Un deuxième ministre “positiv’image” sort ses griffes

Il y a du changement dans l’air. A quelques heures d’intervalles, deux ministres du gouvernement émettent des signaux forts qu’ils entendent prendre en main le ministère auquel ils ont été reconduit. D’abord Ziyad Baroud avec son coup de colère, puis Ibrahim Najjar avec la condamnation d’un magistrat pour corruption.

Deux ministres “positiv’image” ou RP externe
Ces deux Ministres ont un grand nombre de points communs. Ils sont tous les deux juristes, francophones, issus de l’Université Saint Joseph, Chrétiens. Les deux ont été reconduits à leur poste, à un ministère de “souveraineté”. Les deux avaient étaient choisis il y a un an pour leur image. Cette motivation n’est pas particulièrement rare pour le choix d’un ministre chrétien. Après tout, la moitié des sièges gouvernementaux leur était réservée alors que la part des réseaux clientélistes chrétiens était assez réduite. Les patrons des réseaux clientélistes pouvaient donc sans risques, à faible coût et à grand rendement choisir une personnalité chrétienne extérieure au petit monde politique (et à leur réseau clientéliste) pour l’image qu’elle représente. C’est essentiellement pour ces raisons que Ghassan Salamé, George Corm, Tarek Mitri (avant qu’il ne prouve sa fidélité sans faille), et plus récemment Ziyad Baroud et Ibrahim Najjar on été choisis dans une opération de relation publique externe.
La particularité d’Ibrahim Najjar est qu’il a été nommé au gouvernement en tant que représentant des Forces Libanaises. Or, il n’est pas particulièrement proche de cette formation. Sans doute, Samir Geagea l’a choisi pour modifier l’image des Forces Libanaises, et convaincre les élites chrétiennes de la “respectabilité” de sa formation.

Deux ministères de souveraineté court-circuités par les réseaux clientélistes
Il y a trois jours, nous avons vu les problèmes sur lesquels Ziyad Baroud buttait au Ministère de l’Intérieur. La même chose peut-être dite de Ibrahim Najjar et de son Ministère de la Justice. Au lieu de s’étendre sur la manière dont la classe politique s’est appliquée à envahir, noyauter et manipuler la justice, nous attaquerons directement l’affaire du juge Tanios Ghantous. En quelques mots: Le Ministre de la Justice a annoncé que le Conseil Supérieur de la Discipline a démis un juge de ses fonction pour des raisons disciplinaires (corruption). Dix-huit autres dossiers seraient sous étude. Ibrahim Najjar a présenté cette condamnation comme le début d’un vaste chantier de réforme de la justice.

Réforme du système judiciaire ou extension du système clientéliste?
Ce n’est pas anodin que le juge en question, Tanios Ghantous, soit chrétien. Du fait que les réseaux clientélistes établis durant la première moitié du mandat syrien soient essentiellement confessionnels, l’appartenance confessionnelle de ce magistrat a comme conséquence de le laisser quasiment sans protection (avec l’affaiblissement de Michel el Murr et Suleiman Frangieh). Cette opération est donc politiquement très peu coûteuse pour Najjar; il ne risque de se mettre aucun patron de réseau clientéliste à dos. En fait, elle est tout à fait profitable puisqu’elle donne au ministre une certaine crédibilité dans sa promesse de réforme et d’assainissement de la justice au Liban.
Sur sur le plan pratique, l’opération “main propre” du Ministre de la Justice a deux conséquences:

• Si l’opération est sérieuse, elle met les réseaux clientélistes à la défensive. Il faudra qu’il arrive à convaincre Hariri, Jumblatt et Berri de ne plus couvrir, soutenir et encourager les juges verreux ou “influençables”. Najjar a obtenu le soutient du Président de la République, mais cela n’est pas suffisamment.
• Son effet pervers est d’encourager les juges verreux à se mettre sous la protection d’un za’im communautaire (parce qu’il y a des verreux freelance), et surtout encourager les chrétiens d’entre eux de se trouver un protecteur… Ils auront le choix entre Michel Aoun et Samir Geagea. Les deux pourront se révéler très efficaces dans leur protection s’ils sont disposés à le faire (le sont-ils? là est la question). En d’autre mots, cette opération est tout à fait délicate. Si elle n’est pas suivie rapidement par d’autres actions, si elle ne devient pas systématique et institutionnalisée, elle risque de renforcer le système de corruption au lieu de le combattre.

