Week’s highlight: the weapons issue

Weapons sparked three debates this week. It all started when the Israeli military fished a weapon cargo heading to Beirut. Then the Maronite patriarch made a speech on how weapons and democracy were mutually exclusive and finally the head of the FPM Michel Aoun criticised the Patriarch’s speech and added that if he had the means he would arm himself to fight for Palestine! We’ll look into these polemics one at the time.

The record weapon catch. The most fascinating thing about the story isn’t what was said, but what wasn’t said. We got a lot of info about how much the booty weighted, we didn’t get any info about what exactly these weapons were and who had made them. We got a lot of info about the crew and the three last destination of the ship, but no info on its past and its real ownership. Classified information or courteousness between weapon dealers and producers?

The Patriarch’s sermon. The Patriarch picked up a habit of recurrently making a sermon against Hezbollah and its weapons. His followers, that is political followers (not necessarily of his flock) and backers applaud his “national stands” and celebrate his “national role”. But they never mention the effect it has on communal politics and the gate it opens for other political interventions of clergymen in the public sphere (his backers had even asked him to pick a President for the country two years ago…). His stance does not prevent him from backing parties who will join a government in which Hezbollah will be part of and whose declaration will not condemn the weapons this party holds. Three of the christian political groups he has been actively supporting for nearly a decade (what is left of Qornet Chehwan that was never a political party and is the biggest looser of the past elections with only one MP in parliament, the Lebanese Forces that hasn’t been reestablished as a party since its dissolution in the 1990s probably for financial reasons and the Kataeb that has been hijacked by the Gemayel family after having been hijacked by the Syrian intelligence) will probably express their reservations on the government’s declaration but that will not prevent them from participating in it.

This kind of condemnation is the best example of the “public stand culture” ثقافة المواقف that is meant to satisfy (with words) one’s constituency or sponsor, but that never translates into political action.

Aoun’s tantrum. When angry, the hindered Za’im has no qualms about contradicting himself and making the most outrageous and irresponsible declarations. His first argument to the Patriarch followed these lines: “these weapons were never used against you, so why are you complaining”. Then he expressed his willingness to take up arms too, but regretted he didn’t have the financial ressources for that. I pity Michel Aoun’s supporters who will have to find a way to justify this outburst.

Looking into the central alliance behind the Opposition®

How consistent are political alliances in Lebanon and what effects do they have ? These are two important questions that Ghassan Saoud deals with indirectly in his article published by al-Akhbar: “العونيون لحزب الله: “العتب على قد المحبة (Aounists to Hezbollah: “reproaches  equal to affection”). I discovered this article yesterday thanks to Remarkz’s post on the subject.

First a quick summary then a quick interpretation followed by extrapolations.

The Summary: as the title clearly shows, the article is another example of Lebanese pamphlet-journalism (with substance). Its author is “sending a message” to Hezbollah and the FPM. He hopes that the Shiite party will hear and remedy the points or questions that he formulates. He also wishes the FPM emulates Hezbollah in several ways (balancing between charisma and institution, party organisation, communication policy and strategy…). Here are the questions Ghassan Saoud (quite rightly) believes are bugging the FPM’s christian constituency:

• Is Hezbollah willing to decommission its weapons once Shebaa is liberated and a defensive strategy is adopted & followed?
• What are Hezbollah’s priority or focus (the Shiites? Christian-Muslim partnership in Lebanon? Iran?)?
• Why doesn’t Hezbollah publicly address or communicate on issues that matter to the FPM?
• Why doesn’t Hezbollah support the FPM’s claims the way it supports its own (militarily?)?
• How does Hezbollah’s religious dimension fit in the alliance?

Quick Interpretation: The journalist is obviously frustrated by the fact that the alliance between Hezbollah and the FPM hasn’t  evolved, deepened. It has remained during these three years limited to the highest ranks of both parties and only appears publicly when the need for a common stance is felt.
Little effort is put in bridging the constituencies, deliberating together, working as partners on topics that matter to both (or even to one party). On the other hand, a lot of energy and time is spent on justifying the alliance or the ally’s actions (more at the hand of the FPM than Hezbollah).
Interestingly, many interviewed FPMers bring up the question of “justification”. They blame Hezbollah for not justifying (“explaining”) its actions sufficiently. They also mention the fact that they sometimes have problem justifying these actions to their colleagues. The insistance on justification goes hand in hand with the request for common public stances. This focus translates perfectly the way politics have come to be regarded by Lebanese (especially Christian Lebanese) as a logocracy where all that matters are words and stances.

