David Issa on MTV, political analysis gone astray

This guy is obviously angry… and in need of recognition. During his hour long discussion on MTV (a resurrected Lebanese TV channel), his voice showed an emotional range that varied from displeasure to exasperation to indignity to outrage. At a random moment I decided to count how many times he repeated “I” in one minute: 7 times, and twice for no apparent reason (there was no call in grammar, syntax or meaning for it). I didn’t catch the show from the start (when the presenter gives a flattering biographical outlook on his guest), but I believe he ran as candidate in 2000 for Beirut’s Greek-Catholic seat (and lost to Michel Pharaon).

The host obviously tried as hard as he could to formulate his questions as if his guest was a fortuneteller or a weather forecaster; doesn’t political analysis belong to this family of activities after all? when you read our press or watch our news programs, you come up with the obvious answer: YES.

So you can’t really blame David Issa for answering these questions as a weatherman or a fortuneteller would. When given the occasion, he pointed out a couple of things that were very true, but then made a mess of the analysis that was a times incoherent at others biased and most of the time unfounded (traits that are alas shared by the political system).

Here are the most interesting points he made:

• The Christians are divided, but what are the issues that they disagree on? They have an important role in bridging the divide between Shiites and Sunnis.

Now this in itself is a topic that could be discussed lengthily. David Issa didn’t notice the internal contradiction between his two statements. He regrets the division of the Christians, but believes that the mobilisation of the Shiites and Sunnis behind two blocs is negative (and leaves aside the Druze and Alawite communities). If the Christians were mobilised (which is structurally impossible) behind one leader and bloc, how would that facilitate the demobilisation of the muslim groups?

• Zahlé, as the capital of Greek-Catholics, should be represented in government by a minister holding a “respectable” portfolio.

David Issa, speaking on behalf of his community (although he claimed several times that he was against the communal feelings and the power-division scheme with a communal dimension) introduced a new principle for the composition of the government. He linked together two constitutional principles: the quota system along communal lines and  the fair representation of region. If such a rule is introduced, one could imagine its complicating effect on the formation of governments. Should Armenian ministers be from Burj Hammoud, should there be a minister Shiite minister from Baalbeck, one from Nabatieh and one from the Southern suburb of Beirut… Regional representation are obviously taken into account in all governments, so are family issues. But does this mean they should be transformed into rules that know of no exception?

Recipe for a fruitful discussion

Bring a thread, not a woven carpet!

I was reading a couple of blogs today, vast discussions debating over the best solution to the Palestinian question (the more realistic, the more equitable, the more profitable…). Bloggers were parrotting  politicians, proposing package deals and behaving like merchants, trying to sell the best product, the miracle pill.

It reminded me of those humorous pills you find in gadget stores (“Take two pills a day and become blond”, “Four pills to learn German”) or at your chemists (“this pill will make u happier”, “this pill will make u slimmer”).

These discussions have little sens. They do not even qualify as discussions. It’s like merchants yelling their goods. And taking it very much at heart, behaving as if they created the product to start with.
In Lebanon, we have similar discussions. The debate over institutional reform follows the same pattern. People will howl at you the virtues of federalism, others will hammer at you the necessity for deconfessionalisation. Each is convinced that the opponent’s solution is seditious, destructive and morally flowed.

Such discussions are sterile. A one state solution for Palestine/Israel could threaten Jewish existence as much as it could threaten Palestinian existence. It could be a solution just as it could just reframe the problem. All depends on the institutions that will be chosen and the way social and political actors will interact with them. Similarly, a two state solution could reinforce the antagonism between the two people just as it could comfort their fears.
The same could be said about the institutional debate in Lebanon. Federalism could bring the country closer together just as it could be the first step towards a permanent divorce between regions and communities. It all depends on what kind of federalism is adopted and how the social and political actors will interact with the new institutions. These two elements are hardly ever considered. The same could be said about confessionalisation and deconfessionalisation. Up to now, the results haven’t been very positive either way. When President Chehab introduced confessionalism to the public administration in the 1960s, it worked as an instrument of “affirmative action” but increased the hold of patronage networks and gave it a stronger communal flavour. Similarly, when the Taef agreement got rid of the Chehabist parity rule, it didn’t diminish the hold of the patronage networks but encouraged Christian-Lebanese to “withdraw” from the State apparatus (just as they had did since the 1950s from the Municipality of Beirut)…

