Deconstructing March XIV® _______________________ *********************** 3 Steps for change: Bringing women into politics... massively! _______________________ ***********************
Battling God-fearing combattants -2 _______________________ *********************** Mixed courts: an unexplored approach to M.E. peace
Identity sprang up this weekend in three very different cyber-discussions: one with a psychologist, one with a philosopher and one with a sociologist. The contexts were obviously different, but in each of the conversations I was asked to disclose my identity as did my interlocutor, and discuss both identities. Not only did I catch myself disclosing different identities (truthfully and in good faith), but also using opposing arguments.
In the past, I had on several occasions discussed such a possibility arising, and given several examples to illustrate it: at university (an undergrad course) and in trainings (within an NGO). But experiencing it in such a short scope of time was extremely disturbing. It shakes one’s sense of self, and the value of one’s argumentation.
Context and setting is obviously central in discussing identity. And I was discussing this topic in four different settings: Lebanon, Israel, Belgium and France. Each setting has its own history in understanding this notion, its own definition, its own vocabulary and tradition in expressing it. So when you shift from one setting to another, you wonder if you’re still speaking the same “language” and you feel the need to “translate” it.
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In the coming days, I will be discussing an initiative that a friend has pointed out to me: Laïque pride and I promised to say something useful about it. Before looking into the site, let’s glance at the expression “Laïque pride”. The first word, Laïque, is an “untranslatable french notion”, or so it is presented, that refers to French secularism (the ideology, not the actual system which is quite far from embodying the principle). With the word “pride” that follows the result reminds us of similar contemporary expressions such as Black pride, Gay pride, Welsh pride… in all these expressions, the word is used to trigger awareness, celebrate and empower a previously dominated group whose identity has been shamed in the past. With this simple expression of “laïque pride”, we are left with many explosive elements: secularism, foreign model, political protest, identity assertion… I’ll try to tackle all this tomorrow.
In his closing remarks at the Israel Annual Conference on Aviation and Astronautics, Benjamin Netanyahou claimed that Israel is “the most threatened country in the world”. How preposterous!! What about us?
Any objective viewer will agree that we have earned this title at a very costly price: civil wars on a regular basis, foreign military involvement, autonomous paramilitary formations, massive bombings from our neighbours, occupation… The ingredients are simple:
LOCATION: best choice of bellicose neighbours: we’re stuck between Syria and Israel. Who can beat that? We’ve been repeatedly occupied, pounded, plundered… Can Israel beat that?
CASTING: Shrewd thugs and their offsprings. Our political class was taught in the late 50s that violence pays! Every single political player (except one) who took up arms and killed a couple of his compatriots was rewarded with amnesty and a piece of the cake. Every now and then, there’s a repeat to get some new players in. The country is threatened by those who hold power! Can Israel beat that?
GUEST STARS: We started with the PLO in the 1960s, and now we have a dozen of foreign armed groups operating under different banners all over the country. Can Israel beat that?
SCRIPT: We’ve been working on it for almost half a century. We’ve done a better job than Bill Murray in Groundhog Day (check out this scene to get the picture). We found a way to combine Nietzche’s Eternal return with hollywood style happy ending (in a disaster movie meets post-modern family drama). As a cinema teacher of mine once said with his typical Brooklyn accent (trying desperately to be the epitome of a jewish producer): “It’s Story, Story, Story”. Can Israel beat that?
REVIEWS: Now that’s the best part. When you read what the critics have to say about our country, you wonder if they even bothered to watch the movie. Do you remember the poster “What’s on man’s mind?“, well, in the case of our critics, it’s ta’ifya (also called confessionalism, sectarianism…), they don’t care about the plot, they already have their culprit.
and most importantly STYLE: no panic, no hysteria, no paranoia. just a bit of tension, some humour and a full enjoyment of life! Can Israel beat that?
How can we assert our claims to the title of MOST THREATENED COUNTRY IN THE WORLD? Should we ask our new Tourist Minister, Fadi Abboud who was behind Lebanon’s entry in the Guinness book of world records for the largest dish of hummus?
Weapons sparked three debates this week. It all started when the Israeli military fished a weapon cargo heading to Beirut. Then the Maronite patriarch made a speech on how weapons and democracy were mutually exclusive and finally the head of the FPM Michel Aoun criticised the Patriarch’s speech and added that if he had the means he would arm himself to fight for Palestine! We’ll look into these polemics one at the time.