Extrapolation: What Ghassan Saoud criticises in the Opposition® reminds me of what Michel Hajji-Georgiou reproaches March XIV® with in an even friendlier and more indirect way: Lack of consistency and content.

Security first? The contours of a Lebanese policy for peace talks with Israel

The Lebanese have grown accustomed to governments unable or unwilling to deal with their southern neighbour. Some regret that these governments haven’t been able to defend the country militarily and diplomatically (from the IDF’s ferocious attacks), while others deplore that none has come up with a policy for peace talks with Israel.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain, a contributor to NOW Lebanon, has come up with an interesting analysis on the subject. He believes Lebanon should define a policy on Israel and embark in peace talks because “Lebanon will never defeat Israel militarily, [so] its ‘conflict’ with the Jewish state can only be resolved by diplomacy”. He concludes his article with the following statement:

Since the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, both governments have failed to produce a policy on Israel. The Mitchell team is determined to change all this, but they need the help of Lebanon’s leaders, who must not be shy about talking peace with Israel, just like their Syrian and Palestinian brethren. The rest will become details.

At face value, his conclusion is indisputable, but if you look into it, you discover there is an important dimension to Israeli-Lebanese relations that Hussain Abdul-Hussain completely leaves out: the “security” dimension.

This is quite common among Beirutis. But if you ask Israelis or Lebanese living in Southern Lebanon, it’s their primary concern. And this issue is certainly the murkiest. Here’s why:

• Since the 1960s, the Lebanese government has failed to secure its border with Israel. So before embarking in Peace talks, the Lebanese government should see how it will be able to achieve that and start working on it.
• Since the 1960s, Israel has been “retaliating” after each attack coming from Lebanon. This has brought a lot of destruction, death and distrust in Southern Lebanon. Shouldn’t Lebanon build a defensive strategy so as to dissuade, limit or restrain the “IDF”?
• An armed grouped, Hezbollah, backed by the majority of the local population wants to keep the fight going. Their most popular argument within their constituency is similar to the one of the Israeli army: only military strength will ensure our security and disuade our enemy from attacking us. It’s a defensive argument (that is not weaker than that of the Israeli army). What could the Lebanese government answer to this argument be?
• There are other armed groups that are held back by Hezbollah (mostly Palestinian, and Sunni islamists) who are willing to pursue the fight, and the Lebanese State doesn’t seem to have a hold on them.

Before asking the government to come up with a diplomatic strategy toward Israel, I think it is foremost important to ask them to come up with a coherent military and defensive strategy, one that takes into account and deals with Hezbollah and the Palestinians of Lebanon.

A cartoon to illustrate a Taef principle

In 1989, the Lebanese parliamentarians convened in Taef, with financial encouragements from Rafik Hariri. In this Saudi Arabian city, they spawned an agreement, the Document of National Accord supposed to provide the basis for the ending of the civil war and the return to political normalcy in Lebanon. Have a glimpse at the document, and check a good commentary for backdrop information. But let’s get to the crux of the matter.

In 1989, the country was in the hands of five militias (PSP, Amal, Lebanese Forces, Hezbollah, SLA), two foreign armies (Israeli, Syrian) and a divided Lebanese army. These militias are only mentioned once in the document that speaks of “disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced”. This mention focuses on militias as a weapon bearing group. Sure, this is its defining quality, but militias are much more than that. Militias are power centers, networks, they have a human, an economical, a territorial, a symbolic and in this case an ethnic dimension. These dimensions are not mentioned in the Taef Agreement which hides one basic principle: The militias, after decommissioning will be recognised as political parties, and will safeguard their positions within government (a process that began in the 1980s with the Rachid Karami lead National Unity government).

Three of those militias are now pillars of the quadripartite oligarchy, two other decommissioned militias are junior partners of the oligarchy, and so is the former head of the Lebanese Army.

