Security first? The contours of a Lebanese policy for peace talks with Israel

The Lebanese have grown accustomed to governments unable or unwilling to deal with their southern neighbour. Some regret that these governments haven’t been able to defend the country militarily and diplomatically (from the IDF’s ferocious attacks), while others deplore that none has come up with a policy for peace talks with Israel.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a contributor to NOW Lebanon, has come up with an interesting analysis on the subject. He believes Lebanon should define a policy on Israel and embark in peace talks because “Lebanon will never defeat Israel militarily, [so] its ‘conflict’ with the Jewish state can only be resolved by diplomacy”. He concludes his article with the following statement:

Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, both governments have failed to produce a policy on Israel. The Mitchell team is determined to change all this, but they need the help of Lebanon’s leaders, who must not be shy about talking peace with Israel, just like their Syrian and Palestinian brethren. The rest will become details.

At face value, his conclusion is indisputable, but if you look into it, you discover there is an important dimension to Israeli-Lebanese relations that Hussain Abdul-Hussain completely leaves out: the “security” dimension.

This is quite common among Beirutis. But if you ask Israelis or Lebanese living in Southern Lebanon, it’s their primary concern. And this issue is certainly the murkiest. Here’s why:

• Since the 1960s, the Lebanese government has failed to secure its border with Israel. So before embarking in Peace talks, the Lebanese government should see how it will be able to achieve that and start working on it.
• Since the 1960s, Israel has been “retaliating” after each attack coming from Lebanon. This has brought a lot of destruction, death and distrust in Southern Lebanon. Shouldn’t Lebanon build a defensive strategy so as to dissuade, limit or restrain the “IDF”?
• An armed grouped, Hezbollah, backed by the majority of the local population wants to keep the fight going. Their most popular argument within their constituency is similar to the one of the Israeli army: only military strength will ensure our security and disuade our enemy from attacking us. It’s a defensive argument (that is not weaker than that of the Israeli army). What could the Lebanese government answer to this argument be?
• There are other armed groups that are held back by Hezbollah (mostly Palestinian, and Sunni islamists) who are willing to pursue the fight, and the Lebanese State doesn’t seem to have a hold on them.

Before asking the government to come up with a diplomatic strategy toward Israel, I think it is foremost important to ask them to come up with a coherent military and defensive strategy, one that takes into account and deals with Hezbollah and the Palestinians of Lebanon.

“Regional Normalisation”… an assessment -1

Normalisation or  االتطبيع  (el-Tatbi’) is certainly one of the most detested words in the Arabic political lexicon. But western diplomacy willfully ignores that and  hasn’t come up with another word to wrap up its propositions. I could delve into semantics and share with you my views on the reasons behind the word’s extremely negative connotations, but that would spawn a whole different article. I’d rather tackle the propositions directly.

Here are the regional normalization steps Washington seems to be seeking (according to Haaretz):

1. Arab countries in the Gulf would allow Israeli passenger and civilian cargo aircraft to fly over their territory. The move would save long detours on flights to Asia, a popular destination for Israeli travelers.
2. Israel would be able to open interest sections in other states’ embassies in Arab capitals, such as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Israel had interest sections in several Arab countries but they were closed after the start in 2000 of a Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

A very revealing affair (3): Gad Elmaleh & Lebanese Jewish Politics

Let’s cut to the chase (and cut the crap). The Gad Elmaleh affair reveals three things?

• The political function of rhetorical battles. Rhetorical battles are an excellent tool for mobilisation. They grant politicians room for overbidding (with no political cost). It allows people to express and affirm key values (not necessarily held, but at least celebrated). In a polarised setting, it affirms, confirms and “justifies” the separation between the two groups.

