on me. Between the time I read it, and the time I saw it, I had skimmed through many editorials commenting it. But this hadn’t altered my views on it. It is by far one of the most impressive PR stunts that I have ever witnessed. Barak Obama had succeeded in extending to the Muslim communities worldwide the message he gave to Americans during the presidential campaign. He sold them “change they could believe in”.
Many things could be said about the American President’s speech in Egypt, and indeed, many things have been said about it. However, what seems to be extremely important is the liberal approach that he has espoused to discuss Islam. Instead of referring to the Muslim World or addressing Muslim countries, Obama preferred to talk on one hand about Islam as a religion, one that should be treated in the very same way other religions are treated, and on the other hand about “Muslim-majority countries”. Now this expression is rather new to me. It’s obviously preferable to the expression “Muslim countries”, because it insists that the “muslim” character comes from the fact that the population is mostly muslim, it’s not a character of the state. Furthermore, the expression “muslim majority” hints that there could be a non-muslim minority in those countries… This expression is undoubtedly a non-essentialist and liberal one. It reflects the way religion is seen in America: it is recognised as an important social feature, but one that doesn’t have a direct tie with the government because of the principle of separation of church and state (first amendment: establishment clause and freedom of religion).
A month to the day, Ziad Baroud, Lebanon’s Interior Minister, issued a circular giving every Lebanese citizen the right to remove the reference to his/hers religion from the Civil Registry’s records. The circular instructed the registrar to accept all requests made by citizens to delete the reference to their religion in their records. It added that such a right is protected by the Lebanese constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements that Lebanon has ratified.
This decision (and the laudatory reactions to it) enraged me so much it paralysed me. Here was the perfect illustration of a highly ideological step that was the fruit of a soon to be century old legal and conceptual confusion on Middle-Eastern communalism. Nowhere in the press did I find any critical approach to that decision. All comments were congratulatory. Some pundits even spoke of a step towards the end of religious discrimination!? Who exactly is discriminated against? And obviously, no one spoke of the legal difficulties that are likely to arrise from this decision.
Ministry of Administrative affairs
A month to the day, Ziad Baroud, Lebanon’s Interior Minister, issued a circular giving every Lebanese citizen the right to remove the reference to his/hers religion from the Civil Registry’s records. The circular instructed the registrar to accept all requests made by citizens to delete the reference to their religion in their records. It added that such a right is protected by the Lebanese constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements that Lebanon has ratified.