A very revealing affair (2): Gad Elmaleh & the Lebanese Media

Now let’s look at the facts:

1. Beiteddine Festival, operated by Nora Joumblatt (Walid Joumblatt’s syrian born wife) programs French stand-up comic and actor Gad el-Maleh in this year’s edition of the Festival.
2. Manar TV station, that’s nothing less than a mouthpiece for Hezbollah, airs two “reports” claiming that Gad el-Maleh has fought in the IDF (Israeli army), denounce his participation in a Lebanese summer festival and pronounce him unwelcome in Lebanon.
3. Tourism Minister Elie Marouni (Kataeb), Information Minister Tarek Mitri (Future Movement ally), Culture Minister Tamam Salam (pro-Future Movement ally), and Beiteddine Festival President Nora Joumblatt (oligarch’s wife) speak out against al-Manar’s reports and denounce them as unfounded.
4. Gad el-Maleh cancels his three shows for security reasons
5. Pro-March XIV media, March XIV politicians and the above ministers launch a campaign against Hezbollah’s “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking” and (my personal favourite) “bringing the image of Lebanon into disrepute”,  and for maintaining the show (or having it “videoconferenced” from Paris).

Then let’s get to the analysis:

A rhetorical battle. Up to now, the whole “Gad elmaleh affair has been a “rhetorical battle” between el-Manar on one hand and some March XIV politicians and media mouthpieces (Hezbollah’s allies, most notably the FPM, have remained completely silent on it). As you have noted from fact #5, the accusations brought against el-Manar can hold no legal ground (except for the fourth one). This “detail” is quite important. Why have the accusers chosen to attack Hezbollah on charges that hold no legal ground?

No charges have been pressed. Well, the matter is quite simple. Under lebanese law, there actually are several grounds for legal charges against el-Manar and Hezbollah. So why sticking to polemical accusations, when there are three accusations that actually hold.

• El-Manar is accused of either disinformation or basing its reporting on dubious sources. Why doesn’t the Minister of Information press charges (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Tarek Mitri?
• El-Manar is accused of attacking Gad el-Maleh on the bases he’s Jewish. Now Lebanon doesn’t have a specific law against anti-semitism, but it does have a law against inciting confessional hate, and Judaism is one of Lebanon’s protected faiths. Now El-Manar has been doing it for years. Why hasn’t anyone pressed charges against that? Why hasn’t the Interior Minister pressed charges against tmhat (instead of giving a press conference)? What are you waiting for M. Ziad Baroud?
• El-Manar is accused of tarnishing Lebanon’s image. I personally find the concept absurd and totally illiberal and antidemocratic (it’s no coincidence that it is mostly used by authoritarian regimes). But it holds under Lebanese law. Why hasn’t the Minister of Justice acted upon it?

Silly yet revealing accusations. el-Manar and Hezbollah have been accused of “Censorship”, “Intellectual terrorism”, “Cultural hostage taking”. Let’s take one accusation at a time and see in what way it is revealing.

• Censorship. My dictionary defines censorship as “the practice of officially examining books, movie, etc. and suppressing unacceptable parts”. The most important element in this definition is obviously “Officially“. Censorship is practiced by an authority that holds power. Hezbollah shares with Walid Joumblatt’s “Democratic Gathering”, the position of fourth largest bloc in Parliament (less than 10% of MPs). It has one minister in the current government (out of 30). Now that doesn’t really put it in a position of power institutionally. And the “anti-Gad Elmaleh campaign” was launched by one of Lebanon’s medias, not by an official media. Sure, Hezbohallah is armed and could endanger Gad Elmaleh’s life were he to come to Lebanon. But it’s not the only armed side in Lebanon, and a security arrangement could be found with it, like it has been found on so many other matters. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Intellectual terrorism. Here’s wikipedia’s definition (my translation): “the practice which aims at intimidating or silencing people by submitting them to arguments and intellectual pressures through publications, media interventions (etc) so as to prevent them from formulating perturbing ideas (regardless of their validity, falsity or disputability)”. What is interesting with the concept of “intellectual terrorism” is that it doesn’t have to be “official”, it can be operational as long as the people exercising it hold the upper hand in the specific field they are operating in. Now Hezbollah surely doesn’t have the upper hand in the communication field or the cultural production field. Truth to tell, its cultural influence is rather limited (and so is its participation in cultural production). So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?
• Cultural hostage taking. The charge is quite meaningless. It assumes that Hezbollah has a dominant position in the cultural sector and can define Lebanese cultural expressions or at least censor them, which bring us back to the first two “charges”. So why do people feel cornered by Hezbollah?

So why is the Gad Elmaleh affair just another rhetorical battle, and in what way does it reveal that people feel cornered by Hezbollah? You can look at the way some bloggers (Jester, Now Lebanon, Khaled Barraj) or journalists (Daily Star’s Michael Young, Orient-Le Jour’s Michel Hajji Georgiou) have been dealing with this issue. My answer comes tomorrow.