The record weapon catch. The most fascinating thing about the story isn’t what was said, but what wasn’t said. We got a lot of info about how much the booty weighted, we didn’t get any info about what exactly these weapons were and who had made them. We got a lot of info about the crew and the three last destination of the ship, but no info on its past and its real ownership. Classified information or courteousness between weapon dealers and producers?
The Patriarch’s sermon. The Patriarch picked up a habit of recurrently making a sermon against Hezbollah and its weapons. His followers, that is political followers (not necessarily of his flock) and backers applaud his “national stands” and celebrate his “national role”. But they never mention the effect it has on communal politics and the gate it opens for other political interventions of clergymen in the public sphere (his backers had even asked him to pick a President for the country two years ago…). His stance does not prevent him from backing parties who will join a government in which Hezbollah will be part of and whose declaration will not condemn the weapons this party holds. Three of the christian political groups he has been actively supporting for nearly a decade (what is left of Qornet Chehwan that was never a political party and is the biggest looser of the past elections with only one MP in parliament, the Lebanese Forces that hasn’t been reestablished as a party since its dissolution in the 1990s probably for financial reasons and the Kataeb that has been hijacked by the Gemayel family after having been hijacked by the Syrian intelligence) will probably express their reservations on the government’s declaration but that will not prevent them from participating in it.
This kind of condemnation is the best example of the “public stand culture” ثقافة المواقف that is meant to satisfy (with words) one’s constituency or sponsor, but that never translates into political action.
Aoun’s tantrum. When angry, the hindered Za’im has no qualms about contradicting himself and making the most outrageous and irresponsible declarations. His first argument to the Patriarch followed these lines: “these weapons were never used against you, so why are you complaining”. Then he expressed his willingness to take up arms too, but regretted he didn’t have the financial ressources for that. I pity Michel Aoun’s supporters who will have to find a way to justify this outburst.
I was reading a couple of blogs today, vast discussions debating over the best solution to the Palestinian question (the more realistic, the more equitable, the more profitable…). Bloggers were parrotting politicians, proposing package deals and behaving like merchants, trying to sell the best product, the miracle pill.
It reminded me of those humorous pills you find in gadget stores (“Take two pills a day and become blond”, “Four pills to learn German”) or at your chemists (“this pill will make u happier”, “this pill will make u slimmer”).
These discussions have little sens. They do not even qualify as discussions. It’s like merchants yelling their goods. And taking it very much at heart, behaving as if they created the product to start with.
In Lebanon, we have similar discussions. The debate over institutional reform follows the same pattern. People will howl at you the virtues of federalism, others will hammer at you the necessity for deconfessionalisation. Each is convinced that the opponent’s solution is seditious, destructive and morally flowed.
Such discussions are sterile. A one state solution for Palestine/Israel could threaten Jewish existence as much as it could threaten Palestinian existence. It could be a solution just as it could just reframe the problem. All depends on the institutions that will be chosen and the way social and political actors will interact with them. Similarly, a two state solution could reinforce the antagonism between the two people just as it could comfort their fears.
The same could be said about the institutional debate in Lebanon. Federalism could bring the country closer together just as it could be the first step towards a permanent divorce between regions and communities. It all depends on what kind of federalism is adopted and how the social and political actors will interact with the new institutions. These two elements are hardly ever considered. The same could be said about confessionalisation and deconfessionalisation. Up to now, the results haven’t been very positive either way. When President Chehab introduced confessionalism to the public administration in the 1960s, it worked as an instrument of “affirmative action” but increased the hold of patronage networks and gave it a stronger communal flavour. Similarly, when the Taef agreement got rid of the Chehabist parity rule, it didn’t diminish the hold of the patronage networks but encouraged Christian-Lebanese to “withdraw” from the State apparatus (just as they had did since the 1950s from the Municipality of Beirut)…
Wouldn’t it be preferable to stop looking for the miracle panacea and spend all our energy on defending this “global solution” and just tackle the points that we find important, one by one? For example advancing individual and collective rights or dismounting the patronage networks in Lebanon, or working on mobility, security and the respect of individual and collective rights in Israel/Palestine…
The 9 original candidates. Housny is second from left
Before delving into the analysis, let’s set the record straight. I won’t be looking into the dirty politics behind these elections. I do have some crusty insider information on some dirty play, but it’s closer to gossip than meaningful information, and strictly off topic. What we’ll be looking into is the public debate that surrounded these elections. I believe it had an incidence on the final outcome: Irina Bokova’s election to the post of Director General of UNESCO. But there is no way to prove this fact.