Policy statement. Who gives a damn?

Resistance picture, part of the "only in Lebanon" series.

Future Movement’s Shiite effigy, MP Oqab Saqr considers that the sentence regarding the “spread of state authority throughout Lebanese territory” and placing “war and peace decisions solely into the hands of the Lebanese state” does not harm the resistance (Voix du Liban). So he sees no reason why it shouldn’t be included in the Policy Statement of Saad Hariri’s government.

I personally see no reason why any sentence should or shouldn’t be included in the Policy Statement. It is after all a totally futile rhetorical exercice with no legal or political effects whatsoever. The only use it could possibly serve is feed sterile polemics whenever any disagreement appears between any two parties/blocs represented in the government (with no less than 10 political parties on board, I’m sure there will be numerous occasions for that). Has anyone bothered to take a look at the previous declaration and see which part of it was actually implemented? Such an exercice would certainly be extremely difficult to follow through because it is rather difficult to see what these abstract statements imply in practice.

What does the sentence “spread of state authority throughout Lebanese territory” imply practically? Does that mean that police officers would be able to do their job in Palestinian camps? Certainly not. Politicians and officials have already “given guarantees” to Mahmoud Abbas’ representative that they won’t. Does that mean that the Minister of Interior will actually be able to monitor the work of the security forces anywhere outside his office? And I’m not only hinting at Hezbollah’s “security pockets”, but also some directories and local forces in Northern Lebanon and Beirut (that obey to Hariri), Southern Lebanon (that obey to Nabih Berri) or Southern Mount Lebanon (that obey to Walid Jumblatt). Wouldn’t it be more effective to say that the Minister of the Interior is mandated to assert the authority of his ministry throughout the territory and make sure that no group can hold arms unless authorised by Parliament?

Ziyad Baroud’s revolt. A coming of age story?

You’ve probably heard the news about our ministers tantrum last week, his boycott of the drafting committees meetings and his leave from the ministry. Before trying to make sens of it all, let’s have a closer look at the most popular minister in the government.
What’s his secret? Why is Ziad Baroud so appreciated and admired across political, partisan and communal lines? Here’s my two word answer: Image and Style.

Baroud’s image. When one speaks of Baroud, one cannot help but talk of his image. It’s not really about what he does or about who he is, but more about what he represents to others. He is young, he is active, he is independent, he is not tainted by any financial scandal, he was never envolved in any war, he doesn’t hail from a “traditionnal” political family. In other words, he embodies the perfect profile of the person many Lebanese would like to see in the government. He represents what everyone would like their political class to be.

Baroud’s style. This guy has an extremely quirky way of taking himself very seriously. You can’t help but smile when you hear him speak. He is eloquent (as all good lawyers usually are), he is determined, he is enthusiastic… and somewhat unconventional (more in style than in substance, probably for lack of imagination and inspiration). He developed a kind of a reverse deadpan attitude.

Baroud’s record as minister. For the past year, he has been the president’s man, the independent minister above the political fray, arguably the most popular minister, for the western ministries (heavily concerned with our state), and my compatriots alike. But has he been Minister of Interior? In title, yes. But in practice, he was more like a junior minister, a Minister of State in charge of the parliamentary elections. This is the function for which he was chosen. Former president of the Lebanese  Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), he was the best PR choice the political class could make to give some credibility to the most disenchanting elections in our history. And he played his role quite well. Everyone congratulated him for his only feat: Getting the country to vote on the same day (which deprived us of a very amusing feature in our electoral culture). On all the other fronts, his record is similar to that of the two Murr whose conduct he had much criticised back when he was an activist. He supervised the observatory commission, he caved in to pressure and political demands before and after the drafting of the electoral law that allowed media bias and facilitated vote buying. But on the whole, he pulled it off, and everyone was happy with the job he did.

