Recipe for a fruitful discussion

Bring a thread, not a woven carpet!

I was reading a couple of blogs today, vast discussions debating over the best solution to the Palestinian question (the more realistic, the more equitable, the more profitable…). Bloggers were parrotting  politicians, proposing package deals and behaving like merchants, trying to sell the best product, the miracle pill.

It reminded me of those humorous pills you find in gadget stores (“Take two pills a day and become blond”, “Four pills to learn German”) or at your chemists (“this pill will make u happier”, “this pill will make u slimmer”).

These discussions have little sens. They do not even qualify as discussions. It’s like merchants yelling their goods. And taking it very much at heart, behaving as if they created the product to start with.
In Lebanon, we have similar discussions. The debate over institutional reform follows the same pattern. People will howl at you the virtues of federalism, others will hammer at you the necessity for deconfessionalisation. Each is convinced that the opponent’s solution is seditious, destructive and morally flowed.

Such discussions are sterile. A one state solution for Palestine/Israel could threaten Jewish existence as much as it could threaten Palestinian existence. It could be a solution just as it could just reframe the problem. All depends on the institutions that will be chosen and the way social and political actors will interact with them. Similarly, a two state solution could reinforce the antagonism between the two people just as it could comfort their fears.
The same could be said about the institutional debate in Lebanon. Federalism could bring the country closer together just as it could be the first step towards a permanent divorce between regions and communities. It all depends on what kind of federalism is adopted and how the social and political actors will interact with the new institutions. These two elements are hardly ever considered. The same could be said about confessionalisation and deconfessionalisation. Up to now, the results haven’t been very positive either way. When President Chehab introduced confessionalism to the public administration in the 1960s, it worked as an instrument of “affirmative action” but increased the hold of patronage networks and gave it a stronger communal flavour. Similarly, when the Taef agreement got rid of the Chehabist parity rule, it didn’t diminish the hold of the patronage networks but encouraged Christian-Lebanese to “withdraw” from the State apparatus (just as they had did since the 1950s from the Municipality of Beirut)…

Wouldn’t it be preferable to stop looking for the miracle panacea and spend all our energy on defending this “global solution” and just tackle the points that we find important, one by one? For example advancing individual and collective rights or dismounting the patronage networks in Lebanon, or working on mobility, security and the respect of individual and collective rights in Israel/Palestine…

No Presidential share in government! Some reasons why Michel Suleiman shouldn’t get any!

Ever since the process for the formation of a new government started, pundits have been discussing the Presidents share; how large its going to be, and who is likely to be part of it. At first, analysts wondered if the President’s share could be neutral, given the extreme polarisation of Lebanese politics, or if it will bring together people from both sides of the spectrum. Then the magic formula appeared: 15 (for March XIV® and allies), 10 (for the Opposition®) – 5 (for the President). The political class had agreed to increase the President’s share from 3 to 5! This was presented as a measure to reinforce the presidency that was much weakened by the constitutional amendments agreed upon in Taef. Unsurprisingly, analysts were easily convinced by this unanimous decision & argument. No one seemed to question its appropriateness, its pertinence or its constitutionality. But don’t worry, things are going to change! I’m going to share with you a couple of good reasons why their shouldn’t be any “presidential share” in any cabinet!

Here are 5 good reasons why the President shouldn’t have a share in government.

Having a share neutralises his constitutional function as arbitrator. Being able to swing from one to another in a cabinet vote is not arbitration, it’s taking sides.

1. Being part of the government weakens his authority. It’s not about numbers and positions, it’s about being on another level! He should assert his moral authority and stay above the political fray.
2. Having ministers means that he accepts to be like all the other political players, but with one notable difference, he will be the only one who cannot count on a group of MPs.
3. By having a share, he complicates and circumvents two rules of coalition formation : the proportionality rule and the consociational rule.
4. By accepting to have a share, he affirms the mouhassassa and mahsoubié principle.