Approaching Iran: Lebanese wishful thinking

I find this picture quite revealing of the mindset of many of my nationals who are interpreting the electoral turmoil in Iran: Hezbollah is seen as a branch of the Iranian regime. This perception has two consequences:
- If the tree is venomous (violent and repressive), so is its branch.
- If the tree is weakened, the branch will wither.

These two postulates aren’t very convincing. Its actually a very simplistic view that ignores the complexity of the situation.

Historically, one could say that Hezbollah is somewhat an offshoot of the Islamic Republic of Iran (even though it really stems from Musa Sadr’s Amal movement…). But that doesn’t mean that it is a branch of the Iranian Regime. Moreover, one could also argue that Hezbollah is bound by its spiritual obedience to Iran’s spiritual leader and its financial & military dependence on Iran’s government. But this doesn’t negate its autonomy. It certainly limits it, but doesn’t annul it. Hezbollah enjoys a massive popular backing within Lebanon’s Shiite community. Its leadership is Lebanese, its rank and file are Lebanese, its territorial site is Lebanese… Sure, a change in Iran’s regime will have an impact on Hezbollah. But that doesn’t mean that turmoil or change in Iran will weaken the party or make it disappear. Hezbollah can always adapt, choose another spiritual leadership (most Lebanese shiites supporters of Hezbollah don’t even recognise the spiritual authority of Khamanei), find other sources of financing (remember the drug trade in the Beqaa?)… and even if there was a regime change in Iran, would that mean that this budding regional power will abandon its regional ambitions? Why would it, and if it doesn’t, can it do it without Hezbollah?

As it is usually the case, the Lebanese pundits take on Iran says more about them then it does about Iran.

Jumblatt’s back to business

While journalists and March 14th politicians are musing on their “victory” (and indulging), Walid Jumblatt knows better. It is quite obvious that the quadripartite oligarchy won those elections: Mustaqbal won the overwhelming majority of the Sunni seats in parliament, Amal-Hezbollah the overwhelming majority of the Shiite seats, Ishtiraqi the overwhelming majority of the Druze seats. Knowing that Sunnis and Shiites have the same number of seats in parliament, it’s Walid Jumblatt’s Druze seats that makes a difference and determines who is the “majority”.

It’s not surprising that he is the one who informed the press yesterday on the rules of the game: The next government will be one of “National Unity” (i.e. bringing together the quadripartite oligarchy), but there will be no “1/3 blocking minority”. This declaration is quite surprising coming from the Lebanese political figure that lost the most MPs in these elections. His “Democratic Gathering” bloc (1/2 Druze Ishtiraqi MPs, 1/2 Christian client MPs) shed 4 additional MPs: He is gradually learning to “share” MPs in the districts he had conquered during the Civil War: Michel Aoun’s FPM took over the Christian seats in Baabda, the Christian neo-helf (Kataeb, Lebanese Forces, Ahrar) took one seat each in the Chouf and Aley (one from the Future Movement, and two from the Democratic Gathering), and Talal Arslan was granted two Druze seats.

Withstanding this gross loss of parliamentary weight, Jumblatt remains a pivotal player in the quadripartite oligarchy thanks to the even split of Christian MPs between pro-Aoun and anti-Aoun that neutralises Christian MPs as negotiation chips between the two rival/collaborating sides of the ruling oligarchy.

Change(?) we DON’T believe in… (1)

The quadripartite oligarchy has decided to unburden Sunnis, Shiites and Druze with the hardships of democratic choice. The weight of the electoral battle lays on shoulders of the Christians.

This is not particularly new. In 2005, the Quadripartite oligarchy had struck an alliance, withstanding its members’ opposing geopolitical alliances. The Christian electorate had to choose between the christian allies of this quadripartite alliance and those who opposed (or were left out of) this alliance (most notably the Free Patriotic Movement).

Today, things have slightly changed. The quadripartite oligarchy is not running on the same tickets  (even though the geopolitical rift between it’s two parts isn’t as big as before). Why? Probably because they no longer need it (Politics has precedence on Geopolitics)!

