How they helped defeat Farouk Hosny (the story)

The 9 original candidates. Housny is second from left

Before delving into the analysis, let’s set the record straight. I won’t be looking into the dirty politics behind these elections. I do have some crusty insider information on some dirty play, but it’s closer to gossip than meaningful information, and strictly off topic. What we’ll be looking into is the public debate that surrounded these elections. I believe it had an incidence on the final outcome: Irina Bokova’s election to the post of Director General of UNESCO. But there is no way to prove this fact.

Interestingly enough, the reasons behind Farouk Hosny’s defeat are not of much interest. They will leave no trace in the public conscience. On the other hand, the fierce debate surrounding this election will undoubtedly mark those who feel envolved in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Let’s start with a quick look at the five rounds that brought Farouk Hosni to his defeat. If you’re interested in more details, check out this blog.

Results of the 5 rounds


Candidate	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5
Farouk Hosny	22	23	25	29	27
Irina Bokova	8	8	13	29	31
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	7	9	11	0	0
Ivonne Baki	7	8	9	0	0
Ina Marciulionyte	3	4	0	0	0
Alexander Yakovenko	7	3	0	0	0
Noureini Tidjani-Serpos	2	2	0	0	0
Sospeter Muhongo	1	1	0	0	0
Mohammed Bedjaoui	0	0	0	0	0
Blank	1	0	0	0	0
Total	58	58	58	58	58

As the figures clearly show, Farouk Hosni was the leading contestant up to the fifth round. His candidacy was supported by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization for the Islamic Conference. It was backed by France and unopposed (though grudgingly) by Israel. So what happened? If you’re interested in geopolitics, check out what Stephen Suleyman Schwartz had to say about it. I’d rather look into one campaign that picked up speed and was given more media attention than any other story in these elections: that of Bernard-Henri Lévy (alias BHL, alias BHV) relayed on the net through Save Unesco!, a blog started by “French students in political science” that was deleted earlier today (but here is the cached copy). Much can be said about Bernard-Henri Levy and the anonymous group of French students, but I will focus on the issues that they raised, and they are identical. Instead of supporting one specific candidate, they attacked the Egyptian candidate on three main issues

• Antisemitism. This accusation springs from a misquoted statement on burning Israeli books found in Egyptian libraries (a statement Farouk Hosny later apologised for in his “message to the world“). BHL reinterpreted this statement as a vow “to burn with his own hands any book in Hebrew that could have possibly infiltrated the stacks of the Alexandria Library”.
• An alleged involvement in the Achille Lauro Hijacking affair.  
• Responsibility as Minister of Culture (for over two decades) in the crackdown of liberties and freedom of expression in Egypt.

So, is Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace price laureate, right when he says “UNESCO has escaped a scandal, a moral disaster. Mr. Hosni did not deserve the job he does not deserve this honor  tomorrow”. Can we agree with BHL when he says “We have won. Liberty has won. Tolerance has won. And thanks to all of you, respect has won. I’d like to thank you, net surfers, for engaging in this battle for democracy and peace. Thanks to all who refused the unacceptable and who allowed for this beautiful victory”. That’s what we’ll be looking into tomorrow.