What the President should do.

At this point of time, he should set the rules behind the composition of the government by arbitrating between the opposing contentions, and innovating. There is no agreement on the three dimensions of coalition buildings. The political class still hasn’t defined definitive rules for distributing share and portfolios, picking ministers and setting a common program. Now these issues are quite complex, and they are never formulated in legal terms so as not to complicate even more the process. But when disagreements run so deep, an arbitrator is needed. Why go to Damascus, to Riyad or to Doha to find an arbitrator? why not simply go to Baabda.

Here are a couple of principles that the President should arbitrate on:

• Can a candidate who lost the parliamentary elections become minister? People are thinking about Gebran Bassil, but there are others, and I’m thinking of Ahmad Asaad, for instance. I personally believe Asaad should become Minister even though he lost during the elections… This would ensure a political diversity within the Shiite representation. And then, is it fair to exclude from the government people who lost during the elections without equally excluding politicians who didn’t dare run because they were almost sure to loose?
• Should the different Zuama stick to naming people from within their ranks or can they name people from outside their ranks? such as “independents” or “allies”.
• Does anyone have a veto power on the nomination of ministers within each share?

Peut-on casser l’oligarchie quadripartite?

Sous l’angle de la distribution et de l’exercice du pouvoir au Liban, la division Quatorze Mars/8 mars n’a pas beaucoup de sens. Sa seule pertinence semble se situer au niveau des alliances géopolitiques, mais également au niveau d’une partie de la base populaire qui y croit. Le pouvoir au Liban est partagé entre quatre réseaux clientélistes qui s’appuient sur de nombreuses ressources: financières, bancaires, institutionnelles, locales, étatiques, étrangères…

L’oligarchie quadripartite: les monopoles politiques en milieu musulman
Ces réseaux sont tous confessionnels: deux chiites, un druze et un sunnite. Trois d’entre eux s’appuient, au besoin, sur leurs armes. A cet égard, le Hezbollah est le plus convainquant, suivi par le PSP et puis Amal, comme l’ont démontré “les événements du 7 mai” 2008. Certe, les pressions géopolitiques les obligent à une rivalité, mais celle-ci restre exceptionnelle et circonscrite sur le plan local. D’ailleurs, même en période de crise extrême la collaboration entre ces quatre réseaux continue. Pour ne citer que quelques exemples: les versements au Conseil du Sud ont continué durant la période de démission non-acceptée des ministres d’Amal… les périmètres de sécurité du Hezbollah sont continuellement respectés… la force de police est “équitablement” partagée entres les différents réseaux… Chacun est satisfait de sa part, et s’accommode de la part de l’autre. Toutefois, cette “rivalité” appuyé par l’étranger à trois conséquences malheureuses: elle renforce la mobilisation communautaire, elle consolide les réseaux clientélistes et elle envenime les rapports entre les membres des trois principales communautés sur lesquels ces réseaux s’appuient.

Ces trois conséquences n’auraient pas pu être neutralisées ou affaiblies par les élections en 2005  (sous le signe de l’alliance) et en 2009 (sous le signe de la “compétition”)… Au contraire, elles les ont consacrés ou reconduits.

La compétition politique en milieu chrétien
Les Syriens ont soutenu l’oligarchie quadripartite dans sa conquête et son renforcement du pouvoir. Du côté chrétiens, seuls des réseaux confessionnel locaux ont été autorisés et soutenus. Depuis 2005, deux stratégies différentes s’offraient aux chrétiens pour intégrer le système politique libanais tel que: l’intégrer en tant que “juniors partner(s)” ou transformer l’oligarchie quadripartite en oligarchie pentapartite.

Can the FPM regain its electorate?

Three extremely vigorous debates over the interpretation of the outcome of the parliamentary elections began before the final results were even published. Two of them involved the FPM: how much of its electorate did it actually loose, and why it lost it. We have discussed these issues in a preceding post. We will ask ourself today how likely it is for the FPM to regain its electorate.