Wouldn’t it be preferable to stop looking for the miracle panacea and spend all our energy on defending this “global solution” and just tackle the points that we find important, one by one? For example advancing individual and collective rights or dismounting the patronage networks in Lebanon, or working on mobility, security and the respect of individual and collective rights in Israel/Palestine…

Student elections echo the country’s woes

Results: Politically exploited, freely interpreted

I followed quite closely this year’s student elections back at my Alma Mater. The picture wasn’t a pretty one. If you took the time to read the Daily Star, l’Orient-Le Jour, An-Nahar, As-Safir, lebanese-forces.org and Tayyar.org, it might just kill your hopes for a better future. Here are the highlights:

• the university changed the electoral law without consulting students, without any debate. The proportionate system was chosen because it was “the most democratic voting system”. The university didn’t even explain how it came to this conclusion, echoing the recent general consensus that was imposed in Lebanon that the proportionate system is the only democratic voting system.
• the student groups decided to choose politically neutral names for their lists in a bid to depoliticise the battle. This bid didn’t go any farther than this terminological camouflage (that everyone found satisfactory). Most candidates didn’t hide their political affiliations and much of the discussions within the student body were about political affiliations.

   

  

  Unabashed political bias by L'Orient-Le Jour

• The battle was extremely polarised. “Independents” didn’t have a common platform and many question their real independence. The dominant lists replicated the national divide between “opposition” (that is extremely heterogeneous and mostly in government) and “majority” (that is a loose and divided coalition of rival or autonomous parties and patronage networks), here called “B+” and “réforme” (or “University2010″).
• The campaign were quite costly and relied on explicit or implicit commercial and political sponsoring. The University did nothing to regulate the financing of the campaign. Even if there were no cases of vote buying, patronage networks were quite active. You had posters, T-shirt distributions, professional logos for the campaign… To try to mobilise the students, one camp proposed manakish and crepes, while the other proposed popcorn. On the following day, each brought loudspeakers and played electronic music.
• Are you interested in programs? Well, each list had prepared one. But the students didn’t seem much interested in it. Most of those who I talked to had no clue about what each list was campaigning for (those who did were actually part of the core team supporting a list). The programs were a formal exercice with very little meaning.
• Each camp had its own interpretation of the results. Samir Geagea, the leader of Lebanese Forces celebrated the victory of “March XIV” with a “bye bye ya 7alween” while Aoun claimed that his party won the popular vote and most of the big faculties.

Interpreting death & giving freedom a bad name

I just came back from the screening of Marmoulak (the Lizard) at the Samir Kassir Foundation. I didn’t have the time to sit through the whole film and as the subtitles were hard to decipher (white on white), I let my mind drift around the room and the event.

Why on earth did the Samir Kassir Foundation choose to screen this film? Is it because it was censored? Is it because it is Iranian? Is it because it is critical of the Iranian regime? I think all three reasons are equally true. The Samir Kassir Foundation is quite clear about its political orientation. It is unabashedly March XIV and follows this camp’s political and geopolitical stands and views. So you’re sure to hear more criticism of the Syrian, Hamas and Iranian regime than the Saudi, Fatah or Egyptian regime.

I was sitting in the main room. On my left there was a wall with some 12 pictures of assassinated journalists on it, each “martyr” featured twice: Kamal Mroueh, Michel Seurat, Samir Kassir, Gibran Tueni, Salim al-Lawzé and probably Riad Taha. By putting the word martyr between quotes, I don’t mean to downplay the tragedy of these journalists’ death. My point is to stress that this appellation has political implications and that it indicates a specific interpretation of their deaths.
I’ve never quite understood how the death of some people could be paraded in a country like Lebanon where life has very little value to start with and violent death is not an uncommon occurrence. In 1958, a civil war brought about the death of over 2000 Lebanese citizens, most of them civilians. Between 1975 and 1990, over 200 000 Lebanese perished in the civil war, most of them civilians. In 2006, over a 1000 Lebanese were killed by war acts, most of them civilians. In 2008, over a hundred people were killed in less than 10 days, many of them were civilians.
So what makes the death of a few people significant enough to distinguish them from the lot, to remember their name, to commemorate their death and to give it a personal meaning that elevates them to the rank of role models, heroes? For the innocent civilians that were killed by armies and militias, they are only remembered collectively as victims of the brutality of war. For the journalists that were targeted, their death is interpreted as saying as much about them as it says about their perpetrator.