How they build their coalition governments

Let’s first start by answering three questions:
Why compare? The reason is fairly simple, there are many benefits to it. Comparisons can help us understand the difficulties of cabinet formation (and distinguish structural problems from contextual ones). Comparisons can help us reframe our expectations. Comparisons can help us determine where the problems lie. Comparisons offer us solutions others have figured out to solve similar problems.
Why choose Belgium, Israel and Northern Ireland? These countries have recurrently faced problems in cabinet formation. But the difficulties they encountered are not the same.
In Belgium, their is a deep division between Walloons and Flemish parties. So during the cabinet formation process, you have to please parties belonging to both groups, which isn’t always easy, even when the parties belong to the same ideological family, because the parties’ constituencies are not the same. Each communal group has its priorities and its perspective. Negotiations can take time (in the case of Belgium, it took 196 days in 2007), and they can be facilitated through arbitration (by the King or an appointee of his).
Israel on the other hand is extremely efficient in cabinet formation although all of its governments have recently been coalition governments bringing together parties that have deep disagreements (ex: secularists and religious parties, leftists and rightists…). Some of the parties even have distinct communal constituencies (ex: Shass, Yisrael B’alya, NRP). What helps the process is the absence of polarisation (there are many parties and each party negotiates alone), the absence of communal power-sharing rules (between Jews and non-Jews or between the different sectors of the Jewish community) and an agreement on several basic rules in cabinet formation: proportionality according to parliamentary weight, each party chooses its ministers, no veto power for any party on the inclusion.
Northern Ireland’s example is rather interesting too. In this case, the largest problem was that one of the largest political formations in the country was armed (Sinn Féin-IRA), and had refused to disband because the Irish police force was in the hand of the rival communal group, and it considered that the British Army was in favour of that group. So the United Kingdom brokered a decommissioning plan that was linked to the participation of the political branch of the party to the government of Northern Ireland (the Northern Ireland Executive). After this was done, the basic rule for cabinet formation was that of proportionality between government weight and parliamentary weight within a broad and cross-communal “national-unity government”. This being said, tensions are still recurrent and this has lead the British government to suspend the Northern Ireland Executive for several years!
What can we learn from these examples or others? Cabinet formation takes time in plural societies, especially if they are polarised, because the process has to take into account an extremely large number of elements that have to be negotiated, mainly:

• the choice of the Prime minister
• the number and the identity of parties that will partake in the government,
• the government’s program (national priorities),
• allocation of seats,
• distribution of portfolios,
• choice of ministers.

The existence of rules can facilitate or complicate the formation of governments. Rules can be formalised (explicitly by law) or not. Formalised rules can abridge negotiations by limiting their scope. Rules that are not formalised could have the same effect, and they have the advantage of adapting to change. On the hand, opinions can differ on the interpretation of tules. The more there are disagreements on rules, the longer time it will take to get to a consensus. That’s why the existence of an arbitrator is essential. This arbitrator not only breaks the deadlock, but he gives an authoritative interpretation of the rule (formal and informal). It is important for the system to spell out the facilitating rules and to replace or prohibit the complicating rules. Tomorrow, we’ll look into the complicating factors in Lebanon and ways they could be rationalised (we’ll look into Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch’s approach to how parliamentarism can be rationalised).

Something fishy about the cabinet formation process

Hariri Jr has replaced several of his political aids during the past few months with new ones. But he seems to remain rather ill advised. How can you explain his recent move?

1- He informs the President of the new draft he has prepared (in accordance with the 15-10-5 formula).
2- He doesn’t inform neither his electoral allies nor his electoral “rivals” of how he allocated the seats.
3-The composition of the proposed cabinet is leaked to the press.

Such an approach is unheard of in the history of coalition governments. It comes closer to how things are done for the composition of a majority government in which an undisputed leader (usually a president, but sometimes a chancellor or Prime Minister) chooses who (s)he wants for whatever position (s)he wants within the ranks of his/her party (or even another one if (s)he so chooses, like we have witnessed recently in France and the US). So how could Saad Hariri have mistaken these two approaches? How didn’t he predict that his rivals and allies would both reject this approach?

There are two possibilities:

• either he failed to predict an obvious outcome, which can only mean that he is incompetent, imprudent and badly advised. Let’s go beyond the accusations and see why this could be the case.
  • Father image. Rafik Hariri used to do the same consultations, hear each party out (including the Syrian authorities who used to impose on him their requests), and then decide on a composition and hand it out to the Syrian authorities who informed their allies, heard their complaints and then arbitrated between the disagreeing sides. This system pleased everyone and was highly effective. The composition of governments were not a problem. The Syrians had their way and Rafic Hariri could play the Sultan even though he received a couple of humiliating bows on the way. Saad Hariri is replicating his father’s behaviour. But he know that times had change and that there is no longer a powerful arbitrator. But does he believe that this enables him to play the Sultan, like his father?
  • Misreading of the political situation. Could each camp believe all the nonsense it is producing to feed its public? This is quite possible. We know authoritarian regimes suffered from that because their press had no independence whatsoever, indulged in its biased opinions and invested a lot of time in flattery & political overbidding. Even though Lebanon is far from being autocratic, the function of the press is quite similar to the one found in authoritarian regimes, only instead of working for the Regime, they work  for (or take sides with) a leadership or camp.