Interestingly enough, the reasons behind Farouk Hosny’s defeat are not of much interest. They will leave no trace in the public conscience. On the other hand, the fierce debate surrounding this election will undoubtedly mark those who feel envolved in the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Let’s start with a quick look at the five rounds that brought Farouk Hosni to his defeat. If you’re interested in more details, check out this blog.
Results of the 5 rounds
Candidate
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Farouk Hosny
22
23
25
29
27
Irina Bokova
8
8
13
29
31
Benita Ferrero-Waldner
7
9
11
0
0
Ivonne Baki
7
8
9
0
0
Ina Marciulionyte
3
4
0
0
0
Alexander Yakovenko
7
3
0
0
0
Noureini Tidjani-Serpos
2
2
0
0
0
Sospeter Muhongo
1
1
0
0
0
Mohammed Bedjaoui
0
0
0
0
0
Blank
1
0
0
0
0
Total
58
58
58
58
58
As the figures clearly show, Farouk Hosni was the leading contestant up to the fifth round. His candidacy was supported by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization for the Islamic Conference. It was backed by France and unopposed (though grudgingly) by Israel. So what happened? If you’re interested in geopolitics, check out what Stephen Suleyman Schwartz had to say about it. I’d rather look into one campaign that picked up speed and was given more media attention than any other story in these elections: that of Bernard-Henri Lévy (alias BHL, alias BHV) relayed on the net through Save Unesco!, a blog started by “French students in political science” that was deleted earlier today (but here is the cached copy). Much can be said about Bernard-Henri Levy and the anonymous group of French students, but I will focus on the issues that they raised, and they are identical. Instead of supporting one specific candidate, they attacked the Egyptian candidate on three main issues
Antisemitism. This accusation springs from a misquoted statement on burning Israeli books found in Egyptian libraries (a statement Farouk Hosny later apologised for in his “message to the world“). BHL reinterpreted this statement as a vow “to burn with his own hands any book in Hebrew that could have possibly infiltrated the stacks of the Alexandria Library”.
Responsibility as Minister of Culture (for over two decades) in the crackdown of liberties and freedom of expression in Egypt.
So, is Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace price laureate, right when he says “UNESCO has escaped a scandal, a moral disaster. Mr. Hosni did not deserve the job he does not deserve this honor tomorrow”. Can we agree with BHL when he says “We have won. Liberty has won. Tolerance has won. And thanks to all of you, respect has won. I’d like to thank you, net surfers, for engaging in this battle for democracy and peace. Thanks to all who refused the unacceptable and who allowed for this beautiful victory”. That’s what we’ll be looking into tomorrow.
Let’s first start by answering three questions: Why compare? The reason is fairly simple, there are many benefits to it. Comparisons can help us understand the difficulties of cabinet formation (and distinguish structural problems from contextual ones). Comparisons can help us reframe our expectations. Comparisons can help us determine where the problems lie. Comparisons offer us solutions others have figured out to solve similar problems. Why choose Belgium, Israel and Northern Ireland? These countries have recurrently faced problems in cabinet formation. But the difficulties they encountered are not the same.
In Belgium, their is a deep division between Walloons and Flemish parties. So during the cabinet formation process, you have to please parties belonging to both groups, which isn’t always easy, even when the parties belong to the same ideological family, because the parties’ constituencies are not the same. Each communal group has its priorities and its perspective. Negotiations can take time (in the case of Belgium, it took 196 days in 2007), and they can be facilitated through arbitration (by the King or an appointee of his).
Israel on the other hand is extremely efficient in cabinet formation although all of its governments have recently been coalition governments bringing together parties that have deep disagreements (ex: secularists and religious parties, leftists and rightists…). Some of the parties even have distinct communal constituencies (ex: Shass, Yisrael B’alya, NRP). What helps the process is the absence of polarisation (there are many parties and each party negotiates alone), the absence of communal power-sharing rules (between Jews and non-Jews or between the different sectors of the Jewish community) and an agreement on several basic rules in cabinet formation: proportionality according to parliamentary weight, each party chooses its ministers, no veto power for any party on the inclusion.