Constrained by patronage networks. As for the rest of his functions, he very quickly discovered that they were rather limited. He was allowed to do cosmetic actions, but several directories and functions were off limit. Security matters were among them. There was no formal arrangement to deprive him of these functions. The game is an informal one, and it is very simple. The first period of the pax Syriana allowed several networks to take over large chunks of the administration (محاصصة), and control its bodies through a restricted system of appointments (محسوبية) which in practice circumvents the administration’s hierarchy; those who are placed in certain key positions only obeys orders given or agreed upon by their “patron”, regardless of their superior’s order. This doesn’t only translate through insubordination, it also means that information does not find its way up the ladder to the very top. It is filtered and can very well stop at a certain point.
The Security Forces are a good example of محاصصة and محسوبية: State Security is controlled by Nabih Berri. Since Achraf Rifi took over the Internal Security Forces, it’s commandement answers to Hariri’s Mustaqbal. But the local units can be quite autonomous, and some sections report to Walid Jumblatt, others to Nabih Berri… In the region I lived in, the units were used as Michel Murr’s personal police, delivering “personal messages” to Mayors or simple citizens.

The straw that broke this camel’s back. Ziyad Baroud’s latest fit of rage is quite understandable. Recently reappointed Minister of the Interior, he felt it was time to take over his full functions. He noticed that things looked increasingly like they did last year. The political class still saw him as a junior minister in charge of elections, this time local. He made a test to see if his hierarchical powers were still undermined by the networks and received a clear message that they were.
His outburst seems to have paid off. He received a strong support from the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister has pressured his man in the General Security to yield to the demands of his superior. Such conflicts and resolutions are quite common in Lebanon. And we’re left with a question. How far is this dynamic going to go? Is Ziyad Baroud finally going to be taken seriously by his ministry? Is he going to be able to implement the change that is needed?

How they build their coalition governments

Let’s first start by answering three questions:
Why compare? The reason is fairly simple, there are many benefits to it. Comparisons can help us understand the difficulties of cabinet formation (and distinguish structural problems from contextual ones). Comparisons can help us reframe our expectations. Comparisons can help us determine where the problems lie. Comparisons offer us solutions others have figured out to solve similar problems.
Why choose Belgium, Israel and Northern Ireland? These countries have recurrently faced problems in cabinet formation. But the difficulties they encountered are not the same.
In Belgium, their is a deep division between Walloons and Flemish parties. So during the cabinet formation process, you have to please parties belonging to both groups, which isn’t always easy, even when the parties belong to the same ideological family, because the parties’ constituencies are not the same. Each communal group has its priorities and its perspective. Negotiations can take time (in the case of Belgium, it took 196 days in 2007), and they can be facilitated through arbitration (by the King or an appointee of his).
Israel on the other hand is extremely efficient in cabinet formation although all of its governments have recently been coalition governments bringing together parties that have deep disagreements (ex: secularists and religious parties, leftists and rightists…). Some of the parties even have distinct communal constituencies (ex: Shass, Yisrael B’alya, NRP). What helps the process is the absence of polarisation (there are many parties and each party negotiates alone), the absence of communal power-sharing rules (between Jews and non-Jews or between the different sectors of the Jewish community) and an agreement on several basic rules in cabinet formation: proportionality according to parliamentary weight, each party chooses its ministers, no veto power for any party on the inclusion.
Northern Ireland’s example is rather interesting too. In this case, the largest problem was that one of the largest political formations in the country was armed (Sinn Féin-IRA), and had refused to disband because the Irish police force was in the hand of the rival communal group, and it considered that the British Army was in favour of that group. So the United Kingdom brokered a decommissioning plan that was linked to the participation of the political branch of the party to the government of Northern Ireland (the Northern Ireland Executive). After this was done, the basic rule for cabinet formation was that of proportionality between government weight and parliamentary weight within a broad and cross-communal “national-unity government”. This being said, tensions are still recurrent and this has lead the British government to suspend the Northern Ireland Executive for several years!
What can we learn from these examples or others? Cabinet formation takes time in plural societies, especially if they are polarised, because the process has to take into account an extremely large number of elements that have to be negotiated, mainly:

• the choice of the Prime minister
• the number and the identity of parties that will partake in the government,
• the government’s program (national priorities),
• allocation of seats,
• distribution of portfolios,
• choice of ministers.