No Presidential share in government! Some reasons why Michel Suleiman shouldn’t get any!

Ever since the process for the formation of a new government started, pundits have been discussing the Presidents share; how large its going to be, and who is likely to be part of it. At first, analysts wondered if the President’s share could be neutral, given the extreme polarisation of Lebanese politics, or if it will bring together people from both sides of the spectrum. Then the magic formula appeared: 15 (for March XIV® and allies), 10 (for the Opposition®) – 5 (for the President). The political class had agreed to increase the President’s share from 3 to 5! This was presented as a measure to reinforce the presidency that was much weakened by the constitutional amendments agreed upon in Taef. Unsurprisingly, analysts were easily convinced by this unanimous decision & argument. No one seemed to question its appropriateness, its pertinence or its constitutionality. But don’t worry, things are going to change! I’m going to share with you a couple of good reasons why their shouldn’t be any “presidential share” in any cabinet!

Here are 5 good reasons why the President shouldn’t have a share in government.

Having a share neutralises his constitutional function as arbitrator. Being able to swing from one to another in a cabinet vote is not arbitration, it’s taking sides.

1. Being part of the government weakens his authority. It’s not about numbers and positions, it’s about being on another level! He should assert his moral authority and stay above the political fray.
2. Having ministers means that he accepts to be like all the other political players, but with one notable difference, he will be the only one who cannot count on a group of MPs.
3. By having a share, he complicates and circumvents two rules of coalition formation : the proportionality rule and the consociational rule.
4. By accepting to have a share, he affirms the mouhassassa and mahsoubié principle.

What the President should do.

At this point of time, he should set the rules behind the composition of the government by arbitrating between the opposing contentions, and innovating. There is no agreement on the three dimensions of coalition buildings. The political class still hasn’t defined definitive rules for distributing share and portfolios, picking ministers and setting a common program. Now these issues are quite complex, and they are never formulated in legal terms so as not to complicate even more the process. But when disagreements run so deep, an arbitrator is needed. Why go to Damascus, to Riyad or to Doha to find an arbitrator? why not simply go to Baabda.

Here are a couple of principles that the President should arbitrate on:

• Can a candidate who lost the parliamentary elections become minister? People are thinking about Gebran Bassil, but there are others, and I’m thinking of Ahmad Asaad, for instance. I personally believe Asaad should become Minister even though he lost during the elections… This would ensure a political diversity within the Shiite representation. And then, is it fair to exclude from the government people who lost during the elections without equally excluding politicians who didn’t dare run because they were almost sure to loose?
• Should the different Zuama stick to naming people from within their ranks or can they name people from outside their ranks? such as “independents” or “allies”.
• Does anyone have a veto power on the nomination of ministers within each share?

Anti-Confessionalism: a state ideology

This is not a joke. Anti-confessionalism is a state ideology. It might sound shocking to many ears, but I believe it is actually indisputable. Will this sketchy demonstration you are about to read convince you? I hope so. This blog is certainly not the place for a meticulous study of this surprising and counterintuitive feature. But it will allow me to point out quite broadly a couple of arguments that are usually overlooked by most analysts. And then you’ll do the math.

First, I’d like to remind the reader that the Lebanese political system was not founded on a single pre-existing ideology or political theory that one could call “confessionalism”. This is usually the case with state ideologies. Let’s take the example of the United State (where federalism and democracy were theorised before they were implemented), France (where the basic elements of republicanism were theorised before the overthrow of the Monarchy), the Soviet Union (with communism) and closer to us, Syria (where Baasism was theorised before the establishment of the Baasist regime) and Israel (where Zionism was theorised half a century before the establishment of the State). In all these cases, we find thinkers, intellectuals or theorists who pondered over a regime before its establishment. This is not the case of Lebanon. No thinker, intellectual or theorist reflected on the country’s communal reality and how it could be translated politically before the establishment of the political system or regime (the Constitution of 1926).