Northern Ireland’s example is rather interesting too. In this case, the largest problem was that one of the largest political formations in the country was armed (Sinn Féin-IRA), and had refused to disband because the Irish police force was in the hand of the rival communal group, and it considered that the British Army was in favour of that group. So the United Kingdom brokered a decommissioning plan that was linked to the participation of the political branch of the party to the government of Northern Ireland (the Northern Ireland Executive). After this was done, the basic rule for cabinet formation was that of proportionality between government weight and parliamentary weight within a broad and cross-communal “national-unity government”. This being said, tensions are still recurrent and this has lead the British government to suspend the Northern Ireland Executive for several years! What can we learn from these examples or others? Cabinet formation takes time in plural societies, especially if they are polarised, because the process has to take into account an extremely large number of elements that have to be negotiated, mainly:
the choice of the Prime minister
the number and the identity of parties that will partake in the government,
the government’s program (national priorities),
allocation of seats,
distribution of portfolios,
choice of ministers.
The existence of rules can facilitate or complicate the formation of governments. Rules can be formalised (explicitly by law) or not. Formalised rules can abridge negotiations by limiting their scope. Rules that are not formalised could have the same effect, and they have the advantage of adapting to change. On the hand, opinions can differ on the interpretation of tules. The more there are disagreements on rules, the longer time it will take to get to a consensus. That’s why the existence of an arbitrator is essential. This arbitrator not only breaks the deadlock, but he gives an authoritative interpretation of the rule (formal and informal). It is important for the system to spell out the facilitating rules and to replace or prohibit the complicating rules. Tomorrow, we’ll look into the complicating factors in Lebanon and ways they could be rationalised (we’ll look into Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch’s approach to how parliamentarism can be rationalised).
Frequent sojourns in Paris do have their advantages. One of them is being able to see a great variety of films at the movies, many of which have no chance of being screened in Beirut (at least not in public screenings). I had the pleasure to watch a couple of hours ago “Tu n’aimeras point”, an Israeli film by Haim Tabakman (that came out in Paris before Tel Aviv).
Don’t let this hollywood style trailer mislead you. The film is not about a gay couple. It’s no Israeli version of Bareback Mountain. It’s not about conflict of lifestyles (Jerusalem vs Tel Aviv; secular global vs religious local). It’s about a righteous person (צדיק, صادق) who discovers love with another man yet refuses to make choices until confronted by his community. He indulges in a homosexual relation without letting go of his beliefs and his respect of the Law. Quite the contrary, his passion opens up his eyes to a less stoic interpretation of religious texts. But he doesn’t notice the social consequences of his acts until the social reaction hits him in the face.
What is particularly interesting about the film is that it introduces you to a hassidic worldview showing you its many facets and its struggle for survival in a world that upholds opposing values. Withstanding the risks entailed by its subject matter, it refrains from being judgemental, pedagogical or raunchy. The excellent performance, clean editing and focused cinematography also serve a script that leaves no room for justification or explanation (neither from the director’s perspective nor from the characters’).
The Lebanese have grown accustomed to governments unable or unwilling to deal with their southern neighbour. Some regret that these governments haven’t been able to defend the country militarily and diplomatically (from the IDF’s ferocious attacks), while others deplore that none has come up with a policy for peace talks with Israel.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a contributor to NOW Lebanon, has come up with an interesting analysis on the subject. He believes Lebanon should define a policy on Israel and embark in peace talks because “Lebanon will never defeat Israel militarily, [so] its ‘conflict’ with the Jewish state can only be resolved by diplomacy”. He concludes his article with the following statement:
Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, both governments have failed to produce a policy on Israel. The Mitchell team is determined to change all this, but they need the help of Lebanon’s leaders, who must not be shy about talking peace with Israel, just like their Syrian and Palestinian brethren. The rest will become details.
At face value, his conclusion is indisputable, but if you look into it, you discover there is an important dimension to Israeli-Lebanese relations that Hussain Abdul-Hussain completely leaves out: the “security” dimension.