The existence of rules can facilitate or complicate the formation of governments. Rules can be formalised (explicitly by law) or not. Formalised rules can abridge negotiations by limiting their scope. Rules that are not formalised could have the same effect, and they have the advantage of adapting to change. On the hand, opinions can differ on the interpretation of tules. The more there are disagreements on rules, the longer time it will take to get to a consensus. That’s why the existence of an arbitrator is essential. This arbitrator not only breaks the deadlock, but he gives an authoritative interpretation of the rule (formal and informal). It is important for the system to spell out the facilitating rules and to replace or prohibit the complicating rules. Tomorrow, we’ll look into the complicating factors in Lebanon and ways they could be rationalised (we’ll look into Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch’s approach to how parliamentarism can be rationalised).

Coalition government building 101 (the problem)

Most analysis I have read on the cabinet formation process is marked by a particular model, that of majoritarian western systems. The approach is quite simple. After labelling the March XIV® coalition (and gluing to it Walid Joumblatt’s Democratic Gathering withstanding his extremely public departure) as the majority, the analyst expects the Prime minister designate to act as the French President, the British Prime Minister or the American President: swiftly put together a cabinet, with the generous option of integrating ministers belonging to the Opposition® as he deems fit.

One would have expected Lebanon’s consociationalists to react to such an approach, but they have been rather discreet lately. They’re probably bothered by the fact that consociational theory and analysis doesn’t exactly fit with their current political preferences. This is particularly true of Antoine Messarra, the co-founder (with Theodor Hanf) of the Lebanese consociational school.

Now let’s set aside our assumptions and normative stands, and look at reality’s ugly face. So today, we’ll  first look at who we are, and who we resemble. Tomorrow, we’ll be looking into the challenges that any Prime Minister designate will face in forming a government given our political system and the political conjoncture.

• Our society is divided along many lines (regional, social, confessional). Of late, four political groups have succeeded in transcending all lines except one; mobilising “their” communities behind them (Amal-Hezbollah mobilises the majority of Shiites, Mustaqbal mobilises the majority of Sunnis, Ishtiraki mobilises the majority of Druze). Moreover, this extreme mobilisation was facilitated by a regional polarisation between Sunnis and Shiites that was locally fed instead of being neutralised. Each side has its weapons: Hezbollah is fully armed and operational; Mustaqbal holds the financial weapon (without its support, the Lebanese economy will be crippled and would certainly collapse).
• Our political system is extremely complicated. Its rules are an odd mix of jacobine republicanism and ottoman communalism. And these rules are circumvented by the dominant political groups, most importantly the Quadripartite Oligarchy (Amal, Hezbollah, Mustaqbal, Ishtiraki) and its junior partners (Marada, Murr, Kataeb, Lebanese Forces, Democratic Party… and probably the FPM if given the time and the opportunity, only time will tell). Historically, the Lebanese army has on three occasions circumvented the constitutional rules (during the presidency of Fuad Chehab, Charles Helou and Emile Lahoud) but seems rather put for the time being.
• The political conjecture is extremely complex. Behind the two labels March XIV® and Opposition®, we find two composite coalitions grouping rival parties with distinct ideologies, interests, constituencies and regional allies. Since the departure of Walid Jumblatt’s Democratic Gathering from March XIV®, the two coalitions have roughly the same size. What complicates matters even further are these four constraining factors:
  • the great mistrust between the two main pillars of each coalition (Mustaqbal, Hezbollah)
  • the decision of these two pillars to participate in the next government (so as to secure their interests and outlook).
  • the fact that their decision to participate in the government cannot be ignored, because of the mobilisation of their respective communal group behind them, their international alliances and their respective weapons (financial for one, military for the other).
  • the solidarity each pillar has shown toward the members of his coalition, especially its Christian junior partners (that give them a trans-communal dimension): FPM (and its christian allies), Lebanese Forces, Kataeb.