The Paradoxes of AntiConfessionalism (an introduction)

AntiConfessionalism! The word seems easy to grasp. The prefix and suffix speak for themselves. Intuitively, one could assume that anticonfessionalism is antonymous & opposed to a specific system, principle, ideology: confessionalism. Up to now things might seem pretty clear. But when you look a bit closer, you discover something completely different. It’s actually quite hard to oppose anti-confessionalism to confessionalism. It’s like opposing black and white. Sure it’s a common assumption that black is the opposite of white, but it doesn’t tell you much about one or the other, and so the opposition turns out to be meaningless.

I have already dealt with the issue of anticonfessionalism two years ago (albeit hysterically) through a “hate mail” sent to Amam05 posted here. The arguments haven’t changed, but maybe I should restate them more serenely.

We might have many bad intellectual habits in Lebanon, but anti-confessionalism is unmistakably the worst. If you’re looking for insight, learning, critical engagement… keep away from anti-confessional literature. On the other hand, if you’re looking for repetitive prose, dogmatism, distilled ideology, decontextualised constructions, baseless assumptions, groundless accusations… Then you should definitely check out the many books, articles and declarations written on confessionalism.

At first, I thought it would be possible to discuss this issue in one post, but judging from the reactions I’m getting, I think it better to discuss one paradox at a time.

1. Monday: Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin.
2. Tuesday: Anti-confessionalism: A state ideology
3. Wednesday: Anti-confessionalism’s side effects

Lebanese Confessional-Republicanism 101

The Lebanese political system is quite muddling. Most people who discuss it either ignore some of its basic rules and principles, or oversimplify and distort them beyond recognition. Political discussion is marred by ideology. So it’s always useful to state our political system’s basic rules and principles. Once this is done, it becomes quite clear how hybrid it is with its mix of “communal” principles and “republican” principles. Most analysts only see the first set of principles and ignore the second set. We need to look into Lebanon’s “confessional” rules and principles so as to untangle these two set of principles and see how they intertwine.

A glimpse at our constitution rules and principles.

• The principle of “confessional representation” تمثيل طائفي (Article 95) is a misnomer, the principle is actually a set of rules for multiconfessional participation قوقعد للاشتراك المتعدد طائفيآ . It introduces quotas to the public sphere. By law, it has three implications: in Parliament, in government and in the public administration. Most analysts see it as a collective right, but in fact it’s not. The rights are not given to communities, but to individuals who belong to certain communities.

Peut-on casser l’oligarchie quadripartite?

Sous l’angle de la distribution et de l’exercice du pouvoir au Liban, la division Quatorze Mars/8 mars n’a pas beaucoup de sens. Sa seule pertinence semble se situer au niveau des alliances géopolitiques, mais également au niveau d’une partie de la base populaire qui y croit. Le pouvoir au Liban est partagé entre quatre réseaux clientélistes qui s’appuient sur de nombreuses ressources: financières, bancaires, institutionnelles, locales, étatiques, étrangères…

L’oligarchie quadripartite: les monopoles politiques en milieu musulman
Ces réseaux sont tous confessionnels: deux chiites, un druze et un sunnite. Trois d’entre eux s’appuient, au besoin, sur leurs armes. A cet égard, le Hezbollah est le plus convainquant, suivi par le PSP et puis Amal, comme l’ont démontré “les événements du 7 mai” 2008. Certe, les pressions géopolitiques les obligent à une rivalité, mais celle-ci restre exceptionnelle et circonscrite sur le plan local. D’ailleurs, même en période de crise extrême la collaboration entre ces quatre réseaux continue. Pour ne citer que quelques exemples: les versements au Conseil du Sud ont continué durant la période de démission non-acceptée des ministres d’Amal… les périmètres de sécurité du Hezbollah sont continuellement respectés… la force de police est “équitablement” partagée entres les différents réseaux… Chacun est satisfait de sa part, et s’accommode de la part de l’autre. Toutefois, cette “rivalité” appuyé par l’étranger à trois conséquences malheureuses: elle renforce la mobilisation communautaire, elle consolide les réseaux clientélistes et elle envenime les rapports entre les membres des trois principales communautés sur lesquels ces réseaux s’appuient.

Ces trois conséquences n’auraient pas pu être neutralisées ou affaiblies par les élections en 2005  (sous le signe de l’alliance) et en 2009 (sous le signe de la “compétition”)… Au contraire, elles les ont consacrés ou reconduits.