Lastly, it has a very satisfying emotional dynamic. In the beginning, it “wakes people up”, in this case, keeps them alert to the danger of Hezbollah (for March XIV) or to the danger of March XIV (for Hezbollah). Through overbidding, the tension builds up: “they are imposing cultural censorship on us” vs “they are pushing for cultural normalisation with Israel“). The more the tension builds up, the more it infiltrates the masses; people start repeating the politicians slogans, strengthening the framework that was set up for them… Frustrations are expressed… freely. Emotions become violent. Taboos fall. Accusations swell… Each and every one participating in this rhetorical battle feels he is winning it. Each person feels he has the better arguments. At this point, no one is listening to the other, and each is intoxicated by his own rhetoric, values, arguments… People and groups let off steam. And they feel relieved.

It’s a rhetorical battle, so nothing on the ground will change, nothing except the deepening of the divide between the two “battling” groups.

• A Lebanese jewish quagmire. Since the establishment of Israel, Lebanese officials seem to have  felt uncomfortable with Lebanon’s Jewish community. Unlike Morocco whose king (Hassan II) took a public stand affirming and reaffirming  the place Moroccan Jews held in Moroccan society, Lebanese officials have preferred to remain silent on that issue. Sure, the Lebanese security forces offered the community protection in times of war and tensions. The Kataeb party was quite vocal in its defence of Lebanese Jews, and Kamal Joumblatt seems to have offered some Beiruti-Jews shelter in newly formed fiefdom in 1967. But on the governmental level, Jews were pushed out of the public administration and the army, and the 1943 “national pact” offered them no public place. The country was being redefined as Christian-Muslim.

Hypocrisy denounced in a hypocritical cartoon

In the 1960s, anti-Israeli rhetoric started soaring. Lebanese politicians engaged in this new rhetorical battle and some really excelled in it (ex: Kamal Joumblatt). Things haven’t changed today. Lebanese politicians are proud to boast that “Lebanon will be the last arab country to sign peace with Israel“. And they keep on reminding the Lebanese that “Israel is our natural enemy“, that “Israel is Lebanon’s antithesis“, and that “Israel is bound on destroying Lebanon because we’re their competitors“. This empty rhetoric isn’t Hezbollah’s (absolute) privilege. It is expressed by Lebanese politicians of all sides. March XIV® politicians regularly engage in “anti-israeli” or “anti-zionist” overbidding (c.f. my former posts  1 2 on the inoperative distinction between “Jews” and “Zionists”). Two days ago, Fares Soueid (a Lebanese politician who hasn’t been able to reclaim his mother’s seat in Parliament since Syria’s withdrawal) declared as secretary general of March XIV that the Gad Elmaleh affair serves the interest of Israel! This kind of overbidding certainly benefits Hezbollah and corners March XIV politicians because it prevents any alternative discourse on Israel, and comes across as insincere to many Lebanese.

• An orphan peace camp. It’s becoming quite clear that there is a growing number of Lebanese that is in favour of peace with Israel. They know that their communal leadership is in favour of peace with Israel (Hariri Senior, Jumblatt, Gemayel, Geagea and Aoun have all expressed this in one way or another at a given time), but they can plainly see that this leadership is engaged in anti-Israeli rhetoric and paying lip service to the importance of resistance to Israel and the Palestinian cause.

This growth of Peaceniks is noticeable from the growing interest Lebanese are having in Israeli issues, the growing consumption of Israeli cultural products (music, films, literature), the Lebanese readership of Haaretz, the growing interest in Judaism and Lebanon’s Jewish community… I personally believe that most of the people who are getting involved in this controversy and supporting Gad Elmaleh’s show in Beiteddine are such peaceniks.

So there is an obvious gap between the leadership (that hides its past and probably present ties with Israeli officials and engages in anti-Israeli rhetoric) and some groups of the population. This gap feeds frustrations. But instead of being rightly  expressed toward their hypercritical leadership, they are canalised and diverted toward Hezbollah (that defends values they don’t agree with), accusing it of being the reason behind Lebanon’s antagonism with Israel, and Israeli’s violent policy toward Lebanon. It takes a couple of minutes on the internet to verify the public support Gad Elmaleh offers to Israel. Insisting on his performance in Lebanon in a way reflects an unexpressed desire of normalisation with judaism, and what has become central to it, i.e. Israel.