How they helped defeat Farouk Hosny (the story)

The 9 original candidates. Housny is second from left

Before delving into the analysis, let’s set the record straight. I won’t be looking into the dirty politics behind these elections. I do have some crusty insider information on some dirty play, but it’s closer to gossip than meaningful information, and strictly off topic. What we’ll be looking into is the public debate that surrounded these elections. I believe it had an incidence on the final outcome: Irina Bokova’s election to the post of Director General of UNESCO. But there is no way to prove this fact.

Interestingly enough, the reasons behind Farouk Hosny’s defeat are not of much interest. They will leave no trace in the public conscience. On the other hand, the fierce debate surrounding this election will undoubtedly mark those who feel envolved in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Let’s start with a quick look at the five rounds that brought Farouk Hosni to his defeat. If you’re interested in more details, check out this blog.

Results of the 5 rounds


Candidate	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5
Farouk Hosny	22	23	25	29	27
Irina Bokova	8	8	13	29	31
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	7	9	11	0	0
Ivonne Baki	7	8	9	0	0
Ina Marciulionyte	3	4	0	0	0
Alexander Yakovenko	7	3	0	0	0
Noureini Tidjani-Serpos	2	2	0	0	0
Sospeter Muhongo	1	1	0	0	0
Mohammed Bedjaoui	0	0	0	0	0
Blank	1	0	0	0	0
Total	58	58	58	58	58

As the figures clearly show, Farouk Hosni was the leading contestant up to the fifth round. His candidacy was supported by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization for the Islamic Conference. It was backed by France and unopposed (though grudgingly) by Israel. So what happened? If you’re interested in geopolitics, check out what Stephen Suleyman Schwartz had to say about it. I’d rather look into one campaign that picked up speed and was given more media attention than any other story in these elections: that of Bernard-Henri Lévy (alias BHL, alias BHV) relayed on the net through Save Unesco!, a blog started by “French students in political science” that was deleted earlier today (but here is the cached copy). Much can be said about Bernard-Henri Levy and the anonymous group of French students, but I will focus on the issues that they raised, and they are identical. Instead of supporting one specific candidate, they attacked the Egyptian candidate on three main issues

• Antisemitism. This accusation springs from a misquoted statement on burning Israeli books found in Egyptian libraries (a statement Farouk Hosny later apologised for in his “message to the world“). BHL reinterpreted this statement as a vow “to burn with his own hands any book in Hebrew that could have possibly infiltrated the stacks of the Alexandria Library”.
• An alleged involvement in the Achille Lauro Hijacking affair.  
• Responsibility as Minister of Culture (for over two decades) in the crackdown of liberties and freedom of expression in Egypt.

So, is Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace price laureate, right when he says “UNESCO has escaped a scandal, a moral disaster. Mr. Hosni did not deserve the job he does not deserve this honor  tomorrow”. Can we agree with BHL when he says “We have won. Liberty has won. Tolerance has won. And thanks to all of you, respect has won. I’d like to thank you, net surfers, for engaging in this battle for democracy and peace. Thanks to all who refused the unacceptable and who allowed for this beautiful victory”. That’s what we’ll be looking into tomorrow.

Coalition government building 101 (the problem)

Most analysis I have read on the cabinet formation process is marked by a particular model, that of majoritarian western systems. The approach is quite simple. After labelling the March XIV® coalition (and gluing to it Walid Joumblatt’s Democratic Gathering withstanding his extremely public departure) as the majority, the analyst expects the Prime minister designate to act as the French President, the British Prime Minister or the American President: swiftly put together a cabinet, with the generous option of integrating ministers belonging to the Opposition® as he deems fit.

One would have expected Lebanon’s consociationalists to react to such an approach, but they have been rather discreet lately. They’re probably bothered by the fact that consociational theory and analysis doesn’t exactly fit with their current political preferences. This is particularly true of Antoine Messarra, the co-founder (with Theodor Hanf) of the Lebanese consociational school.

Now let’s set aside our assumptions and normative stands, and look at reality’s ugly face. So today, we’ll  first look at who we are, and who we resemble. Tomorrow, we’ll be looking into the challenges that any Prime Minister designate will face in forming a government given our political system and the political conjoncture.