The 1960 electoral divisions has clearly set aside  the Shiite electorate from the Sunni and Druze electorates. Bahia Hariri’s election no longer depends on the Shiite electorate, and Berri doesn’t risk opposing votes from Sunni Saïda… And if you check out the competing lists, you will find that the quadripartite oligarchy, even divided, doesn’t face much competition, and the rivalry between its members is almost inexistent. Do Hezbollah and Amal support a rival to Mustaqbal (Future Movement) or Ishtiraki (PSP)? Not really… Do the Mustaqbal or Ishtiraki support a rival to the Hezbollah-Amal bulldozer? Not really… The quadripartite oligarchy has unburdened Sunnis, Shiites and Druze from the hardships of democratic choice!

The only change is to be found on the Christian side. The battle no longer is between the allies and foes of the quadripartite oligarchy, but between two groups of its allies. Oddly enough, for the first time since the 1972, the Christian electorate will be able to choose more than half of the Christian MPs (36 Christian MPs and 4 Muslim MPs: mostly in historical Mount Lebanon and East Beirut). Moreover, this electorate still enjoys important leverage for the choice of another 7 MPs (5 Christian and 2 Muslim in Zahlé). Under such conditions, one would expect the Christian parties to have a greater autonomy from the internal rifts of the Quadripartite alliance. But this isn’t so.

Here’s my thoughts on why this is the case!

- The recent evolution of the patronage system: Even though most of the Christians share the same political views and cultural perceptions, they were not integrated into a dominant denominational patronage structure in the 1990s by the Syrians, unlike the Shiites (under Nabil Berri’s Amal Movement), the Druze (under Jumblatt’s Ishtiraki) or to a slightly smaller extent, the Sunnis (under Rafik Hariri’s Mustaqbal Movement). Many of them were actually split up between those three groups (especially in Beirut, Southern Lebanon and Southern Mount Lebanon where traditionally “indepedent” patrons such as Michel Pharaon, Fuad Saad, Salah Honein became clients of larger Muslim patrons), while the rest were integrated into smaller denominational patronage structure (that of Michel Murr,  Suleiman Frangieh, Elias Skaff).

- Geopolitical positioning: the quadripartite oligarchy has replaced politics with geo-politics. And two of its members (Hezbollah and Mustaqbal) enjoys very strong regional and international backing (financial and military). In such a game, the Christians find themselves with no allies and with no say.

- Electoral reasons: The Quadripartite oligarchy commands the election of no less than 21 Christian MPs (the Hezbollah-Amal alliance: 5 christian MPs; the Mustaqbal-Ishtiraki alliance: 16 MPs). In those elections, the Christians electorate has no say at all. Moreover, one member of the quadripartite oligarchy can have an important influence for sway votes in the choice of 10 additional Christian MPs (in districts where the Christians electorate is dominant).

Elections in Lebanon – The continuance of the Doha effect -2

People usually speak of the Doha effect as a consequence, that of the military takeover of West Beirut by Hezbollah (and the later withdrawal). But it also had an unexpected effect, that of transforming the relationship between the Quadripartite oligarchy with its christian allies.

The Quadripartite oligarchy is composed of the dominant political groups during the Syrian mandate over Lebanon:  Nabih Berry’s Amal (i.e. Hope)  Movement, Hariri’s Future Movement, Jumblat’s Progressif Socialist Party and Hezbollah (under the commandment of Hassan Nasrallah). For over the decades, it had managed to dominate the political landscape through its alliance with Syrian political figures (i.e. the President and his men, and later his son…), through the recognition of its territorial power (true for Jumblatt in southern Mount Lebanon, Berry and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon and the Beqaa. Less true for Hariri who had problems having it recognised), through its power over its community within the State’s institutions, and lastly, through a spoil system in which three of these groups split most of the Christian MPs between themselves, expanded their political weight in Parliament (sometimes doubling it) and hence took a larger share of the State’s ressources.

One would have expected this to change after the Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the end of its Mandate, but it didn’t. Even though the March 14th alliance’s backbone was mainly Christian, its two members that belonged to the Quadripartite alliance treated the Christian parties as junior partners and maintained their Christian cronies (calling them independents) in parliament and the government, giving “them” the larger share (but actually keeping it for themselves).

Widening the Quadripartite oligarchy to Christian partners

After the Doha agreement, things changed. When the Shiite branch of the Quadripartite oligarchy started treating its ally, Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, as a Senior Partner, the Druzo-Sunni branch of the oligarchy had to do the same. Even though none of the Christian partners have a real weight in the political system (neither economical, nor military, nor politically). They just benefited from the competition between the two branches of the oligarchy.