He who represented 70% of Christians

Since 2005, General Michel Aoun boasted that he represented 70% of Christians. This slogan meant two things: that he was the undisputed Za’im of the Christian communities, and that the other Christian blocs, parties and MPs owed their seats to Muslim votes. This wasn’t very far from the truth, but did it serve the FPM? Not really. Even though his bloc scored as well as those of Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri & Hassan Nasrallah, Michel Aoun was denied the same recognition and an equivalent share. His position improved when two pillars of the Quadripartite oligarchy recognised him as the christian Za’im. But it wasn’t enough to make him an equal partner of the Big Four, and his share in power (and ressources) remained significantly smaller than the others (and some would argue  smaller than the oligarchy’s other Christian junior partners). The results of the 2009 elections will likely have no effect on Aoun’s & the FPM’s share of power. Their significant electoral downsizing will probably be of no consequence.

The FPM’s score in 2005 was both monumental and unexpected. The party was just emerging from years of persecution, its leader had just returned from exile, it had little media backing, didn’t provide social services or distribute state ressources… And withstanding all this, it benefited from a massive score that established it as Lebanon’s largest (and dominant) Christian party, one ready to enter into Lebanon’s communal politics withstanding its long-established anti-communal stand. As it entered Parliament, the FPM embodied a principle that it had long fought, that of communalism. The votes it had received were overwhelmingly Christian and the bloc it formed was a Christian one (except for one MP). These characteristics were confirmed in 2009. During these past elections, the FPM had to build on 2005’s protest vote, experience an electoral cross-communal alliance and survive an electoral Bulldozer.

From protest vote to accountability?

Can the FPM change & be reformed?

Some might question the pertinence of such a political move, but it seems to me not only necessary, but also urgent. Sure, general Michel Aoun’s parliamentary bloc remains Lebanon’s second largest, sure his party is still one of Lebanon’s largest, but how long will it survive constant political harassment and sidelining?
These past parliamentary elections were a battle for survival, the FPM had to face a huge political coalition – a Bulldozer – that’s declared goal was to eliminate it. It was able to maintain itself, but lost 20% to 30% of its electorate on the way. In the coming two days, we’ll look into two topics:

• Can the FPM regain its electorate?
• How is the FPM repositioning/reinventing itself?

This topic caught my attention today as I heard on the FPM’s radio (92.5 FM, صوت المدى) that the party was studying the results and outcomes of the 2009 parliamentary elections. As expected, the news bulletin said nothing about what was discussed, how it was discussed and what was finally decided.

Parking meters and the rule of law in Lebanon

What does a parking meter have in common with the rule of law ? Think about it. This is not cracker joke or a riddle. My answer is everything! This device pictured on the left is probably the best expression (if not the only local one) you can find of the famous legal principle everyone seems to be yearning for in Lebanon.

To understand why this is the case, one has to go back to the definition of this legal principle. In most Arab countries, the prevalent expression is a translation from the French or German equivalent “Etat de droit” or “Rechtsstaat” : دولة القانون. In Lebanon, the expression was uselessly expanded to become دولة المؤسسات والقانون, which is rather redundant. But it shows the general frustration people have with State institutions (civil servants and state officials) because of the unjust and discretionary manner in which they implement rule.
Instead of delving in definitions, let’s follow an American legal scholar, Lon Fuller, who determines it through eight defining elements.

Suleiman & Hariri (3): contours of a cohabitation

I couldn’t find a better picture to illustrate the oddness of the Hariri/Suleiman couple. Which one do you think will be playing Laurel, and which one will be playing Hardy? I’m not too sure about this. Both men are political outsiders. They were hurled to office, unprepared. So they are likely to make some rather comical mistakes. And some mistakes might even be spun to serve them (remember Saad’s very unlebanese زي ما هي ”Zay ma hya” in 2005?). But just like everything opposed Laurel to Hardy (and vice versa), the same applies to our odd couple. On a personal level, the former playboy/businessman seems more flexible, more humorous, more apt to learn than the former military chief. On a political level, the Prime Minister holds all the cards, and the president none!