La compétition politique en milieu chrétien
Les Syriens ont soutenu l’oligarchie quadripartite dans sa conquête et son renforcement du pouvoir. Du côté chrétiens, seuls des réseaux confessionnel locaux ont été autorisés et soutenus. Depuis 2005, deux stratégies différentes s’offraient aux chrétiens pour intégrer le système politique libanais tel que: l’intégrer en tant que “juniors partner(s)” ou transformer l’oligarchie quadripartite en oligarchie pentapartite.

Can the FPM regain its electorate?

Three extremely vigorous debates over the interpretation of the outcome of the parliamentary elections began before the final results were even published. Two of them involved the FPM: how much of its electorate did it actually loose, and why it lost it. We have discussed these issues in a preceding post. We will ask ourself today how likely it is for the FPM to regain its electorate.

He who represented 70% of Christians

Since 2005, General Michel Aoun boasted that he represented 70% of Christians. This slogan meant two things: that he was the undisputed Za’im of the Christian communities, and that the other Christian blocs, parties and MPs owed their seats to Muslim votes. This wasn’t very far from the truth, but did it serve the FPM? Not really. Even though his bloc scored as well as those of Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri & Hassan Nasrallah, Michel Aoun was denied the same recognition and an equivalent share. His position improved when two pillars of the Quadripartite oligarchy recognised him as the christian Za’im. But it wasn’t enough to make him an equal partner of the Big Four, and his share in power (and ressources) remained significantly smaller than the others (and some would argue  smaller than the oligarchy’s other Christian junior partners). The results of the 2009 elections will likely have no effect on Aoun’s & the FPM’s share of power. Their significant electoral downsizing will probably be of no consequence.

The FPM’s score in 2005 was both monumental and unexpected. The party was just emerging from years of persecution, its leader had just returned from exile, it had little media backing, didn’t provide social services or distribute state ressources… And withstanding all this, it benefited from a massive score that established it as Lebanon’s largest (and dominant) Christian party, one ready to enter into Lebanon’s communal politics withstanding its long-established anti-communal stand. As it entered Parliament, the FPM embodied a principle that it had long fought, that of communalism. The votes it had received were overwhelmingly Christian and the bloc it formed was a Christian one (except for one MP). These characteristics were confirmed in 2009. During these past elections, the FPM had to build on 2005’s protest vote, experience an electoral cross-communal alliance and survive an electoral Bulldozer.

From protest vote to accountability?

Can the FPM change & be reformed?

Some might question the pertinence of such a political move, but it seems to me not only necessary, but also urgent. Sure, general Michel Aoun’s parliamentary bloc remains Lebanon’s second largest, sure his party is still one of Lebanon’s largest, but how long will it survive constant political harassment and sidelining?
These past parliamentary elections were a battle for survival, the FPM had to face a huge political coalition – a Bulldozer – that’s declared goal was to eliminate it. It was able to maintain itself, but lost 20% to 30% of its electorate on the way. In the coming two days, we’ll look into two topics:

• Can the FPM regain its electorate?
• How is the FPM repositioning/reinventing itself?

This topic caught my attention today as I heard on the FPM’s radio (92.5 FM, صوت المدى) that the party was studying the results and outcomes of the 2009 parliamentary elections. As expected, the news bulletin said nothing about what was discussed, how it was discussed and what was finally decided.

Parking meters and the rule of law in Lebanon

What does a parking meter have in common with the rule of law ? Think about it. This is not cracker joke or a riddle. My answer is everything! This device pictured on the left is probably the best expression (if not the only local one) you can find of the famous legal principle everyone seems to be yearning for in Lebanon.

To understand why this is the case, one has to go back to the definition of this legal principle. In most Arab countries, the prevalent expression is a translation from the French or German equivalent “Etat de droit” or “Rechtsstaat” : دولة القانون. In Lebanon, the expression was uselessly expanded to become دولة المؤسسات والقانون, which is rather redundant. But it shows the general frustration people have with State institutions (civil servants and state officials) because of the unjust and discretionary manner in which they implement rule.
Instead of delving in definitions, let’s follow an American legal scholar, Lon Fuller, who determines it through eight defining elements.