This unexpected effect of the Doha agreement after appearing in the formation of the government is being translated today in the parliamentary elections. Whatever the outcome of the elections is going to be on the Christian scene, one thing is sure, the Oligarchy’s allies are going to win (over the “independents”, “pseudo-independents”, Quadripartite christian affiliates…) on both sides, claiming (and bargaining for) their share in the system; and they’re going to be even more autonomous as before, with a larger share of power and State ressources.

Elections in Lebanon – The Downsizing of the Quadripartite oligarchy -1

Next month, the Lebanese will be electing a new parliament. I will be posting these coming days my thoughts on this question. Today, a look at the Quadripartite alliance.

The downsizing of the Quadripartite alliance Oligarchy

The biggest looser will undoubtedly be Walid Jumblatt. During the Syrian occupation, he not only commanded the largest Druze parliamentary block in Lebanese history, but he doubled his parliamentary weight by commanding as many Christian MPs as Druze MPs (and some would argue more). In the coming elections, he risks loosing 3 Druze MPs (in Baabda, Rashaya and Hasbaya) and is certain to loose a greater number of Christian MPs to his Christian allies (Kataeb, National Liberal Party or Lebanese Forces) or foes (Free Patriotic Movement).

What about the other three: Amal, Hezbollah and Future Movement.

The Future Movement has shown to be rather poor in organising a strong political base, but is sure to benefit from the Hezbollah effect. Many Sunnis will vote for him because they see in him the only Sunni force able (more or less) to stand up to Hezbollah. But his constituency is growing weaker with time and he might loose a couple of Sunni seats and has already handed out some Christian seats to Christian allies or foes (Tashnag).

Amal and Hezbollah still control a highly effective electoral monster that was given to them by the Syrians: the bulldozer. It will certainly crush their Shiite rivals in the large Shiite constituencies of the South (Sour, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil) and the Beqaa (Baalbeck-Hermel). It is likely to have the same effect in the mixed constituencies through their political alliances. But they are likely to loose a couple of Christian MPs to their Christian ally, the Free Patriotic Movement (in Jezzin).

In other words, the Quadripartite alliance of 2005 is still going to be the greatest winner in the game; its political division (and electoral rivalry) working for the domination of each political group within its community in the same way their electoral alliance allowed it in 2005. The only difference will be the Doha effect; the birth of real partnerships with Christian parties on both sides of the political spectrum (even if the partnerships are deeply asymmetrical).

Arrogance vs Resentment : street politics in Beirut

“We don’t go to that pub anymore… Because of what they did in May… They set up a roadblock, you know… They mugged and humiliated people”. 

The resentment in Beirut for Hezbollah and its allies’ takeover of Beirut in May 2008 is palpable. Hezbollah is seen as the main political foe. But people hold grudges against two other parties who they believe are the main perpetrators of the “invasion”: the Syrian Social National Party and Amal  (even though they believe Hezbollah bares the political responsibility). 

Many see the month of Ramadan as a truce. But the tension is still high, and the “authentic beirutis” do not hide their vindictiveness.

On the other side of the divide, Amal and the Syrian Social National Party behave as if they didn’t take part of the bloody fray. There seems to be a national and international consensus to restrict the responsibility on Hezbollah, and Hezbollah readily accepts it, and even boasts about it.

Interestingly enough, Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech last week which was received differently by the two sides. His allies found it conciliatory, while his foes saw it as arrogant. Actually, I believe it was actually a bit of both. The general tone was conciliatory, but his justification of the May “events” was felt by his foes as “blaming the victim”. One thing is for sure, Hezbollah and its leader have never been so arrogant. Even though this trait is shared by many politicians and parties in Lebanon, in this case, it comes from a party that knows it’s the strongest in the political arena and that’s what its arrogance is putting forward.

Monster and Angels?

 I just did a little research on the net to see who this “Samir Kuntar” is. The Lebanese press and politicians call him a hero, the Israeli press calls him a monster.  The Lebanese talk about him in general terms, describing him as a resistant (not to confuse with freedom-fighter… in the Middle East, it’s never about freedom, it’s about pride and survival), and counting the years he spent in an Israeli Jail. 

The Israeli press on the other hand unanimously describe him as the monster, a cold-blooded assassin who brutally murdered a 4 year old girl and is responsible for the death of a 2 y/o sister (who was accidentally killed by her mother). They also talk about him in general terms and are only interested in the drama that he and the commando he was with triggered. The only details you get are on his victims.