A very revealing affair (2): Gad Elmaleh & the Lebanese Media

Now let’s look at the facts:

1. Beiteddine Festival, operated by Nora Joumblatt (Walid Joumblatt’s syrian born wife) programs French stand-up comic and actor Gad el-Maleh in this year’s edition of the Festival.
2. Manar TV station, that’s nothing less than a mouthpiece for Hezbollah, airs two “reports” claiming that Gad el-Maleh has fought in the IDF (Israeli army), denounce his participation in a Lebanese summer festival and pronounce him unwelcome in Lebanon.
3. Tourism Minister Elie Marouni (Kataeb), Information Minister Tarek Mitri (Future Movement ally), Culture Minister Tamam Salam (pro-Future Movement ally), and Beiteddine Festival President Nora Joumblatt (oligarch’s wife) speak out against al-Manar’s reports and denounce them as unfounded.
4. Gad el-Maleh cancels his three shows for security reasons
5. Pro-March XIV media, March XIV politicians and the above ministers launch a campaign against Hezbollah’s “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking” and (my personal favourite) “bringing the image of Lebanon into disrepute”,  and for maintaining the show (or having it “videoconferenced” from Paris).

Then let’s get to the analysis:

A rhetorical battle. Up to now, the whole “Gad elmaleh affair has been a “rhetorical battle” between el-Manar on one hand and some March XIV politicians and media mouthpieces (Hezbollah’s allies, most notably the FPM, have remained completely silent on it). As you have noted from fact #5, the accusations brought against el-Manar can hold no legal ground (except for the fourth one). This “detail” is quite important. Why have the accusers chosen to attack Hezbollah on charges that hold no legal ground?

No charges have been pressed. Well, the matter is quite simple. Under lebanese law, there actually are several grounds for legal charges against el-Manar and Hezbollah. So why sticking to polemical accusations, when there are three accusations that actually hold.

• El-Manar is accused of either disinformation or basing its reporting on dubious sources. Why doesn’t the Minister of Information press charges (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Tarek Mitri?
• El-Manar is accused of attacking Gad el-Maleh on the bases he’s Jewish. Now Lebanon doesn’t have a specific law against anti-semitism, but it does have a law against inciting confessional hate, and Judaism is one of Lebanon’s protected faiths. Now El-Manar has been doing it for years. Why hasn’t anyone pressed charges against that? Why hasn’t the Interior Minister pressed charges against tmhat (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Ziad Baroud?
• El-Manar is accused of tarnishing Lebanon’s image. I personally find the concept absurd and totally illiberal and antidemocratic (it’s no coincidence that it is mostly used by authoritarian regimes). But it holds under Lebanese law. Why hasn’t the Minister of Justice acted upon it?

Silly yet revealing accusations. el-Manar and Hezbollah have been accused of “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking”. Let’s take one accusation at a time and see in what way it is revealing.

• Censorship. My dictionary defines censorship as “the practice of officially examining books, movie, etc. and suppressing unacceptable parts”. The most important element in this definition is obviously “Officially“. Censorship is practiced by an authority that holds power. Hezbollah shares with Walid Joumblatt’s “Democratic Gathering”, the position of fourth largest bloc in Parliament (less than 10% of MPs). It has one minister in the current government (out of 30). Now that doesn’t really put it in a position of power institutionally. And the “anti-Gad Elmaleh campaign” was launched by one of Lebanon’s medias, not by an official media. Sure, Hezbohallah is armed and could endanger Gad Elmaleh’s life were he to come to Lebanon. But it’s not the only armed side in Lebanon, and a security arrangement could be found with it, like it has been found on so many other matters. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Intellectual terrorism. Here’s wikipedia’s definition (my translation): “the practice which aims at intimidating or silencing people by submitting them to arguments and intellectual pressures through publications, media interventions (etc) so as to prevent them from formulating perturbing ideas (regardless of their validity, falsity or disputability)”. What is interesting with the concept of “intellectual terrorism” is that it doesn’t have to be “official”, it can be operational as long as the people exercising it hold the upper hand in the specific field they are operating in. Now Hezbollah surely doesn’t have the upper hand in the communication field or the cultural production field. Truth to tell, its cultural influence is rather limited (and so is its participation in cultural production). So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Cultural hostage taking. The charge is quite meaningless. It assumes that Hezbollah has a dominant position in the cultural sector and can define Lebanese cultural expressions or at least censor them, which bring us back to the first two “charges”. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?