Having seen how different the unlikely president and the unexpected heir are, having glimpsed at how unbalanced their power sharing is, we can start imagining how their cohabitation is likely to be. Let us look at three variables/factors:

- Cabinet weight
- Communal representation
- Allotment of cross-communal shares in Government
- Political competence
- Political potency

Interested in more?

What Future for the Future Movement

I stumbled upon a very small news item yesterday that wasn’t given much attention by the Press. Samir Doumit, the former head of the Lebanese Order of Engineers, replaced Salim Diab as head of the temporary commission to restructure the Future Movement. I found this information quite interesting.

Second reform committee, two years after foundation

Hardly two years after the establishment of the Future Movement as a political party, a second committee will be studying new strategies for reform. And interestingly enough, the Prime Minister designate chose a Christian (among his faithfuls) to head this committee. What does this signal? I believe that the picture above says it all. This poster is a follow up to Future Movement’s electoral campaign “As long as the sky is blue”… Here what it says: “We are all under Lebanon’s skies” and it is signed Saad Hariri. On the bottom of the picture, you find the top part of 6 flags that are actually rather easy to recognise: Future Movement (property of the Hariri family), Amal (property of Nabih Berri), Hezbollah, Ishtiraki (property of the Joumblatt family), Kataeb (property of the Gemayel family ) or Lebanese Forces (property of Samir Geagea), and the FPM (property of Michel Aoun).

The message is clear: Hariri and his Future Movement are above the political bikering and divisions. They represent a united trans-communal Lebanon. All this is very nice, but it faces one big problem: reality. Saad Hariri is a Sunni Za’im, and Future Movement is an overwhelmingly sunni party, a mostly sunni KSA backed clientelist network, supported by two funds (educational and socio-medical) and linked to a media group that shares the same name.

The Lebanese Republic: Naming and counting

The FPM’s electoral campaign launched a very sterile debate over the coming of the Third Republic. But  Before tackling the numbers issue, let’s try to name this republic, find the right adjectives that best describe it.
- The first obvious answer is Banana Republic (the BR), but the term is too derogatory and not the least explanatory.
- with a little more analysis one can come up with the “Martyrs of Sovereignty (Hezbollah’s) and Independence (March XIV®) Republic (the MSIR)
- A more socio-political approach will give us the “Zu’ama Republic” or the “Quadripartite Republic” (the ZR or the QR).

Now let’s get to the numbers!
Is this the First, Second or Third Republic?
What’s the story behind them? It all started with the Taef agreement. Some political analysts wanted to show that Lebanon was making a new start, institutionally speaking. So they followed the French academic system that distinguishes between 5 different republics.

Suleiman & Hariri (1): the unlikely president

One of the greatest political unknowns in Lebanon is surely the evolution of the presidential cohabitation between Saad Hariri and Michel Suleiman. They both share the same views on the head of the executive: his function, duty and responsibilities. Only both see themselves as that head. Let’s take a brief look at the political positioning of two men who never were intended to take such prominent political positions and try to see how things are likely to evolve for two unlikely politicians and between them.

If you want to read more on the unlikely President (what will & what way?) read below. In the coming days, you’ll find some thoughts on the unlikely Prime Minister.

Lobby for the appointment of these MINISTERS (and now the guys)

• Ministry of Secularism, Religious & Communal affairs

This ministry is certainly the trickiest of all. Its basic mission is to set the record straight about Lebanon’s secularism and its commitment to the recognition of religious communities and their rights.