This is quite common among Beirutis. But if you ask Israelis or Lebanese living in Southern Lebanon, it’s their primary concern. And this issue is certainly the murkiest. Here’s why:
Since the 1960s, the Lebanese government has failed to secure its border with Israel. So before embarking in Peace talks, the Lebanese government should see how it will be able to achieve that and start working on it.
Since the 1960s, Israel has been “retaliating” after each attack coming from Lebanon. This has brought a lot of destruction, death and distrust in Southern Lebanon. Shouldn’t Lebanon build a defensive strategy so as to dissuade, limit or restrain the “IDF”?
An armed grouped, Hezbollah, backed by the majority of the local population wants to keep the fight going. Their most popular argument within their constituency is similar to the one of the Israeli army: only military strength will ensure our security and disuade our enemy from attacking us. It’s a defensive argument (that is not weaker than that of the Israeli army). What could the Lebanese government answer to this argument be?
There are other armed groups that are held back by Hezbollah (mostly Palestinian, and Sunni islamists) who are willing to pursue the fight, and the Lebanese State doesn’t seem to have a hold on them.
Before asking the government to come up with a diplomatic strategy toward Israel, I think it is foremost important to ask them to come up with a coherent military and defensive strategy, one that takes into account and deals with Hezbollah and the Palestinians of Lebanon.
How fast is Israel heading for trouble? How much can one extrapolate from one crime news heading, a simple human interest story? Could it be an indicator or is it just an isolated case?
One thing is certain, Israeli editorialists and politicians are not taking it so lightly (c.f. Yediot Ahronot article). For them, it’s not just about Nir Katz (24) and Liz Trubeshi (17) who were killed on saturday. It’s about a shooting attack on a gay and lesbian youth center in Tel Aviv. It’s about a hate crime. It’s about an automatic weapon (such as an M-16 rifle) that was used by an Israeli to kill other Israelis because of differences in lifestyle and values.
It’s about a bubble exploding, but unlike Eytan Fox’s הבועה, the needle that burst it is not directly tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict… but might very well be indirectly link to it. For how long can Israeli society nurture its militaristic culture and breed distrust between some of its sectors, before that starts spreading?
Judging from the reaction of editorialists and politicians, the fear is there, but also the discomfort. How should this attack be called? A terror attack? Can it be called a terror attack although its perpetrator seems to be jewish? This is the kind of hesitation one sees in interviews and opinion papers. It’s not a simple case of semantics, its about classification, operating a distinction between “jewish violence and “palestinian violence”: when violence is so instrumental in separating and defining two groups, what happens when it erupts within one of the groups? what does it say about the opposition between the two groups…
Vous avez remarqué les points de suspension qui terminent le titre de l’article, ou plutôt le laisse ouvert pour indiquer que beaucoup de choses restent à dire. En fait, il aurait été plus juste de le ponctuer avec un deux-points car cet editorial est un véritable réquisitoire où l’auteur exprime méthodiquement tout son dégout sur les Musulmans, un dégout ordinaire puisqu’il est partagé par beaucoup et peut passer inaperçu: une virulente islamophobie de salon dirons nous en détournant l’une de ses expressions. Pour bien saisir les idées fondamentales autour desquels l’article s’articule, il est conseillé de se poser ces trois questions suivantes en le lisant:
Normalisation or االتطبيع (el-Tatbi’) is certainly one of the most detested words in the Arabic political lexicon. But western diplomacy willfully ignores that and hasn’t come up with another word to wrap up its propositions. I could delve into semantics and share with you my views on the reasons behind the word’s extremely negative connotations, but that would spawn a whole different article. I’d rather tackle the propositions directly.
Here are the regional normalization steps Washington seems to be seeking (according to Haaretz):
Arab countries in the Gulf would allow Israeli passenger and civilian cargo aircraft to fly over their territory. The move would save long detours on flights to Asia, a popular destination for Israeli travelers.
Israel would be able to open interest sections in other states’ embassies in Arab capitals, such as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Israel had interest sections in several Arab countries but they were closed after the start in 2000 of a Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Read the rest of this entry »
Haaretz published a story on Israeli Arab MK Ahmed Tibi joining calls to scrap this television commercial which he finds offensive. He explained to Reuters that “the advertisement presents the barrier as though it were just a garden fence in Tel Aviv”, while it actually ”separates families and prevents children from reaching schools and clinics”.