I couldn’t help but search the internet to find some details about this person. I honestly didn’t find much. But I realised that on April 22 1979, the day he disembarked on the shore of Nahariya, he was only 16. This hero/monster was a teenager, caught up in a violent secular group which boasted that its actions were aimed at terrorising its enemy. On april 22 1979 this indoctrinated teenager was caught under fire. He was vulnerable and all powerful at the same time. He had complete power over the two israeli hostages he had. They represented the enemy in his eyes; the group he perceived to be responsible for his country and the region’s plights. His camarades were being shot down around him. He could have fell at any moment. Imagine the odd mix of emotions rushing in his head: fear, hate, excitement, panik, anger…

In such dramatic moments, people act in ways that they can later regret, they act without thinking, relying on their instincts. On that beach, Samir Kuntar brutally killed Danny and Einat Haran, by instinct, to show his enemy that he is vulnerable, to be remembered and celebrated as having incurred harm to his enemy. At the same moment, Smadar Haran accidentally took away her two y/o daughter’s life while trying to muffle her cries. She acted by instinct, to save her own life and that of her daughter.  

What Samir Kuntar did that night in Nahariya is beyond doute criminal. But instead of looking at him through war-faring eyes, why not situate the whole dramatic event in its hate structured context. Over 1000 civilians were killed in Israel’s “Second Lebanon war” (July 2006), many of them children. Does anyone in Israel see the IDF as a criminal organisation? Does anyone condemn the soldiers who shot at Lebanese civilians, shelled their houses, destroyed the bridges they were using to flee the region that was under fire?There is no empathy in war, unfortunately. Only fear and loathing. You can’t accuse the other for having no empathy when you are deprived of it.

Samir Kuntar is no monster, he is no angel either. But neither are Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev. They are victims of waring structures that crushed them as they have crushed many others. 

Prisoners and corpses: First values in the Middle-East stock exchange

It seems that Israel will be releasing its Lebanese prisoners (amongst them a dangerous criminal who massacred an Israeli family in the name of resistance)  tomorrow , in exchange for two soldiers (probably dead) held by Hezbollah and some information on Ron Arad (an Israeli aviator who probably pulverised many innocent Lebanese in the name of self defense).  

And all the Lebanese politicians are bikering about is why the Lebanese government wasn’t part of this deal. Some Lebanese politicians (close to or part of the Hariri-Jumblatt alliance) are publicly wondering why!

The reason I find is quite simple. Hezbollah and the IDF speak the same language. They play in the same market and find it normal to trade in human lives, livelihoods and corpses. And if the government wanted to be part of the talks, why didn’t the Prime minister ask Hezbollah to hand in the Israeli POW. Instead of making this issue one of national sovereign (which it really is), they preferred to bicker about the Hezbollah telephone lines (which is everything but a question of national sovereignty).

Nasrallah’s latest speech -3: Challenges and threats.

All those who are familiar with Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches know how he articulates them. He always focuses on very few points, presents his foes with several challenges and adds a couple of threats that he always presents as consequences of the opponent’s actions.The Lebanese media focused on his last threat, the one with which he ends his long speech: the call made to Emile Lahoud asking him take all the necessary measures to save the country. One can quite understand why this call caught the media’s attention. In the last weeks of the election period, the whole political debate is centred on the presidential elections and the different scenarios that are likely to happen. Hassan Nasrallah reminded the analysts of an actor that could disrupt their different schemes: Emile Lahoud. Up to now, he has been generally discarded politically, diplomatically and analytically. Had he not intervened a couple of times in the public debate (with unavoidable mediocrity), one would have thought that Lebanon has been functioning without a President (which in many ways it has). Hassan Nasrallah was inviting him to react to the situation and prevent the worst from happening. He didn’t exactly say how he imagined Emile Lahoud’s intervention (and in what way it could prevent the worst from happening). Some analysts thought that he could be inviting him to act as two outgoing Lebanese Presidents did in 1953 and in 1988. But the Taef accords have ruled out this possibility. It’s actually hard to see what Lahoud could do without contravening to the constitution. I personally don’t find this part of the speech very interesting. And I don’t think the call should be separated from the preceding paragraph. It followed several sentences in which Emile Lahoud was praised. To understand this part of the speech, I believe one should compare it to the (infamous) one he gave on March 8th 2005. Even then, analysts tried to see messages about the future. But all of their analyses in 2005 turned out false. The praise he gave to the Syrian army and Intelligence were not about the future. It was about the past. Hassan Nasrallah was thanking an ally for his loyalty and support. Through this act, he was expressing his loyalty to his allies and his gratitude. As he did with the Syrian army and intelligence in 2005, he did with Emile Lahoud in 2007. It’s not about strategy or tactics, it’s about ethics. This behaviour is certainly atypical in Lebanon. What about the challenges he delved into. How come so little attention was given to them?  They are certainly the most important issues in Lebanon today (even if politicians and analysts hardly mention them). Hassan Nasrallah talked about transparency, accountability, good governance and defence policy (not in these words). He showed that on all these matters, the Siniora government was lagging. Pro-government analysts and politicians usually brush those criticism off by simply saying that Hezbollah is a State within a State (an accusation made to the PLO in the 1970s). What Hassan Nasrallah seems to be saying is that Hezbollah is accomplishing some of the State’s missions because the government seems to have relinquished. In other words, were the government more serious about them, Hezbollah wouldn’t be doing them. These are undeniably challenges that the Hezbollah leader is issuing to the Lebanese government and rest of the Lebanese political class.  Unfortunately, they don’t seem able to rise to them.