Wouldn’t Ziad Baroud be great in it? Sure, our current Minister of the Interior has made quite a blunder on this particular issue with his decision to allow people to cross of their communal membership on the civil registries (a sloppy decision with a very muddled legal justification). But he is a fast learner, and he can be quite flexible…

• Minister of Civil liberties & Rights: Now this ministry would have the important task of fighting censorship (replacing the censorship bureau with a rating bureau), putting some order into the Personal registries and modernising them (giving each citizen a personal number instead of a family number linked to one locality, reinstating the obligatory mention of communal membership, reinstating the mention of place of residency), and proposing legislation for the protection of civil liberties and privacy. This ministry should equally insure that all residents in Lebanon benefit from the legislation protecting and guaranteeing civil rights and liberties. And this legistlation should also encompass a broadening of our legislation on political refugees from the Arab States, if Lebanon wants to truly become the beacon of democracy and free thoughts.

Who better than Nizar Saghieh could do the job? This lawyer is one of the founders of Hurriyyat Khassa (Private Liberties), a Lebanese human rights organization founded on October 1, 2002 (not sure it’s still active). He has published widely on such topics as reform of the judicial system and the memory of war (in Arabic).

• Minister of Defence and Human Security: A Lebanese General. Not really familiar with the Kaki world. Does anyone have a person in mind?

• Minister of Palestinian Affairs.

This ministry is certainly the most “explosive” new ministry I have suggested, both metaphorically and literally. Palestinian affairs” are a very sensitive issue in Lebanon. After all, this group was singled out in the 1990s as being responsible for the civil war. Moreover, if you want to terrorize a Lebanese Christian, just mention the possible naturalisation of Palestinians… This fear runs so deep that the preambule of our constitution sees it fit to explicitly state “NO to naturalisation”. And this is used as an excuse for rampant discrimination against a population that is mostly born in Lebanon (and has never been anywhere else).
Finally, the Lebanese Army and Police still respect the Cairo Accords (though they have been abrogated), and refuses to enter the Palestinian neighbourhoods or settlements (called “camps” to emphasise their ephemerality) and the Palestinian training camps (now these are usually quite far from palestinian settlements).

Chibli Mallat is a lawyer and a professor of law. Director, Centre for the Study of the European Union. He currently teaches in the US. He considers himself left-leaning and supportive of Palestinian rights. He was candidate to the Presidential elections in 2004. Nobody really took him seriously.

• Minister of Municipalities and Decentralisation

Karam Karam. No, not the old one, the young one!  He’s the one sitting next to Ziad Baroud in this picture. He is a researcher in political science that had worked a couple of years ago on the Municipal Elections. He used to be close to the IFPO (French Institute for the Near East) and now works for the LCPS (Lebanese center for Policy Studies). He is also an active member of LADE (The Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections).

Transfiguring old ministries: Culture/Environment/Displaced

Let’s start by looking at the relatively “new”  ministries that were created in the 1990s and that look ancient already. What I’m suggesting here is not a simple “lifting”, a kind of plastic surgery. It’s genetic manipulation and engineering that I have in mind. It’s time for these ministries to mutate! Basically , we’re looking at the Ministry of Culture (established in 1993), the Ministry of the environment (an Office of a Minister of State since 1981 established as a ministry in 1993), the Ministry of the Displaced (an Office of a Minister of State since 1992, established as a Ministry in 1993).

• Ministry of Heritage, Cultural innovation, Media and Communication. The Ministry of Culture is probably the most underfunded ministry in the land. But that’s not its only problem. Most of the ministers who headed it seem to have looked down on it and failed to take it very seriously. Their vision of what this Ministery should or could do was rather limited. That is particularly true for the better ministers such as Ghassan Salamé (who was preoccupied with the Francophonie Summit), Tarek Mitri (who preferred to play Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Tamam Salam (who is completely taken by the project “Beirut, world book capital” that was totally neglected by his predecessor). So I suggest we expand this ministry and merge it with another ministry that seems better sooted for a totalitarian state: the Ministry of Information.