Don’t you find his stand rather irrelevant? It will certainly not bring about any kind of change. The advert will keep on running (which is inconsequential) and the wall will stay standing. And Ahmed Tibi will keep on making ineffective political moves meant to reassure his constituency on his political stands. Read the rest of this entry »
Let’s cut to the chase (and cut the crap). The Gad Elmaleh affair reveals three things?
The political function of rhetorical battles. Rhetorical battles are an excellent tool for mobilisation. They grant politicians room for overbidding (with no political cost). It allows people to express and affirm key values (not necessarily held, but at least celebrated). In a polarised setting, it affirms, confirms and “justifies” the separation between the two groups.
Lastly, it has a very satisfying emotional dynamic. In the beginning, it “wakes people up”, in this case, keeps them alert to the danger of Hezbollah (for March XIV) or to the danger of March XIV (for Hezbollah). Through overbidding, the tension builds up: “they are imposing cultural censorship on us” vs “they are pushing for cultural normalisation with Israel“). The more the tension builds up, the more it infiltrates the masses; people start repeating the politicians slogans, strengthening the framework that was set up for them… Frustrations are expressed… freely. Emotions become violent. Taboos fall. Accusations swell… Each and every one participating in this rhetorical battle feels he is winning it. Each person feels he has the better arguments. At this point, no one is listening to the other, and each is intoxicated by his own rhetoric, values, arguments… People and groups let off steam. And they feel relieved.
It’s a rhetorical battle, so nothing on the ground will change, nothing except the deepening of the divide between the two “battling” groups.
A Lebanese jewish quagmire. Since the establishment of Israel, Lebanese officials seem to have felt uncomfortable with Lebanon’s Jewish community. Unlike Morocco whose king (Hassan II) took a public stand affirming and reaffirming the place Moroccan Jews held in Moroccan society, Lebanese officials have preferred to remain silent on that issue. Sure, the Lebanese security forces offered the community protection in times of war and tensions. The Kataeb party was quite vocal in its defence of Lebanese Jews, and Kamal Joumblatt seems to have offered some Beiruti-Jews shelter in newly formed fiefdom in 1967. But on the governmental level, Jews were pushed out of the public administration and the army, and the 1943 “national pact” offered them no public place. The country was being redefined as Christian-Muslim.
Hypocrisy denounced in a hypocritical cartoon
In the 1960s, anti-Israeli rhetoric started soaring. Lebanese politicians engaged in this new rhetorical battle and some really excelled in it (ex: Kamal Joumblatt). Things haven’t changed today. Lebanese politicians are proud to boast that “Lebanon will be the last arab country to sign peace with Israel“. And they keep on reminding the Lebanese that “Israel is our natural enemy“, that “Israel is Lebanon’s antithesis“, and that “Israel is bound on destroying Lebanon because we’re their competitors“. This empty rhetoric isn’t Hezbollah’s (absolute) privilege. It is expressed by Lebanese politicians of all sides. March XIV® politicians regularly engage in “anti-israeli” or “anti-zionist” overbidding (c.f. my former posts 12 on the inoperative distinction between “Jews” and “Zionists”). Two days ago, Fares Soueid (a Lebanese politician who hasn’t been able to reclaim his mother’s seat in Parliament since Syria’s withdrawal) declared as secretary general of March XIV that the Gad Elmaleh affair serves the interest of Israel! This kind of overbidding certainly benefits Hezbollah and corners March XIV politicians because it prevents any alternative discourse on Israel, and comes across as insincere to many Lebanese.
An orphan peace camp. It’s becoming quite clear that there is a growing number of Lebanese that is in favour of peace with Israel. They know that their communal leadership is in favour of peace with Israel (Hariri Senior, Jumblatt, Gemayel, Geagea and Aoun have all expressed this in one way or another at a given time), but they can plainly see that this leadership is engaged in anti-Israeli rhetoric and paying lip service to the importance of resistance to Israel and the Palestinian cause.