So why is the Gad Elmaleh affair just another rhetorical battle, and in what way does it reveal that people feel cornered by Hezbollah? You can look at the way some bloggers (Jester, Now Lebanon, Khaled Barraj) or journalists (Daily Star’s Michael Young, Orient-Le Jour’s Michel Hajji Georgiou) have been dealing with this issue. My answer comes tomorrow.

Talking in peace

I met a group of people today studying Hebrew and Arabic through a French organisation called “Parler en Paix” (Talking in Peace). They had a stand in the International Fair for Peace Initiatives that took place in Paris this weekend. A Lebanese organisation partook in the event too (for the first time it seems). Though every one was busy attending to his or her stand, some exchanges were possible, and they centered on two issues: the political situation in Lebanon and the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. I overheard some heated arguments, but on the whole, people from all sides discussed all issues very openly, and without taboos. It was rather nice for a change. 

Not in our name

For several years now, a worldwide jewish movement has been voicing its rejection of the Israeli policy towards Palestinians, summing it up by the slogan “not in my name”.

I think we should do the same in Lebanon, replacing “my” by “our” because our political actors never refer to us as individuals, but express themselves as representatives of their communities. I personally don’t believe they represent their communities, and the responsibility of their acts certainly do not fall on their communities. It’s time they took on this responsibility themselves.  

Listening to Amos Oz, A.B. Yehoshua and David Grossman

I went to the Paris Book-Fair today to listen to three authors who are amongst Israel’s most celebrated writers and intellectuals. Oz and Grossman were already familiar figures to me, but not Yehoshua. I was curious to hear them not only for their talent as writers, but because of their political involvement. They were involved in “Peace Now” for several years and they had supported Olmert’s government in its war against Hezbollah/Lebanon in 2006. They discussed three main themes: the relation to the other, their political involvement, the meaning of literature (and the writer’s role).  The talk was intelligent and funny. It was a real pleasure to hear them debate over such issues, and to see them confront their points of view. 

Buidling homes to connect people: why not in Nahr el Bared?

I enterred a jolly argument with some guy in cyberspace over Nahr el Bared. And this has been going on for a couple of days. This brought me back to a question I’ve been asking myself for a couple of months now: What would be a relevant peace initiative in such a situation? The work I carried out this summer with som IDP children coming from that camp was neither relevant nor a real peace initiative (for many reasons that I could develop in some other post).
I remembered an article I had photocopied some time ago on an Irish initiative that seemed to be quite succesful. The operation was called “Blitz Build” and it was carried out by Catholics and Protestants in Glencairn with the help of Habitat for humanity. I believe Offre Joie, a very active Lebanese organisation, participated in a similar operation in southern Lebanon last year, in cooperation with my Alma Mater. Maybe something similar could be done in Nahr el Bared… I should give it a bit more thought and start doing contacts…

Geneva Initiative, 4 years after.