Through this merger and expansion, we’ll have a ministry that is better suited to guide Lebanon into the information age where culture not only matters, but is an important (and ever expanding) economical sector.  two other ministries: The Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Information. This new Ministry will concentrate its effort on innovation, and making Lebanon a platform for artistic creativity in the Middle East. We already have a very productive audiovisual sector, and Lebanese youth are quite good in software and internet production… With a little push… and an energetic Minister, we could play wonders.

• Ministry of Green economy and environmental affairs. The green economy is starting to grow in Lebanon, with organic farms, organic markets, eco-tourism, natural reserves…

Unfortunately, the government’s approach to the environment hasn’t changed much. It is still focused on “natural reserves”, forestation and awareness. It’s high time somebody took it a step further.  Having a ministry in charge of an expanding economical sector is not only relevant, but necessary. It should be given the means to propose important changes in the Legislation (on imports of pollutants) and it should have a special office in charge of converting polluting industries in Lebanon.

• Ministry of Remembrance & Reconciliation. Our Ministry of the displaced has a dreadful record. It was basically used as a tool to reintegrate Lebanese nationals into two clientelistic networks (notably, Walid Jumblatt’s and Nabih Berri’s). It’s time things changed.

Instead of simply abolishing this ministry (as former minister Nehmé Tohmé suggested, its mission should be expanded to deal with non-financial issues, and more specifically, social and psychological issues. Lebanon is deeply marked (and scarred) by intercommunal strife. Lives have been shattered, families broken up and destroyed, villages and neighbourhoods wiped off the map, livelihoods ruined… And very little has been done to deal with it, except giving money to two categories of people: those who are living in properties belonging to “displaced” (i.e. expelled) people, and displaced people whose property has suffered damages). A ministry that has to deal with this memory is probably what the country needs to heel its wounds. Such a ministry will help us go beyond the current cult of martyrs.

Berri returns! How many sequels can we take? (part 1)

“On prend les mêmes et on recommence”, as the French saying goes. The Lebanese press has been announcing Nabih Berri’s return since the alleged victory of the March XIV coalition (two Muslim oligarchs, the two Christian parties they salvaged as Junior partners, their clients and semi-autonomous allies).

Michael Young published a piece last week that sums up March XIV leaders’ and their supporter’s positions perfectly.

First the leaders’ positions: the editorialist will hardly mention them. But one can easily understand that the March XIV leaders have no qualms about reelecting Nabih Berri and will command their MPs to do so. The editorialist will obviously not state this that bluntly. He will simply indicate that “Berri will return” (as Michael Young puts it in the heading, or Philippe Abi Akl in the francophone daily in Orient Le Jour). This certainty is not linked to any agency. At first sight, it seems like a foregone conclusion, a question of fate. The two editorialists mentioned don’t even discuss the alternatives. Michael Young cites exterior pressures (an argument used by politicians to absolve themselves from responsibility), but not very convincingly. Why would Syria insist on Nabih Berri’s reelection? How has it expressed it? In what way will it exert pressure to achieve it? What will be the cost of accepting this pressure or refusing it? These are important questions that Michael Young simply ignores.

And now the March XIV supporter’s arguments. Michael Y0ung and Philippe Abi-Akl do not hide the fact that they favour this alliance. They are actually quite vocal about their political preferences and don’t consider that as a bias. So their editorials sum up the most most intelligent (and intelligible) arguments that camp has to offer. And they illustrate well the uncomfortable position the March XIV supporters are trapped in.

• They castigate and have in the past heavily reviled Nabih Berri, and believe that time has come for a change of Speaker (17 years is a long enough term). This position is shared by many FPM supporters. It was the party’s official position in 2005.
• They believe the “majority” should act as a majority.
• They will justify their leaders’ decision even if they don’t agree with it. This behaviour is shared by many FPM and March VIII supporters. And they know that their leaders have already decided that Berri will succeed to himself.
• They accept their leaders’ decision, but believe that this reelection should be done with a minimal number of votes (some suggest that it should be done after several “humiliating” rounds), and that it should be accompanied by conditions. The two suggestions are obviously meaningless. Practically, what difference does it make if Berri is elected by 80, 60 or 40 votes after 4 rounds? And how exactly can you impose conditions on him? How can you secure his commitment?