So forget about the US, France or the UK. You can’t expect our democracy to function like theirs. If you want to compare our situation to that of another country, learn from their experience, see what mechanisms they have devised to facilitate or accelerate the process of government formation, look elsewhere: to Belgium, to Israel, to Northern Ireland. That’s what we’ll do tomorrow.

Something fishy about the cabinet formation process

Hariri Jr has replaced several of his political aids during the past few months with new ones. But he seems to remain rather ill advised. How can you explain his recent move?

1- He informs the President of the new draft he has prepared (in accordance with the 15-10-5 formula).
2- He doesn’t inform neither his electoral allies nor his electoral “rivals” of how he allocated the seats.
3-The composition of the proposed cabinet is leaked to the press.

Such an approach is unheard of in the history of coalition governments. It comes closer to how things are done for the composition of a majority government in which an undisputed leader (usually a president, but sometimes a chancellor or Prime Minister) chooses who (s)he wants for whatever position (s)he wants within the ranks of his/her party (or even another one if (s)he so chooses, like we have witnessed recently in France and the US). So how could Saad Hariri have mistaken these two approaches? How didn’t he predict that his rivals and allies would both reject this approach?

There are two possibilities:

• either he failed to predict an obvious outcome, which can only mean that he is incompetent, imprudent and badly advised. Let’s go beyond the accusations and see why this could be the case.
  • Father image. Rafik Hariri used to do the same consultations, hear each party out (including the Syrian authorities who used to impose on him their requests), and then decide on a composition and hand it out to the Syrian authorities who informed their allies, heard their complaints and then arbitrated between the disagreeing sides. This system pleased everyone and was highly effective. The composition of governments were not a problem. The Syrians had their way and Rafic Hariri could play the Sultan even though he received a couple of humiliating bows on the way. Saad Hariri is replicating his father’s behaviour. But he know that times had change and that there is no longer a powerful arbitrator. But does he believe that this enables him to play the Sultan, like his father?
  • Misreading of the political situation. Could each camp believe all the nonsense it is producing to feed its public? This is quite possible. We know authoritarian regimes suffered from that because their press had no independence whatsoever, indulged in its biased opinions and invested a lot of time in flattery & political overbidding. Even though Lebanon is far from being autocratic, the function of the press is quite similar to the one found in authoritarian regimes, only instead of working for the Regime, they work  for (or take sides with) a leadership or camp.

Wi’am Wahab, ambassador?

The person is vociferous, crude and politically powerless. Anywhere else, he would have been meaningless, invited once or twice a year to a talkshow for a cheap laugh based on slander. But not in Lebanon. Wi’am Wahab has continuously been in the headlines for the past two weeks. Why?
This guy (pictured on the left) has no power base to count on. His party is insignificant (it’s very little more than a name actually). He doesn’t hail from a political dynasty (local or national). A couple of months ago, he knew that had no chance of becoming an MP so he didn’t even bother take part in the parliamentary elections. Wi’am Wahab doesn’t hold a big fortune. He doesn’t operate a clientelist network (he doesn’t have “his men” in the public administration). He cannot assert himself through force (he has no militia to count own, just a couple of boisterous bodyguards). He isn’t backed by his community’s religious authorities. Saying that he isn’t prominent in any social field is an understatement.
So how come he is given any media attention? Why do his “visits” to political actors (politicians & clergy) seem significant? What makes them significant?
The answer is fairly simple, he is seen as an essential figure in the “reconciliation with Syria”, more precisely with the Syrian regime, or even more precisely with the Syrian President, Bachar el Assad. Interestingly enough, Wi’am Wahab isn’t even close to the Syrian President (unlike Suleiman Frangieh, for instance). He is not part of the regime’s inner circle. So it’s not on a personal level. His visits are not acts of “political socialisation”. He is perceived as an agent of the Syrian regime. He is seen as playing the same role as an ambassador. So I ask myself the following questions:
- Has he been invested as “ambassador”?
- Why are the Lebanese political actors giving his role?
- What does that mean?
I’ll skip the first two questions (expecting the reader to answer them) and go directly to the third one. The fact that the Lebanese political actors and media are recognising Wi’am Wahab’s political function shows not only that they have grown accustomed to informal politics, accepting it and seeing nothing wrong with it, but that they seem to prefer it to formal politics. Why? because it makes them regional actors, small ones for sure, but hell who cares when it inflates your ego! On the other hand, formal politics will surely make them feel left out (remember what happened when Bachar al-Assad and Emile Lahoud established exclusive relations, something that they are entitled to as Presidents of two countries). Moreover, if they established direct contacts with the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon, this would be seen as encouraging Syrian interventionism in Lebanon (which is bad for Syria and bad for the former or persistent March XIV® politicians). So keeping it informal arranges everyone.
If you notice it, only one person is left out of the picture: the Lebanese President, Michel Suleiman. But he’s not complaining (but then, he never does).