• Our society is divided along many lines (regional, social, confessional). Of late, four political groups have succeeded in transcending all lines except one; mobilising “their” communities behind them (Amal-Hezbollah mobilises the majority of Shiites, Mustaqbal mobilises the majority of Sunnis, Ishtiraki mobilises the majority of Druze). Moreover, this extreme mobilisation was facilitated by a regional polarisation between Sunnis and Shiites that was locally fed instead of being neutralised. Each side has its weapons: Hezbollah is fully armed and operational; Mustaqbal holds the financial weapon (without its support, the Lebanese economy will be crippled and would certainly collapse).
• Our political system is extremely complicated. Its rules are an odd mix of jacobine republicanism and ottoman communalism. And these rules are circumvented by the dominant political groups, most importantly the Quadripartite Oligarchy (Amal, Hezbollah, Mustaqbal, Ishtiraki) and its junior partners (Marada, Murr, Kataeb, Lebanese Forces, Democratic Party… and probably the FPM if given the time and the opportunity, only time will tell). Historically, the Lebanese army has on three occasions circumvented the constitutional rules (during the presidency of Fuad Chehab, Charles Helou and Emile Lahoud) but seems rather put for the time being.
• The political conjecture is extremely complex. Behind the two labels March XIV® and Opposition®, we find two composite coalitions grouping rival parties with distinct ideologies, interests, constituencies and regional allies. Since the departure of Walid Jumblatt’s Democratic Gathering from March XIV®, the two coalitions have roughly the same size. What complicates matters even further are these four constraining factors:
  • the great mistrust between the two main pillars of each coalition (Mustaqbal, Hezbollah)
  • the decision of these two pillars to participate in the next government (so as to secure their interests and outlook).
  • the fact that their decision to participate in the government cannot be ignored, because of the mobilisation of their respective communal group behind them, their international alliances and their respective weapons (financial for one, military for the other).
  • the solidarity each pillar has shown toward the members of his coalition, especially its Christian junior partners (that give them a trans-communal dimension): FPM (and its christian allies), Lebanese Forces, Kataeb.

So forget about the US, France or the UK. You can’t expect our democracy to function like theirs. If you want to compare our situation to that of another country, learn from their experience, see what mechanisms they have devised to facilitate or accelerate the process of government formation, look elsewhere: to Belgium, to Israel, to Northern Ireland. That’s what we’ll do tomorrow.

Sex, AIDS, Hitler & Jewish organisations: how Adolf got caught in copyrights

Yesterday, a reporting on a french national television showed the way different organisations in France reacted to a controversial German Aids campaign. This campaign  features Adolf Hitler having sex with a young woman with the tag line “Aids is a mass murderer”.

To reveal how controversial these spots and posters were, the French channel not only showed extracts of the spot and pictures of the posters, but aired reactions from two organisations: an aids awareness NGO (Solidarité Sida) and a Jewish umbrella organisation, the Conseil représentatif des institutions juives. The Aids awarness NGO found the campaign’s message counterproductive because it could stigmatize HIV positive men, likening them to Adolf Hitler and considering them potential mass murderers. This effect is certainly possible. And that’s why AIDS charities worldwide have been critical of the advert even though they recognise its shock value (that put AIDS back in the centre page at a time where people are more concerned about flu and unprotected sex has become hype). But that’s not where the story is.

Richard Pasquier’s interview was far more interesting, and I believe truly controversial. The president of France’s largest Jewish Umbrella organisation expressed the shock of the Jewish community, questioned the use of Hitler’s image and denounces the comparison between genocide and an illness regardless of its importance (“ça n’a rien avoir, mais véritablement rien, avec une maladie aussi grave soit elle…”.

Listening to his arguments, I couldn’t help myself from remembering Avraham Burg’s criticism of contemporary zionist trends in his book “Defeating Hitler”. The Shoah has become so defining to contemporary  jewish identity that Hitler, its mastermind, becomes an icon (a negative one), a strong symbol directly linked to the jewish ethos to a point where his image is claimed by a jewish “representative” through his criticism of its use.

Sex, Values & Globalisation or Mazen Abdel Jawad’s free fall

Last week, LBC & its young anchorman Malek Maktabi were reminded that “red lines” still exist in the Arab world and that crossing them can have an economical and a political cost. This simple fact was brought to their mind when the Saudi authorities closed down their offices in Jeddah following the airing of the weekly programme “A7mar bil khat al 3arid”, “Bold Red Line”.

Here’s the extract that started the whole commotion.

As you might have noticed, the reporting isn’t really interesting. The anchorman’s sensationalism comes across as cheap and uninteresting. We are shown a young man in his “crib” bragging about his sexual exploits, expressing how important sex is to him and how he stimulates his partner’s desire. Some people have described his crowing as lewd, while others have stressed how immature and teen-like his approach to sexuality is.