+++++++++++++++++++

I checked out Amal and Nabih Berri’s sites. They’re quite revealing. Check them out and you’ll see what I mean.

Now the blather is over, the real power issue appears

As you might have noticed, dear reader, the whole electoral debate was extremely polarised. The national and international press and media presented it as a competition between two blocs: March XIV and March VIII Hezbollah. All the political pundits agreed that the electoral battlegrounds between the two camps were the Christian constituencies of historical Mount-Lebanon. This insistence eclipsed the fact that the Christian parties were actually fighting a war of their won. Sure there was a geopolitical (Iran/Syria vs US/KSA/Egypt) dimension to the battle, sure there was a “national” dimension to the battle (the competition between March XIV and March VIII), but what about the local and communal dimension. This dimension was hardly discussed at all.

Interestingly enough, the political actors  mentioned the three dimensions; they all stated that their approach was dual: national (Institutional reform for all… combatting corruption for some, defending national sovereignty for others) and communal (to strengthen and safeguard Christian rights for all). But as you can see, there is no much contradiction in their views and objectives… So their only strategy to distinguish themselves  from the other (and present the voter with a “substantive” choice) was to claim that their rival/foe had other motives (a hidden agenda, for instance) and that he was just a pawn in somebody else’s hand (i.e. directly or indirectly a regional power such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran or the US). By doing so, both sides highlighted the geopolitical dimension of the conflict and obscured the other aspects. Their different alliances with members of the quadripartite oligarchy only highlighted this dimension because each member of the quadripartite alliance had a clear geopolitical positioning, and these regional allies were highlighting the importance of the geopolitical dimension!

But now that the battle was fought (lost and won by everyone), we can look at things more calmly and see more clearly into the real power issues of the electoral battle in historical Mount-Lebanon. The whole thing was about the consecration or the elimination of a potentially fifth pillar that could transform the oligarchy from quadripartite to pentapartite: this pillar was potentially there but wasn’t accepted as such by the other four pillars who all benefited from a power sharing formulae and a hold of political institutions that wasn’t directly related to their popular support (these other ressources are financial, control over part of the public administration, control of State ressources, control of a territory and local public and private institutions, military power, foreign backing…): that potential pillar is Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement.

Obama speech to Muslims: beyond a rhetorical shift

I read Obama’s Cairo speech twice yesterday and just viewed to it on Youtube, from beginning to end; and it still had the same effect on me. Between the time I read it, and the time I saw it, I had skimmed through many editorials commenting it. But this hadn’t altered my views on it. It is by far one of the most impressive PR stunts that I have ever witnessed. Barak Obama had succeeded in extending to the Muslim communities worldwide the message he gave to Americans during the presidential campaign. He sold them “change they could believe in”.

Many things could be said about the American President’s speech in Egypt, and indeed, many things have been said about it. However, what seems to be extremely important is the liberal approach that he has espoused to discuss Islam. Instead of referring to the Muslim World or addressing Muslim countries, Obama preferred to talk on one hand about Islam as a religion, one that should be treated in the very same way other religions are treated, and on the other hand about “Muslim-majority countries”. Now this expression is rather new to me. It’s obviously  preferable  to the expression “Muslim countries”, because it insists that the “muslim” character comes from the fact that the population is mostly muslim, it’s not a character of the state. Furthermore, the expression “muslim majority” hints that there could be a non-muslim minority in those countries… This expression is undoubtedly a non-essentialist and liberal one. It reflects the way religion is seen in America: it is recognised as an important social feature, but one that doesn’t have a direct tie with the government because of the principle of separation of church and state (first amendment: establishment clause and freedom of religion).