Anti-Confessionalism: a state ideology

This is not a joke. Anti-confessionalism is a state ideology. It might sound shocking to many ears, but I believe it is actually indisputable. Will this sketchy demonstration you are about to read convince you? I hope so. This blog is certainly not the place for a meticulous study of this surprising and counterintuitive feature. But it will allow me to point out quite broadly a couple of arguments that are usually overlooked by most analysts. And then you’ll do the math.

First, I’d like to remind the reader that the Lebanese political system was not founded on a single pre-existing ideology or political theory that one could call “confessionalism”. This is usually the case with state ideologies. Let’s take the example of the United State (where federalism and democracy were theorised before they were implemented), France (where the basic elements of republicanism were theorised before the overthrow of the Monarchy), the Soviet Union (with communism) and closer to us, Syria (where Baasism was theorised before the establishment of the Baasist regime) and Israel (where Zionism was theorised half a century before the establishment of the State). In all these cases, we find thinkers, intellectuals or theorists who pondered over a regime before its establishment. This is not the case of Lebanon. No thinker, intellectual or theorist reflected on the country’s communal reality and how it could be translated politically before the establishment of the political system or regime (the Constitution of 1926).

Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin

Anti-confessionalism probably lacks historical perspective because it is utterly uninterested in context. It is obsessed with values and rules: it seeks to impose what it claims to be positive, modern (western), secular values (and rules), while claiming to combat what it defines as archaic, religious, oppressive values (and rules). By doing so, it defines itself (anti-confessionalism) and what it combats (confessionalism).

Before going into this dual definition (and its implication), let’s have a glimpse at these very values and value-laden political programmes anti-confessionalism vows to defend and implement.

A glimpse at the muddle

As Maria sang to the children, “let’s start at the very beginning, a very good place to start”. The whole debate over confessionalism started in the 1940s. Sure, one could trace articles and writing about its many elements to the 1930, and even to the 1920s. But they were still scattered then, and dealt with points that were quite rightly seen as unrelated: secularisation, modernisation, westernisation, nation-building and state building. From the 1940s onwards, all these views converged under the label of “anticonfessionalism” as their proponents defined a common enemy, confessionalism.

This conversion obscures the fact that we are dealing with distinct processes, political programmes and values. This is why we will look into each of them one at a time.

• Secularisation: A process in which the various aspects of society (economic, political, legal, and moral) become increasingly specialised and distinct from religion (and religious authority). It is usually accompanied by a societal decline in levels of religiosity. Its proponents usually link the decline of religiosity to the increase of freedoms. In Lebanon, secularisation usually means three things:
  • Abolishing the personal status laws and courts (up to now, each recognised and established community has its own laws and courts), and replacing them by one civil legislation in matters of family law.
  • Supporting “secular” education, i.e. state schools and universities (vs schools and universities within religious networks).
  • Combatting religious authority and interference in public affairs.