In three weeks, we will be celebrating the 4th anniversary of the Geneva Initiative. A very interesting book I’m reading brought this Israeli-Palestinian initiative back to my mind. David Chemla’s Bâtisseurs de la Paix (Liana Levi, Paris, 2005) is in fact a very important complementary reading to this Draft Permanent Status Agreement, because it consists of extended interviews with its main protagonists: Nazmi al-Jubeh, Ami Ayalon, Abdel Jader Al-Hussein, Dror Etkes, Qadira Fares, Tsvia Grinfeld, Radi Harai, David Grossman (who lost a son during the July War/Second Lebanese War), Zehira Kamal, Amram Mitzna, Saman Khoury, Haïm Oron, Ibrahim Khreishi, Ron Pundak, Sari Nusseibeh, Rafi Walden. The interviews were done by David Chemla, head of the French section of Peace Now: La paix maintenant.

These interviews give you a clear picture on the dynamics that resulted in the Geneva Initiative. For those like myself who are critical about the accord, it gives you all the argument you need to show why their accord was doomed to failure.

Good reason for confusion 3: Time and action

While the battles were raging on, I was working in a Palestinian camp, a couple of miles to the south of Nahr el Bared. I was coordinating the activities of a group of early teenagers comprised of Lebanese and Palestinians residents of Baddaoui and a group of displaced Palestinians from Nahr el Bared. The month long workshop’s general theme was that of peace and how the youth could play an active part in promoting and advancing it. The whole topic was thought of months before the Nahr el Bared battle. It felt quite out of place but I had not time to work on the topic, to adapt it to the current situation. There was a need for something to be done and I couldn’t answer that need. That was terribly frustrating. During one of the sessions we touched on violence and fear. It was a very interesting hour, probably the most interesting hour that month; thought provoking and emotionally very raw. It ended with almost everyone in teers. The youth were expressing their views on peace and violence. And while doing that, they expressed their feelings about the Nahr el Bared battles. Those who had fled the camp talked about what they had left behind, what they had lost, what they had kept and brought with them. Those who were Baddawi residents talked about how they saw the IDPs, and tried to relate to their experience. It was very intense.
I knew that there was something there to work on, but couldn’t see how I could modify the program accordingly. So after that session, the facilitator went back to the original plan and put all that was exchanged in brackets.

Talking politics with an Israeli chap

Just as I was finishing my second lesson of modern hebrew in a public library, the person next to me interrupted me and asked if I found it difficult to learn hebrew and why I was learning it. After a brief discussion, I “came out” as a Lebanese and he as an Israeli. I told him what difficulties I was encountering (mostly having problems distinguishing certain letters), but once I reestablished the proper probounciation of some letters (the ‘ain and the het) it became much easier to me to understand some words because of my knowledge of Arabic.
After finishing my lesson, and very proud of my microscopic progress, I met him at the Cafeteria as we had agreed. And there started a 3 hour lengthy discussion on Israel and Israelophobia. Truth to tell, I didn’t find the discussion very interesting. He was very defensive and kept on justifying what he saw as right. While I was trying to explain the differences in perception, failing miserably to make my points understood. Well, I had too many to start with, and as I wasn’t taking a pre-formated role, I guess it was rather unsettling for him. He very quickly noticed that I wasn’t hostile to Israel, but he then was surprised to see me critical about Israeli politics and understanding with Israelophobes. But even then he was surprised to see that I wasn’t very comfortable and apt in defending their point of view. I think that made me very suspicious in his eyes. My failings were probably interpreted as proof that the Israelophobes are wrong (politically, morally, ethically, legally), that Israelophiles were right (in every way) and that I was a crypto-Israelophobe, probaby for genetical reasons, because in his eyes I was very stereotypically an Arab.
Disappointed as I was with the discussion that centered on the wars betweens the Arabs and the Israelis (bad versus good), on the justification of violence (for survival) and the condemnation of Israelophobia as a prefiguration of the future and a declaration of genocidal intent… I asked myself, what exactly did I learn from this discussion?
- There is a very strong narrative in Israel concerning the Israeli-Arab struggle, and it’s probably even more tightly “argumented” than its Arab and Islamic equivalent(s).
- Israelis are as suspicious of Arabs as the Arabs are of Israelis. They both see hidden intentions and agendas everywhere and perceive themselves and the other as a monolythical whole.
- The Mizrahi Jews have a larger problem than other Jews to tackle with regard to the Arabs because they are not reconciled with their original identity. The guy I was talking to was a clear example of this. His father’s family is from Egypt and his mother’s from Tunesia. He refused at first to acknowledge that any of them spoke Arabic?! Later conceding that they might have spoken a few words to communicate in the market.
- My meta-narrative awakens suspicion and does not bring about a common understanding.