This growth of Peaceniks is noticeable from the growing interest Lebanese are having in Israeli issues, the growing consumption of Israeli cultural products (music, films, literature), the Lebanese readership of Haaretz, the growing interest in Judaism and Lebanon’s Jewish community… I personally believe that most of the people who are getting involved in this controversy and supporting Gad Elmaleh’s show in Beiteddine are such peaceniks.
So there is an obvious gap between the leadership (that hides its past and probably present ties with Israeli officials and engages in anti-Israeli rhetoric) and some groups of the population. This gap feeds frustrations. But instead of being rightly expressed toward their hypercritical leadership, they are canalised and diverted toward Hezbollah (that defends values they don’t agree with), accusing it of being the reason behind Lebanon’s antagonism with Israel, and Israeli’s violent policy toward Lebanon. It takes a couple of minutes on the internet to verify the public support Gad Elmaleh offers to Israel. Insisting on his performance in Lebanon in a way reflects an unexpressed desire of normalisation with judaism, and what has become central to it, i.e. Israel.
A little test before stating the facts behind what can be termed the “Gad el-Maleh affair”.
How do you read this bumper striker?
Here are the most common answers:
I love Israel
I love Jews
I love Judaism
Now try to think how a Jew would read this sticker. And try remembering that in conclusion of two of the most important jewish holidays and services (Yom Kippur and the Passover) the words “ Next Year in Jerusalem” are recited. And that since the 1960s, Israel and Jerusalem have once again become the cultural and religious centers of Judaism (in terms of pilgrimage, religious publishing, and religious authority). For most Jews living in the West (or anywhere else in the world), it’s not really easy to make the difference between the three answers. And most people who identify as Jewish won’t find the differentiation very meaningful. Now imagine what Gad Elmaleh’s answer would be
To complicate things even more, look into some statistics. Try to see how many Jews in the US or France (the two western countries with the largest jewish communities) consider Israel as important and relevant (or even vital) for them as Jews… Try asking most representatives of jewish communities throughout the world if they are zionist or not… and listen to their answers.
All this to say that the comfortable distinction between “Jews” and Zionist that some Lebanese hide behind isn’t really operational anymore (it’s not that easy to make), and it’s mostly irrelevant for most of the world’s jewish population. Israel (defined in zionist terms) has become central to world jewry. And except a very small number of jewish groups and individuals who identify as non-zionist (mostly Iranian Jews, a minority left leaning Jews or some hasidic leaders), and who are usually attacked by other Jews and accused of being “self-hating” or wrongly condemned as anti-Semitic (sometimes by court, c.f. Eyal Sivan’s case).
I stumbled upon an astonishing tourism program this morning called “The Mission“. It offers “a dynamic and intensive eight day exploration of Israel’s struggle for survival and security in the Middle East today: a military, humanitarian, historical, judicial, religious, and political reality check“.
Not only you are served propaganda, but you pay for it too!
Take a look at the “Mission Highlights”:
Briefings by Mossad officials and commanders of the Shin Bet.
Briefing by officers in the IDF Intelligence and Operations branches.
Inside tour of the IAF unit who carries out targeted killings.
Live exhibition of penetration raids in Arab territory.
Observe a trial of Hamas terrorists in an IDF military court.
First hand tours of the Lebanese front-line military positions and the Gaza border check-points.
Inside tour of the controversial Security Fence and secret intelligence bases.
Meeting Israel’s Arab agents who infiltrate the terrorist groups and provide real-time intelligence.
Briefing by Israel’s war heros who saved the country.
Meetings with senior Cabinet Ministers and other key policymakers.
Small airplane tour of the Galilee, Jeep rides in the Golan heights, water activities on Lake Kinneret, a cook-out barbecue and a Shabbat enjoying the rich religious and historic wonders of Jerusalem’s Old City.
Isn’t it just mind boggling. This tour invites you to share an experience where the most controversial of policies are presented as necessary, legitimate, lawful and heroic (targeted killing, penetration raids, separation wall)…
I wonder what a Lebanese version of such a show would look like. Any suggestions for an “Ultimate Mission to Lebanon”?
Identity sprang up this weekend in three very different cyber-discussions: one with a psychologist, one with a philosopher and one with a sociologist. The contexts were obviously different, but in each of the conversations I was asked to disclose my identity as did my interlocutor, and discuss both identities. Not only did I catch myself disclosing different identities (truthfully and in good faith), but also using opposing arguments.