The Paradoxes of AntiConfessionalism (an introduction)

AntiConfessionalism! The word seems easy to grasp. The prefix and suffix speak for themselves. Intuitively, one could assume that anticonfessionalism is antonymous & opposed to a specific system, principle, ideology: confessionalism. Up to now things might seem pretty clear. But when you look a bit closer, you discover something completely different. It’s actually quite hard to oppose anti-confessionalism to confessionalism. It’s like opposing black and white. Sure it’s a common assumption that black is the opposite of white, but it doesn’t tell you much about one or the other, and so the opposition turns out to be meaningless.

I have already dealt with the issue of anticonfessionalism two years ago (albeit hysterically) through a “hate mail” sent to Amam05 posted here. The arguments haven’t changed, but maybe I should restate them more serenely.

We might have many bad intellectual habits in Lebanon, but anti-confessionalism is unmistakably the worst. If you’re looking for insight, learning, critical engagement… keep away from anti-confessional literature. On the other hand, if you’re looking for repetitive prose, dogmatism, distilled ideology, decontextualised constructions, baseless assumptions, groundless accusations… Then you should definitely check out the many books, articles and declarations written on confessionalism.

At first, I thought it would be possible to discuss this issue in one post, but judging from the reactions I’m getting, I think it better to discuss one paradox at a time.

1. Monday: Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin.
2. Tuesday: Anti-confessionalism: A state ideology
3. Wednesday: Anti-confessionalism’s side effects

Meet the next president? From Slimmy to Suleiman II

Is Suleiman Frangieh Jr vying for the presidency? The obvious answer is yes. Which maronite politician isn’t? But this one’s chances seem quite good. You’ve certainly heard by now that he is moving to “Beirut” (Rabieh, to be precise). And you might have read a very flattering “portrait” of him that was published in the Akhbar (cf. a previous posting) or followed his meetings with Sami and Amin Gemayel. These are certainly no indicators of his chances for the presidency.

The reasons why he is the most likely candidate for the highest office lie elsewhere. They are to be found in his political & geopolitical positioning and to the fact that he espouses the predominant social values in Lebanon. Let’s first look into his positioning before examining how he reflects the country’s prevailing values.

Lebanese Confessional-Republicanism 101

The Lebanese political system is quite muddling. Most people who discuss it either ignore some of its basic rules and principles, or oversimplify and distort them beyond recognition. Political discussion is marred by ideology. So it’s always useful to state our political system’s basic rules and principles. Once this is done, it becomes quite clear how hybrid it is with its mix of “communal” principles and “republican” principles. Most analysts only see the first set of principles and ignore the second set. We need to look into Lebanon’s “confessional” rules and principles so as to untangle these two set of principles and see how they intertwine.

A glimpse at our constitution rules and principles.

• The principle of “confessional representation” تمثيل طائفي (Article 95) is a misnomer, the principle is actually a set of rules for multiconfessional participation قوقعد للاشتراك المتعدد طائفيآ . It introduces quotas to the public sphere. By law, it has three implications: in Parliament, in government and in the public administration. Most analysts see it as a collective right, but in fact it’s not. The rights are not given to communities, but to individuals who belong to certain communities.

Peut-on casser l’oligarchie quadripartite?

Sous l’angle de la distribution et de l’exercice du pouvoir au Liban, la division Quatorze Mars/8 mars n’a pas beaucoup de sens. Sa seule pertinence semble se situer au niveau des alliances géopolitiques, mais également au niveau d’une partie de la base populaire qui y croit. Le pouvoir au Liban est partagé entre quatre réseaux clientélistes qui s’appuient sur de nombreuses ressources: financières, bancaires, institutionnelles, locales, étatiques, étrangères…