Anti-confessionalism’s side effects

Indoctrination: As we have seen, Anticonfessionalism is a State defused ideology. Not only is it a defining element of our constitution and our institutions, but it’s the most prominent feature of our political discourse. Even those who want to maintain the political system as it is are either uncomfortable with it or are embarrassed to defend it publicly.
All public discussions are dominated by negative views of confessionalism. These views have been diffused through the media for over half a century. They have found their way in history books and civic education books.
The consequence is obvious: an overwhelming majority of Lebanese holds negative views on confessionalism and consider it incompatible with all values they consider positive (the latter values are not necessarily shared). As we will see, these views are not based on facts, on demonstrations, but on a global prejudgment. A critical approach is surely warranted when it involves an analysis of merits and faults. But  it ceases to be interesting when it’s a simple expression of adverse or disapproving comments and judgments.

Anti-Confessionalism: a state ideology

This is not a joke. Anti-confessionalism is a state ideology. It might sound shocking to many ears, but I believe it is actually indisputable. Will this sketchy demonstration you are about to read convince you? I hope so. This blog is certainly not the place for a meticulous study of this surprising and counterintuitive feature. But it will allow me to point out quite broadly a couple of arguments that are usually overlooked by most analysts. And then you’ll do the math.

First, I’d like to remind the reader that the Lebanese political system was not founded on a single pre-existing ideology or political theory that one could call “confessionalism”. This is usually the case with state ideologies. Let’s take the example of the United State (where federalism and democracy were theorised before they were implemented), France (where the basic elements of republicanism were theorised before the overthrow of the Monarchy), the Soviet Union (with communism) and closer to us, Syria (where Baasism was theorised before the establishment of the Baasist regime) and Israel (where Zionism was theorised half a century before the establishment of the State). In all these cases, we find thinkers, intellectuals or theorists who pondered over a regime before its establishment. This is not the case of Lebanon. No thinker, intellectual or theorist reflected on the country’s communal reality and how it could be translated politically before the establishment of the political system or regime (the Constitution of 1926).

Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin

Anti-confessionalism probably lacks historical perspective because it is utterly uninterested in context. It is obsessed with values and rules: it seeks to impose what it claims to be positive, modern (western), secular values (and rules), while claiming to combat what it defines as archaic, religious, oppressive values (and rules). By doing so, it defines itself (anti-confessionalism) and what it combats (confessionalism).

Before going into this dual definition (and its implication), let’s have a glimpse at these very values and value-laden political programmes anti-confessionalism vows to defend and implement.

A glimpse at the muddle

As Maria sang to the children, “let’s start at the very beginning, a very good place to start”. The whole debate over confessionalism started in the 1940s. Sure, one could trace articles and writing about its many elements to the 1930, and even to the 1920s. But they were still scattered then, and dealt with points that were quite rightly seen as unrelated: secularisation, modernisation, westernisation, nation-building and state building. From the 1940s onwards, all these views converged under the label of “anticonfessionalism” as their proponents defined a common enemy, confessionalism.

This conversion obscures the fact that we are dealing with distinct processes, political programmes and values. This is why we will look into each of them one at a time.

• Secularisation: A process in which the various aspects of society (economic, political, legal, and moral) become increasingly specialised and distinct from religion (and religious authority). It is usually accompanied by a societal decline in levels of religiosity. Its proponents usually link the decline of religiosity to the increase of freedoms. In Lebanon, secularisation usually means three things:
  • Abolishing the personal status laws and courts (up to now, each recognised and established community has its own laws and courts), and replacing them by one civil legislation in matters of family law.
  • Supporting “secular” education, i.e. state schools and universities (vs schools and universities within religious networks).
  • Combatting religious authority and interference in public affairs.

The Paradoxes of AntiConfessionalism (an introduction)

AntiConfessionalism! The word seems easy to grasp. The prefix and suffix speak for themselves. Intuitively, one could assume that anticonfessionalism is antonymous & opposed to a specific system, principle, ideology: confessionalism. Up to now things might seem pretty clear. But when you look a bit closer, you discover something completely different. It’s actually quite hard to oppose anti-confessionalism to confessionalism. It’s like opposing black and white. Sure it’s a common assumption that black is the opposite of white, but it doesn’t tell you much about one or the other, and so the opposition turns out to be meaningless.

I have already dealt with the issue of anticonfessionalism two years ago (albeit hysterically) through a “hate mail” sent to Amam05 posted here. The arguments haven’t changed, but maybe I should restate them more serenely.