Nasrallah’s latest speech -2: Matryrology

It’s weird the way people change, the way one changes. Two years ago, I would have been incapable of analysing Nasrallah’s speech in a calm manner. I was in the opposition then (as I still am today) and his party was defending the outgoing government and the Syrian regime. I remember quite vividly the way each of their public manifestation would distress and aggrieve me. But I believe things have changed now. I don’t see this party as an opponent (or at least not more than most of the parties on the political scene). I don’t even feel threatened by its leader’s threats, even though I know they are dreadful and that he’s capable of putting them into action. Hezbollah and it’s leadership are assuredly apt political players who know what they want and work diligantely to get it. But instead of seeing them as a threat (which I find very counter-productive), I prefer to see them as a challenge, one that Lebanon society is ready to face. But is our political class? probably not.

So I went through the published speech a second and a third time today, noticing its structure, its language , its argumentation, its intended messages, its audiences. It is a very interesting read that I believe gives a clear idea about the party and its world-view.
Roughly, one fourth of the speech is dedicated to what I call martyrology. It is undeniably the most interesting part of the address because it clearly states the party’s values and its narratives. And judging from the reaction it had on the audience, it seems to be pushing every button. I am quite amazed the press hardly mentioned this section of the speech.
November 11th is for Hezbollah Martyr’s day, a day to commemorate the “martyrdrom” of Ahmad Kassir, its first suicide bomber. He exploded himself in the Israeli army’s headquarters in Tyre on that day in 1982. For years no one knew his name, no one claimed responsibility for the operation: it was to protect the martyr’s family he said before drawing up the moral portrait of Ahmad Kassir. He gave absolutely no real biographical information about the person, he only spoke of his character and the symbol he represented. He sketched out the portrait of a hero, of the embodiment of what he considers to be the highest values (purity, faith, sacrifice) in such a way anyone could identify himself with him. On the individual level, the martyr’s whole life is directed to “martyrdom”. It’s not an act that is imposed on him, he is no victim in any way. It’s an act he “naturally” chooses to accomplish. By talking about the martyr’s family (and the care Hezbollah gives to them), Hassan Nasrallah showed the other aspect of martyrdom, the social one (and in some way the economical one). Not only did he mention the martyr’s family but also the institution that is aimed at helping them. And while doing so, he sketched the structure of a sort of spiritual family of martyrs with various Shiite figures in it.
Surprisingly enough, there is no direct reference to the three religious figures of martyrdom in the Shiite tradition. This is probably because the speech is addressed to a larger audience comprised of non-Shiite Muslims. But I’m sure that public present in the stadium and watching Nasrallah on the telly could fill in the blanks; the talk about contemporary martyrs would resonate in their heads and remind them on this historic and religious dimensions of matrydom .

Although Lebanon has become of late the land of martyrs, with each political group continuously commemorating its martyrs in every way possible, it’s easy from this speech to realise how different Hezbollah matyrology is from the others. They have managed to intertwine so many dimensions of this act: the religious, the political, the moral, the military, the personal, the social, the structural, the institutional, the economical, the democratic.