Suleiman & Hariri (3): contours of a cohabitation

I couldn’t find a better picture to illustrate the oddness of the Hariri/Suleiman couple. Which one do you think will be playing Laurel, and which one will be playing Hardy? I’m not too sure about this. Both men are political outsiders. They were hurled to office, unprepared. So they are likely to make some rather comical mistakes. And some mistakes might even be spun to serve them (remember Saad’s very unlebanese زي ما هي ”Zay ma hya” in 2005?). But just like everything opposed Laurel to Hardy (and vice versa), the same applies to our odd couple. On a personal level, the former playboy/businessman seems more flexible, more humorous, more apt to learn than the former military chief. On a political level, the Prime Minister holds all the cards, and the president none!

Having seen how different the unlikely president and the unexpected heir are, having glimpsed at how unbalanced their power sharing is, we can start imagining how their cohabitation is likely to be. Let us look at three variables/factors:

- Cabinet weight
- Communal representation
- Allotment of cross-communal shares in Government
- Political competence
- Political potency

Interested in more?

Suleiman & Hariri (1): the unlikely president

One of the greatest political unknowns in Lebanon is surely the evolution of the presidential cohabitation between Saad Hariri and Michel Suleiman. They both share the same views on the head of the executive: his function, duty and responsibilities. Only both see themselves as that head. Let’s take a brief look at the political positioning of two men who never were intended to take such prominent political positions and try to see how things are likely to evolve for two unlikely politicians and between them.

If you want to read more on the unlikely President (what will & what way?) read below. In the coming days, you’ll find some thoughts on the unlikely Prime Minister.

A very revealing affair (3): Gad Elmaleh & Lebanese Jewish Politics

Let’s cut to the chase (and cut the crap). The Gad Elmaleh affair reveals three things?

• The political function of rhetorical battles. Rhetorical battles are an excellent tool for mobilisation. They grant politicians room for overbidding (with no political cost). It allows people to express and affirm key values (not necessarily held, but at least celebrated). In a polarised setting, it affirms, confirms and “justifies” the separation between the two groups.

Lastly, it has a very satisfying emotional dynamic. In the beginning, it “wakes people up”, in this case, keeps them alert to the danger of Hezbollah (for March XIV) or to the danger of March XIV (for Hezbollah). Through overbidding, the tension builds up: “they are imposing cultural censorship on us” vs “they are pushing for cultural normalisation with Israel“). The more the tension builds up, the more it infiltrates the masses; people start repeating the politicians slogans, strengthening the framework that was set up for them… Frustrations are expressed… freely. Emotions become violent. Taboos fall. Accusations swell… Each and every one participating in this rhetorical battle feels he is winning it. Each person feels he has the better arguments. At this point, no one is listening to the other, and each is intoxicated by his own rhetoric, values, arguments… People and groups let off steam. And they feel relieved.

It’s a rhetorical battle, so nothing on the ground will change, nothing except the deepening of the divide between the two “battling” groups.

• A Lebanese jewish quagmire. Since the establishment of Israel, Lebanese officials seem to have  felt uncomfortable with Lebanon’s Jewish community. Unlike Morocco whose king (Hassan II) took a public stand affirming and reaffirming  the place Moroccan Jews held in Moroccan society, Lebanese officials have preferred to remain silent on that issue. Sure, the Lebanese security forces offered the community protection in times of war and tensions. The Kataeb party was quite vocal in its defence of Lebanese Jews, and Kamal Joumblatt seems to have offered some Beiruti-Jews shelter in newly formed fiefdom in 1967. But on the governmental level, Jews were pushed out of the public administration and the army, and the 1943 “national pact” offered them no public place. The country was being redefined as Christian-Muslim.

Hypocrisy denounced in a hypocritical cartoon

In the 1960s, anti-Israeli rhetoric started soaring. Lebanese politicians engaged in this new rhetorical battle and some really excelled in it (ex: Kamal Joumblatt). Things haven’t changed today. Lebanese politicians are proud to boast that “Lebanon will be the last arab country to sign peace with Israel“. And they keep on reminding the Lebanese that “Israel is our natural enemy“, that “Israel is Lebanon’s antithesis“, and that “Israel is bound on destroying Lebanon because we’re their competitors“. This empty rhetoric isn’t Hezbollah’s (absolute) privilege. It is expressed by Lebanese politicians of all sides. March XIV® politicians regularly engage in “anti-israeli” or “anti-zionist” overbidding (c.f. my former posts  1 2 on the inoperative distinction between “Jews” and “Zionists”). Two days ago, Fares Soueid (a Lebanese politician who hasn’t been able to reclaim his mother’s seat in Parliament since Syria’s withdrawal) declared as secretary general of March XIV that the Gad Elmaleh affair serves the interest of Israel! This kind of overbidding certainly benefits Hezbollah and corners March XIV politicians because it prevents any alternative discourse on Israel, and comes across as insincere to many Lebanese.