We might have many bad intellectual habits in Lebanon, but anti-confessionalism is unmistakably the worst. If you’re looking for insight, learning, critical engagement… keep away from anti-confessional literature. On the other hand, if you’re looking for repetitive prose, dogmatism, distilled ideology, decontextualised constructions, baseless assumptions, groundless accusations… Then you should definitely check out the many books, articles and declarations written on confessionalism.

At first, I thought it would be possible to discuss this issue in one post, but judging from the reactions I’m getting, I think it better to discuss one paradox at a time.

1. Monday: Confessionalism/Anti-confessionalism: Two sides of the same coin.
2. Tuesday: Anti-confessionalism: A state ideology
3. Wednesday: Anti-confessionalism’s side effects

Can the FPM regain its electorate?

Three extremely vigorous debates over the interpretation of the outcome of the parliamentary elections began before the final results were even published. Two of them involved the FPM: how much of its electorate did it actually loose, and why it lost it. We have discussed these issues in a preceding post. We will ask ourself today how likely it is for the FPM to regain its electorate.

He who represented 70% of Christians

Since 2005, General Michel Aoun boasted that he represented 70% of Christians. This slogan meant two things: that he was the undisputed Za’im of the Christian communities, and that the other Christian blocs, parties and MPs owed their seats to Muslim votes. This wasn’t very far from the truth, but did it serve the FPM? Not really. Even though his bloc scored as well as those of Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri & Hassan Nasrallah, Michel Aoun was denied the same recognition and an equivalent share. His position improved when two pillars of the Quadripartite oligarchy recognised him as the christian Za’im. But it wasn’t enough to make him an equal partner of the Big Four, and his share in power (and ressources) remained significantly smaller than the others (and some would argue  smaller than the oligarchy’s other Christian junior partners). The results of the 2009 elections will likely have no effect on Aoun’s & the FPM’s share of power. Their significant electoral downsizing will probably be of no consequence.

The FPM’s score in 2005 was both monumental and unexpected. The party was just emerging from years of persecution, its leader had just returned from exile, it had little media backing, didn’t provide social services or distribute state ressources… And withstanding all this, it benefited from a massive score that established it as Lebanon’s largest (and dominant) Christian party, one ready to enter into Lebanon’s communal politics withstanding its long-established anti-communal stand. As it entered Parliament, the FPM embodied a principle that it had long fought, that of communalism. The votes it had received were overwhelmingly Christian and the bloc it formed was a Christian one (except for one MP). These characteristics were confirmed in 2009. During these past elections, the FPM had to build on 2005’s protest vote, experience an electoral cross-communal alliance and survive an electoral Bulldozer.

From protest vote to accountability?

Can the FPM change & be reformed?

Some might question the pertinence of such a political move, but it seems to me not only necessary, but also urgent. Sure, general Michel Aoun’s parliamentary bloc remains Lebanon’s second largest, sure his party is still one of Lebanon’s largest, but how long will it survive constant political harassment and sidelining?
These past parliamentary elections were a battle for survival, the FPM had to face a huge political coalition – a Bulldozer – that’s declared goal was to eliminate it. It was able to maintain itself, but lost 20% to 30% of its electorate on the way. In the coming two days, we’ll look into two topics:

• Can the FPM regain its electorate?
• How is the FPM repositioning/reinventing itself?

This topic caught my attention today as I heard on the FPM’s radio (92.5 FM, صوت المدى) that the party was studying the results and outcomes of the 2009 parliamentary elections. As expected, the news bulletin said nothing about what was discussed, how it was discussed and what was finally decided.

De l’islamophobie ordinaire*

*Réaction à l’article d’opinion d’Ivan Rioufol “Voila comment s’installe la barbarie ordinaire…”, paru dans le Figaro du vendredi 17 juillet.

Vous avez remarqué les points de suspension qui terminent le titre de l’article, ou plutôt le laisse ouvert pour indiquer que beaucoup de choses restent à dire. En fait, il aurait été plus juste de le ponctuer avec un deux-points car cet editorial est un véritable réquisitoire où l’auteur exprime méthodiquement tout son dégout sur les Musulmans, un dégout ordinaire puisqu’il est partagé par beaucoup et peut passer inaperçu: une virulente islamophobie de salon dirons nous en détournant l’une de ses expressions. Pour bien saisir les idées fondamentales autour desquels l’article s’articule, il est conseillé de se poser ces trois questions suivantes en le lisant:

• De quel danger s’agit-il?
• Quels en sont les symptômes?
• Qui en est responsable?

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