L’oligarchie quadripartite: les monopoles politiques en milieu musulman
Ces réseaux sont tous confessionnels: deux chiites, un druze et un sunnite. Trois d’entre eux s’appuient, au besoin, sur leurs armes. A cet égard, le Hezbollah est le plus convainquant, suivi par le PSP et puis Amal, comme l’ont démontré “les événements du 7 mai” 2008. Certe, les pressions géopolitiques les obligent à une rivalité, mais celle-ci restre exceptionnelle et circonscrite sur le plan local. D’ailleurs, même en période de crise extrême la collaboration entre ces quatre réseaux continue. Pour ne citer que quelques exemples: les versements au Conseil du Sud ont continué durant la période de démission non-acceptée des ministres d’Amal… les périmètres de sécurité du Hezbollah sont continuellement respectés… la force de police est “équitablement” partagée entres les différents réseaux… Chacun est satisfait de sa part, et s’accommode de la part de l’autre. Toutefois, cette “rivalité” appuyé par l’étranger à trois conséquences malheureuses: elle renforce la mobilisation communautaire, elle consolide les réseaux clientélistes et elle envenime les rapports entre les membres des trois principales communautés sur lesquels ces réseaux s’appuient.

Ces trois conséquences n’auraient pas pu être neutralisées ou affaiblies par les élections en 2005  (sous le signe de l’alliance) et en 2009 (sous le signe de la “compétition”)… Au contraire, elles les ont consacrés ou reconduits.

La compétition politique en milieu chrétien
Les Syriens ont soutenu l’oligarchie quadripartite dans sa conquête et son renforcement du pouvoir. Du côté chrétiens, seuls des réseaux confessionnel locaux ont été autorisés et soutenus. Depuis 2005, deux stratégies différentes s’offraient aux chrétiens pour intégrer le système politique libanais tel que: l’intégrer en tant que “juniors partner(s)” ou transformer l’oligarchie quadripartite en oligarchie pentapartite.

Can the FPM regain its electorate?

Three extremely vigorous debates over the interpretation of the outcome of the parliamentary elections began before the final results were even published. Two of them involved the FPM: how much of its electorate did it actually loose, and why it lost it. We have discussed these issues in a preceding post. We will ask ourself today how likely it is for the FPM to regain its electorate.

He who represented 70% of Christians

Since 2005, General Michel Aoun boasted that he represented 70% of Christians. This slogan meant two things: that he was the undisputed Za’im of the Christian communities, and that the other Christian blocs, parties and MPs owed their seats to Muslim votes. This wasn’t very far from the truth, but did it serve the FPM? Not really. Even though his bloc scored as well as those of Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri & Hassan Nasrallah, Michel Aoun was denied the same recognition and an equivalent share. His position improved when two pillars of the Quadripartite oligarchy recognised him as the christian Za’im. But it wasn’t enough to make him an equal partner of the Big Four, and his share in power (and ressources) remained significantly smaller than the others (and some would argue  smaller than the oligarchy’s other Christian junior partners). The results of the 2009 elections will likely have no effect on Aoun’s & the FPM’s share of power. Their significant electoral downsizing will probably be of no consequence.

The FPM’s score in 2005 was both monumental and unexpected. The party was just emerging from years of persecution, its leader had just returned from exile, it had little media backing, didn’t provide social services or distribute state ressources… And withstanding all this, it benefited from a massive score that established it as Lebanon’s largest (and dominant) Christian party, one ready to enter into Lebanon’s communal politics withstanding its long-established anti-communal stand. As it entered Parliament, the FPM embodied a principle that it had long fought, that of communalism. The votes it had received were overwhelmingly Christian and the bloc it formed was a Christian one (except for one MP). These characteristics were confirmed in 2009. During these past elections, the FPM had to build on 2005’s protest vote, experience an electoral cross-communal alliance and survive an electoral Bulldozer.

From protest vote to accountability?

Suleiman & Hariri (1): the unlikely president

One of the greatest political unknowns in Lebanon is surely the evolution of the presidential cohabitation between Saad Hariri and Michel Suleiman. They both share the same views on the head of the executive: his function, duty and responsibilities. Only both see themselves as that head. Let’s take a brief look at the political positioning of two men who never were intended to take such prominent political positions and try to see how things are likely to evolve for two unlikely politicians and between them.

If you want to read more on the unlikely President (what will & what way?) read below. In the coming days, you’ll find some thoughts on the unlikely Prime Minister.