• An orphan peace camp. It’s becoming quite clear that there is a growing number of Lebanese that is in favour of peace with Israel. They know that their communal leadership is in favour of peace with Israel (Hariri Senior, Jumblatt, Gemayel, Geagea and Aoun have all expressed this in one way or another at a given time), but they can plainly see that this leadership is engaged in anti-Israeli rhetoric and paying lip service to the importance of resistance to Israel and the Palestinian cause.

This growth of Peaceniks is noticeable from the growing interest Lebanese are having in Israeli issues, the growing consumption of Israeli cultural products (music, films, literature), the Lebanese readership of Haaretz, the growing interest in Judaism and Lebanon’s Jewish community… I personally believe that most of the people who are getting involved in this controversy and supporting Gad Elmaleh’s show in Beiteddine are such peaceniks.

So there is an obvious gap between the leadership (that hides its past and probably present ties with Israeli officials and engages in anti-Israeli rhetoric) and some groups of the population. This gap feeds frustrations. But instead of being rightly  expressed toward their hypercritical leadership, they are canalised and diverted toward Hezbollah (that defends values they don’t agree with), accusing it of being the reason behind Lebanon’s antagonism with Israel, and Israeli’s violent policy toward Lebanon. It takes a couple of minutes on the internet to verify the public support Gad Elmaleh offers to Israel. Insisting on his performance in Lebanon in a way reflects an unexpressed desire of normalisation with judaism, and what has become central to it, i.e. Israel.

Self-criticism? not a Lebanese word (part 1)

I stumbled on a short interview on el-Nashra with Charles Jazra. The article presents him as a leading figure in the FPM. His name reminded me of an unsuccessful “independent” candidate in the Metn (running for the Greek-Catholic seat) who was presented as close to the FPM and to the SNSP (Syrian national social party). I wonder if it’s the same person. Here are the interviewed Charles Jazra’s arguments:

اعتبر القيادي في “التيار الوطني الحر” شارل جزرا أن ما أسقط المعارضة في الانتخابات لم يكن خطأ في ماكيناتها الانتخابية أو حتى في اعلامها انما كانت الحملة الاعلامية المضادة التي شنّها الفريق الآخر والتي اعتمدت “التخوين، الدفاع عن رئيس الجمهورية وكأننا نريد اسقاطه، عناوين المثالثة والانقلاب على الطائف

He believes that the Opposition’s electoral conduct and its communication strategy are not to blame for its defeat. This was brought by its opponent’s campaign that focused on accusing the opposition of treason, defending the Presidency as if the opposition wanted to bring it down, and the slogan of the reduction of christian share to one third, and the overthrow of Taef.
This idea is shared by many FPM supporters and it shows an unwillingness to assess their political and electoral conduct. Instead of reflecting on their methods, strategy and capacity to respond to the opponent’s campaign, we find an insistance on the denunciation of the other. Not only such an approach is pointless, but it shows a lack of consideration for the electorate’s capacity of seeing through false-accusations, and also of hearing both parties and choosing the side that he finds more convincing.

Sure, the Kataeb (property of the Gemayel family), the Lebanese Forces, the National Liberal Party (property of the Chamoun family), the National Bloc (property of the Edde family), and Christian “independents” (semi-autonomous notables), focused on a smear campaign against the FPM, and this smear campaign was mostly ungrounded. But this says quite a lot about these parties and very little about the FPM.
But it begs the following question: Did the electorate believe in the smear campaign launched by the FPM opponents? Sure the FPM remains the largest christian party and retains the confidence of approximately half of the Lebanese Christian voters, but how can one explain the evaporation of  20% of its electorate in 4 years?

(to be continued)