Talking-back: reacting to posts made on Haaretz on the british academic boycott of Israel

It is no coincidence and it should not come as a surprise that such a reaction [as the academic boycott of Israel] comes from England. It’s in London that the Boycott Movement (that latter became the Anti-Apartheid Movement) against South African products during the apartheid started. And the UK is in many ways responsible for what happened during and after it was given a mandate over Palestine. The regime the Jewish majority (a minority then) set up and is supporting today is a form of Apartheid of a very particular sort, but an Apartheid regime nevertheless.
Humanists, academics and human rights activists cannot condone such a regime and it is only normal they react to it. The question that I ask myself is how effective and productive is the boycott?
I personally believe it’s counterproductive, especially if it triggers hysterical reactions, justifications, accusations and not an ounce of self-criticism.
Boycott is not the solution. Argumentation, open dialogue, non-polemical debate is the only way forward.

Reconciling armed intervention and peacemaking

During a relaxed summer brunch in Vincennes, a heated arguments started between a Lebanese-Palestinian friend and myself over the combats that were raging in the Nahr el Bared camp next to Tripoli.
She was suprised to see that I was supporting the Lebanese army. And I told her that I felt the same about her condemnation of the Lebanese Army. In fact, I’m sure that we were both rather uncomfortable with our stands. Neither of us is really supportive of military interventions of any kind. But in the current situation, is there any other choice than the military one?
The question is tricky and it hides many others. What is the current situation? What are the problems that should be solved? How can they be solved? Are there other ways than the military intervention to solve them? Is the military intervention solving them? Is any side initiating another solution or advancing another means to solve them? What are the objectives of the military intervention?
These are questions that hardly anyone is asking these days. They are all subsumed by a global one “Are you with or against the military intervention?”.

Working on Peace education

I have been working for several weeks now on two programmes for peace education in Lebanon: One for trainers and one for a summer workshop. It’s a whole new field I’m discovering and I this has resulted in my total neglect of this blog. One of the main fuels for my post writing was the daily news. I chose to ignore it a couple of months ago because I noticed that it was sterile and reported nothing really new. But today, it is very difficult to ignore the news because it’s here, it’s violent, it’s real, and it is bloody.
For over two weeks now, there has been ongoing fighting between the lebanese army and a militant islamic group in and around the camp. And I see myself quite supportive of the Lebanese army. How can I reconcile this position with my pro-peace work? how can I be supporting a military intervention while working on an anti-violence pro-peace programme?

Arab Initiative… experiencing a deja vu

The Arab League has reaffirmed its support for the Arab peace initiative. They insisted that anything short of that framework simply will not work. Interestingly enough, the Israeli governement and the American administration have showed more interest in it this year than they had in 2002 when it was penned in Beirut.
This doesn’t mean that they condone it. In fact, they support it as a start for talks, while Arab leaders present it as a package deal; the base threshold for an acceptable and sustainable peace.

Last week, the Arab peace initiative was mentioned by Dennis Ross, Clinton’s principal Mideast negociator a week ago, in a meeting in which I participated. I didn’t know then that the think tank in which he works is closely related to AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee).
He explained that two things in the agreement had shocked the Israelis in the Declaration: the fact that it did not condemn terrorism and that it mentioned the right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. He believed that this was unacceptable because it threatened the existence of Israel as a Jewish State, something that should be preserved as a premisse.

So basically we have two conflicting premisses. And one common missing consideration… human rights that are systematically sacrificed in the name of political collective rights.